If you look a little bit more carefully you can see the American New world order system and her client/slave states: US experts to assist police in recruitment: Ugandan soldiers complete US-led special operations training course: Uganda on course to become a total dictatorship, Prof.OLoka Onyango

 

For the past several decades, a New World Order has been emerging. The model calls for most of the nations of the world to be divided into two parts - an elite class of political / economic "managers," which in most countries approximates about 20 percent of the population, and a "worker-serf" class, which makes up the remaining 80 percent of the population. The "managers" rule the country at the behest and in the interest of American corporate power, which itself is sustained by the machinations and intrigues of the CIA, which in turn is backed up by the guns of the American military. It is an Orwellian realm of "Newspeak" in which there is very little connection between perception and reality; where "freedom" means "slavery;" "democracy" means rule of the many by the few in the interest of corporate profits; and ORGANIZED religion is utilized as a significant and extremely consequential instrument of state control.For the eighty percent of the population which falls into the "worker-serf" category, it is a notably cruel and utterly despotic system. It's held together in two ways: first, by police forces given to fascist-like brutality, torture, terror, and, on extreme occasions, the use of death squads; and second, by an ORGANIZED religious system which has mastered "magic," "mysticism," and Pavlovian psychological techniques. S.R shearer 

 

Militarizing the Police for sectarian politics in USA slave states : Ugandan Police officers to undergo political training - Aronda

http://watchmanafrica.blogspot.com/2013/11/militarizing-police-for-sectarian.html

USA client state exposed: Uganda police to Use Military tactics Against civilians

http://watchmanafrica.blogspot.com/2012/06/usa-client-state-exposed-uganda-police.html

US experts to assist police in recruitment

http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/US-experts-to-assist-police-in-recruitment/-/688334/2143764/-/f2yjbfz/-/index.html  

By Andrew Bagala

Posted  Monday, January 13   2014 at  02:00

In Summary

The team is expected to guide officers in selecting recruits. 

Kampala.

At least five United States experts are in the country to help the police recruit 3,500 officers, an exercise that starts today.

Police is expected to recruit 500 police cadets today in 16 centres around the country and later in the week examine applicants to become part of the 3,000 probation police constables.

The police spokesperson, Ms Judith Nabakooba, confirmed the development, saying the US would help them get the best candidates.

 

“They are training our officers who are going to participate in the recruitment drive. The experts are training our officers on how to carryout interviews,” Ms Nabakooba said yesterday.

The experts are said to be funded by the US government.

Applicants for the cadet course are supposed to be between 18 and 30 years of age and have a minimum qualification of a degree from a government-recognised university.

Requirements
Candidates from the probation police constable are supposed to have attained minimum of a certificate in Uganda Advanced Certificate Examination or its equivalent.

Ms Nabakooba said the applicants should be ready to face physical tests.
“Often times, applicants come dressed in office wear and some women in high heeled foot wear so they fail go for physical exercises,” she said.

According to advertisements, the police will not pay the recruits while undergoing mandatory nine-months training.
In 2012, police cadets nearly went on strike after police management declined to pay them salary for the first nine months of training.

Police human resource managers said they could not pay thenm since they were still on training.

Although officers are supposed to undergo training for nine months, sometimes they spend more than two years in training schools.

The recruitment will increase the number of police officers in the country to 46,500.

The force needs at least 65,000 police officers to meet the UN standard of one police officer for every 500 people but resources for such a number remains a challenge.

Police boss Kale Kayihura recently said they needed more officers to ensure that the 2016 general elections are peaceful.

Must Read:

THE THIRD WORLD AS A MODEL FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER

http://www.antipasministries.com/html/file0000156.htm

CHRISTIANS IN AFRICA: AWAKE! America and the American Church Are Not Your Friends

http://www.antipasministries.com/html/file0000234.htm

 

Ugandan soldiers complete US-led special operations training course

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32081  

Written by Oscar Nkala, Thursday, 03 October 2013 

 

One hundred and forty eight officers of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) have completed a 10-week long special operations course covering emergency first aid, communication, land navigation, vehicle maintenance, rifle marksmanship and IED detection.

The course drills were held at the Uganda Peace Support Operations Training Centre by a team of US Army Marines drawn from the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force Africa (SPMAGTF) in Sigonella, Italy.

Speaking at the graduation ceremony of the team at the training centre in the Ugandan district of Nakaseke, UPDF deputy chief of Logistics and Engineering Brigadier Augustine Kyazze said such training programmes are aimed at professionalising the army and should be complemented by the acquisition of high-tech weapons and equipment.

"We cannot have a professional army if it is not trained and equipped. This training will improve the abilities of the UPDF. In the 21st century, nothing is free of charge. We are lucky to have friends who can provide such training," said Kyazze. He added the training was part of a process of moulding the country's next generation of military leaders.

Major Gregory Dunay, team leader of the US Marines said the training would strengthen the UPDF and urged the soldiers to share the skills they learnt with fellow members of the army who did not get the chance to attend the training.

He said the recent attack in the Kenyan capital Nairobi by Somalia's al-Shabaab Islamist militant movement, which killed more than 67 people in a four-day siege of an upmarket shopping mall, calls for heightened vigilance against terror by all armies in the region. "The world is not short of people who want to kill innocent people in your villages or our homes. It's up to you the righteous ones to stand up to that challenge," Dunay said.

The conclusion of the training programme comes one month after the US Army, through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Consequence Management Assistance Program (CMAP) and US Africom’s Disaster Preparedness Programme, concluded the training of 12 elite Ugandan security personnel on how to detect and deal with threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The specialised course, which is the first of its kind in Africa, also focused on securing biological materials, radiological substances, hazardous chemicals and nuclear weapons material. Security officers drawn from the army and the police were trained in the use of personal protective equipment, material sampling, incident command systems, victim evacuation, de-contamination procedures and how to respond to hazardous waste spills.

Uganda on course to become a total dictatorship

http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29583:uganda-on-course-to-become-a-total-dictatorship&catid=37:guest-writers&Itemid=66

Sunday, 12 January 2014 23:24 

 

Written by prof JOE OLoKA ONYANGO 

Prof Joe Oloka Onyango

Late last year, Prof Joe Oloka Onyango,  from the school of Law at Makerere University,  presented a paper at the Buganda Convention at Hotel Africana.

 Oloka-Onyango tackles the state of Uganda and the place of Buganda in that Uganda.
He argues that if urgent action is not taken to address the causes of tensions, the country will see more turmoil over the next 20 years. We reproduce Oloka-Onyango’s presentation in two parts.

Here is part 1.

My paper today is entitled ‘Towards A New Kind of Politics and Constitutionalism in (B)Uganda.’

While the topic involved is a very large one requiring what management consultants call a SWOT analysis which would examine the strengths or positives, the weaknesses or fragilities, the opportunities and the threats we are likely to encounter in Uganda’s future, my focus this morning is mainly on the last of these, i.e. the threats we face over the coming 20 years.

I choose to focus mainly on the threats in part because of the short time available to me but also because I believe in the old English adage: ‘forewarned is forearmed.’  We need to directly confront the threats to political stability that the country faces if the next two decades are going to be productive and stable.

One can divide the threats facing Uganda into three broad categories, namely the socio-economic, the cultural-ethnic and finally the politico-constitutional. I have added the ‘constitutional’ to the political threats because it is my view that the question of constitutionalism and the threats it faces in the future is going to be crucial to the status of both Uganda and Buganda.  Indeed, in my view, it is the central political question that needs to be addressed if we want to look forward to a positive future.

First, let me start with some historical reflections: On October 8th, 2013, we marked eighteen (18) years since the adoption of the 1995 Constitution. In that time, Uganda has witnessed several important political developments that represent a serious attempt to introduce a new form of governance different from the anarchy and conflict-ridden period between independence and the mid-1980s.

Nevertheless, the experience of the 1995 Constitution has been a mixed one; on the one hand it expanded many of the freedoms that earlier instruments had removed; it improved the operation of the three arms of government; it tightened the checks and balances in the system, and finally—with respect to the issue that we are most concerned with today—it recognized traditional and cultural institutions.

This last action represented a significant step towards reconciling the two entities that had historically co-existed in a tense environment, culminating in the 1966 abolition of monarchies and the subsequent transformation of the Ugandan political scene into one characterized by military dictatorship, civil violence and ethnic marginalization.

However, far from removing or resolving the tensions between the two entities, the 1995 Constitution merely transformed them. This explains the many strains and stresses we have witnessed between these institutions—Buganda paramount among them— and the central government since the Constitution came into force.

One can highlight the disputes over land; the establishment of sub-kingdoms (Buruli and Bunyala); the denial of right of the Kabaka to travel freely through Buganda and the September 2009 riots as the most striking.  But beyond Buganda, we can see that Bunyoro is unhappy with the central government over the issue of oil; Ankole remains in a state of political limbo; many of the other traditional and cultural institutions (Busoga, Lango and others) are involved in protracted struggles over succession, governance and internal management.  In short, despite the great fanfare which greeted its promulgation, the 1995 Constitution did not solve our political problems.

It is my argument that in the next two decades we will witness even more mutations of the basic tensions between Buganda and Uganda unless we take serious steps to address some of the basic reasons that have led to them.  We need to do this because the futures of Uganda and Buganda—just as was the case with their past experiences—are intricately linked.  Secondly, the interests of the peoples of both entities are basically the same, namely peace, development, democracy and the equal treatment of all their citizens.

However, history tells us to be cautious because:

1. The interests of the peoples and the states of both entities have sometimes diverged, with Uganda betraying its people on numerous occasions, and Buganda doing likewise, e.g. UPC/KY marriage.  We, therefore, need to make both entities more accountable and people-centred in order to ensure that the future relations between the two are more transparent, geared towards improving democracy rather than destroying it, and dedicated to enhancing the protection of fundamental human rights rather than dedicated to their violation;

2. In the relationship between Buganda and Uganda there has been both considerable trust and a simultaneous violation of that trust.  Why is that so?  In my view, the trust of the past has been accompanied with too little verification of that trust, partly because personal short-term interests have over-shadowed the longer-term concern with the greater good of the country.

Trust alone is thus insufficient: As Ronald Reagan said of the-then Soviet Union ‘Trust, but verify.’  We need to ensure that the trust that exists between Buganda and Uganda is verified by concrete and measureable confidence-building steps and that any reversals which undermine that trust are vigorously resisted.

I make this final observation because today relations between the two entities appear to be at their most placid and stable since 1993. The recent gesture by the central government via the memorandum of understanding represents an important step in improving the degree of trust between the two entities.

At the same time, caution is necessary because even if we believe that a leopard can truly lose its spots that act does not change its DNA.  Secondly, as we saw with the July celebration of Kabaka Mutebi’s coronation, many in Buganda are not happy with the existing relationship between the two. This is particularly the case for the youth of Buganda; we ignore the youth at our peril because they will be central to the developments of the next two decades.

At the broader level, there are also several issues that would counsel caution on the part of both Buganda as well as the wider Uganda which we need to look out for.  Among them I will just highlight three:
1. The increasing collapse, malfunctioning and even paralysis of the institutions of central government and of broader political society;

2. The growth of impunity, and a startling disregard for the observation of the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights, and
3. The related problems of ‘presidentialism’ and ‘constitucide.’

I will discuss each of the above in turn.

De-institutionalization and paralysis of the institutions of government

It is a basic principle of democratic governance that the three arms of government are like a three-legged stool.  In other words, they sit together in balance.  If that balance is upset, the stool will inevitably collapse.  Since the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution and particularly in the last several years, we have witnessed the progressive collapse of some of the key institutions of government.  What do I mean when I talk of institutional collapse?

1. The replacement of established and well-known procedures for the operation of institutions, with ad hoc, temporary measures designed to address a specific issue, and particularly dependent on the whims of the particular officer or on political expedience, e.g. the creation of unviable districts, the attempted regulation and reconstitution of Kampala city, the debacle over land and evictions (the Nantaba Committee and its conflicts with Police IGP Kayihura), the establishment of illegal universities, the collapse of the public health service and the chronic problem of unpaid civil servants, to mention only a few.

All of this is compounded by the excessive levels of corruption which has now been institutionalized;

2. The over-politicization of the public service which is compelled to follow political dictates that have undermined its effectiveness, coupled with a duplication of its work through the creation of presidential advisors and secretaries; units and bureaus operating in an opaque and contradictory manner;

3. A systematic attempt to undermine, marginalize and dominate the institution of Parliament and to use the power of numbers in order to achieve political goals in complete disregard of the wider good, basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; for example, the debate and final vote on the regulation of the oil sector, and,

4. The deliberate crippling of crucial institutions of the State (such as the Judiciary, the IGG’s office and the DPP’s chambers) by a manipulation of the powers of appointment.  Thus, both the Constitutional and Supreme courts have been crippled over the last several years simply because of the refusal and/or the failure to make appointments to these benches.

The effect of this de-institutionalization has been profound, although little appreciated.  Thus, because there was no Deputy to the Inspector General of Government, the Constitutional court ruled that the office had not been properly constituted in order to carry out criminal prosecutions. The result was that cases against several high-profile individuals involved in corruption had to be dropped because the court said the office was improperly constituted.

Despite this anomaly, it took more than three years after the judgment to appoint a new deputy IGG in order to have the office properly constituted.  The same was true with the inordinate delay in the appointment of a new DPP to replace (now) Justice Richard Buteera.

Although Parliament, under Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, has at times tried to fight back and reassert its independence, this has been a tricky, if not perilous task at the best of times, and a life-threatening one at worst, as we saw in the case of the Cerinah Nebanda stand-off and we continue to see in many other instances.

While democratic theory asserts that the majority must have their way, it is also very clear that majority will cannot suppress minority rights or core constitutional values.  However, under the pressure of Executive influence, we have witnessed Parliament systematically violate both of these, commencing with the first constitutional amendment to change the rules of procedure, followed by the second constitutional amendment which removed presidential term limits.

In other words, Parliament under the NRM has become not simply a rubberstamp but an extension of executive power, rather than a check against it.  Quite clearly, if the next two decades are characterized by the same features, we will end up as a fully-fledged dictatorship.

The problem of institutional collapse is compounded by the dire situation of those institutions of alternative political governance, namely our political parties, which are in various stages of malfunction.

Uganda’s political parties—right from the NRM to the smallest party that has been registered—are in a dire state of institutional failure.  For our political future to be secure, our political parties need to shape up and demonstrate that they are not one-man or one-woman vehicles confined to Kampala and dedicated to personal megalomania.

Impunity and Abrogation of the rule of law

The enforcement of constitutional rights in recent years has been dogged by the phenomenon of impunity.  State agencies and the government itself routinely ignore the decisions of the courts of law, or simply repeat actions that have been condemned and outlawed.

Thus, for example the Constitutional court in the Muwanga Kivumbi case declared several provisions of the police Act unconstitutional, particularly the requirement of permission to convene an assembly or hold a demonstration.  However, in complete disregard of the ruling, the Police continue to prevent assemblies and disband public meetings.  The height of that impunity is manifest in the recent passing of the Public Order and Management Bill which effectively overturned the ruling of the court on the matter.

We have witnessed the effect of this impunity at two levels.  First of all with the reintroduction of the phenomenon of detention-without-trial.  Euphemistically called ‘preventive arrest’, the provision of the law used by the police in their general treatment of Mayor Lukwago and opposition leader Kizza Besigye is a relic of the colonial era, which was automatically rendered illegal by the 1995 Constitution.

Furthermore, the actions of the police violate Article 43, which expressly prohibits detention without trial, not to mention the provisions which limit the length of detention without bringing a person to face a court of law. A more serious problem is the manifest tendency for public offices in Uganda—especially those of a security or military nature—to undermine the independence of constitutional bodies.

While the president typically ignores the independence of these bodies, the trend is moving down the scale.  Ministers of government and the Inspector General of Police routinely ignore court decisions and orders, with the example of Kampala being only the latest in a long and sustained process of treating court judgments and strictures as worth much less than the paper on which they are written.

Thus a junior minister in the Office of the President can unilaterally decide to ignore a court order; what does that reflect about respect for constitutionalism?

Presidentialism and ‘Constitucide’

When all things are considered, the biggest impediment to the enforcement of constitutional powers and rights in Uganda starts at the top of the system, broadly within the Executive branch of government, and specifically with the Office of the President.  Uganda is in the grip of a serious case of presidentialism, brought about by the violation of both the letter and the spirit of the 1995 Constitution, and placing an opaque shroud over the possibilities of achieving democratic constitutionalism.

This development has come about because the country has witnessed the gradual enhancement of executive power at the expense of all the checks and balances inserted in the instrument.  Thus, all efforts aimed at achieving the holistic enforcement of the Constitution fall by the wayside.

The problem of presidentialism in Uganda is compounded by the phenomenon of ‘constitucide.’  Constitutions around the world usually claim some parentage, as for example, the US Constitution, whose ‘founding-fathers’ are recognized to be George Washington and John Adams, among others.

In the case of Uganda, the ‘founding-parents’ of the Constitution are President Museveni who initiated the process while even still in the bush, (former) Chief Justice Benjamin Odoki (who chaired the Constitutional Commission that produced the draft) and the late James Wapakhabulo who steered the Constituent Assembly that debated and eventually adopted the instrument.

Let us take the case of President Museveni’s recent letter to the chairperson of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) which captures the essence of the single-minded assault on constitutionalism on which he has embarked.  Referring to the decision by the JSC to appoint recently-retired Odoki as an acting justice of the Supreme court, the president stated: ‘… it is my decision that for those two years, His Lordship Justice Benjamin Odoki should continue to be the Chief Justice so that we maximize the services of our human resource.’

The letter concludes with a command in typical military style: ‘Therefore, send the appropriate instruments of appointment for my signature.’  Of course such a command is manifestly illegal, not simply because it attempts to reverse the role of President and JSC (it is the latter which recommends to the former not vice versa), but also in the blatant flouting of the provisions of the Constitution regarding the appointment of a Chief Justice.

I will make no further comment on the case in order not to violate the rule of sub judice, but one can clearly see that there is a larger problem involved. For most founding-parents, the fruits of the new instrument are passed on to the next generation; it is rare that the founders partake of the fruits.

The case of Uganda is that rare exception where the founders are able to enjoy the fruits of their labour.  But instead of nurturing the tree to produce more fruit, the founding parents are involved in its desecration, whether through the amendment of term limits, the lifting of age limits, or in the appointment of army generals to the civilian Cabinet in blatant violation of the Constitution. This is the essence of constitucide—where the founding parents of the Constitution are systematically involved in killing the child to which they gave birth.

I have selectively chosen recent political events in Uganda to demonstrate a wider problem: Uganda is not in a good place, and if we continue down this road in future, we will end up back where we started.  In short, if we continue with the existing pattern of governance and politics in two decades time, we will be facing major questions of state failure and collapse.

In part 2, which will come in subsequent editions, Prof Oloka-Onyango analyses what Buganda and Uganda must do to thrive.

Muhoozi presents a dangerous scenario

http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=29712:muhoozi-presents-a-dangerous-scenario&catid=37:guest-writers&Itemid=66  

Sunday, 19 January 2014 22:55 

 

Written by Joe Oloka-Onyango 

 

This is the second and last part of a paper Law professor Joe Oloka-Onyango presented at last month’s Buganda Convention at Hotel Africana, on the future of Buganda and Uganda.

The first part ran in last Monday’s Observer, and in part II, Prof Oloka-Onyango analyses what Buganda and Uganda must do to thrive.  He starts with Uganda…

Ugandans must act to bring to an end the ‘imperial presidency’ that we have been shackled with for the last two-plus decades.

In particular this must include a grand review of the 1995 Constitution and to consider the extent to which it has delivered on its original promise.

The review must include a frank discussion of the issue of succession and of the necessary steps that must be taken in order to ensure Uganda’s first peaceful transition in power.

Central to this discussion is an examination of the place of the military in Uganda’s current system of governance and the problem of military stress, represented most acutely by the emergence of the Special Forces Group, controlled by the President’s son.

What conclusions can we make about the Muhoozi project of which we have heard so much over the past year?  I personally do not believe in the project as part of a plan of succession.

Dictators do not (as a rule) plan for their successions.

This is because they cannot envision themselves out of office, and it is what explains why President Museveni adamantly refuses to discuss the issue of succession; he genuinely does not see himself going anywhere.

The Muhoozi phenomenon has emerged as a protection for the Museveni project, which is in effect a life presidency; you need to be protected by somebody whom you trust 110%.

But while I don’t believe in the Muhoozi project as articulated by General Sejusa, I nevertheless contend that Muhoozi presents a very dangerous scenario for Uganda’s future, primarily because the Special Forces Group (SFG) which he heads is effectively an army within the army.

It is better equipped, more mobile and more determined to protect the incumbent than any other unit of the UPDF.  We should also not forget that there is also a Reserve Force.  The UPDF is currently headed by General Katumba Wamala.  If President Museveni were to unexpectedly depart the scene—either by natural or other causes not related to the Constitution—the key question is whether our military institution as presently constituted would be able to withstand the resultant stresses.  As presently constituted, I highly doubt it.

Away from the issue of broad constitutional review, Ugandans need to increase their resistance to impunity by state officials such as the Inspector General of Police and of the individual ministers who act above the law (like the Minister of the Presidency).  Ugandans also need to decry and reverse the persistent and unending decline of its state institutions, and their substitution by personal rule.

Buganda

Buganda needs to assert itself more clearly on the side of democracy and transparent governance (the remarks of the Katikiro on the treatment of the mayor were a welcome statement from an institution which had previously steered clear of discussing democracy and the rule of law); Let me also congratulate Ssabasajja’s government for finally fully engaging with the issue of politics as demonstrated by the topic we are now discussing.

I disagreed, and continue to disagree, that you can divorce politics from culture: Buganda has never been and will never be simply a cultural entity.  Buganda is a complex mix of the cultural, the social, the anthropological and of all other aspects of human society.

Let me just give one example; supposing you got a new president: let us call him President ‘OO’ who persuades his majority members of parliament to pass a law entitled: ‘The abolition of kwanjula, okufukamira and other related traditional practices.’  If a traditional leader speaks out to oppose this law, is he engaging in politics, or is he defending his culture?

What about if the central government of the day embarks on a process of deliberately discriminating against or marginalizing a particular ethnic community?  Should the traditional leader of that community simply keep silent in order not to find himself on the wrong side of the law?

The absurdity of the law we now have in place is that the government selectively decides which traditional leaders practise ‘good’ politics, and which ones practise the bad: I have never heard the government caution a traditional leader who praises President Museveni and urges his/her people to vote for the NRM; but all Hell breaks loose when a traditional leader even whispers that the government is mistreating the opposition, or that there is corruption in the management of our oil.

What is, therefore, crucial in this debate is to discuss exactly what kind of politics cultural institutions should be permitted to engage in, bearing in mind that Article 3, Clause 4 of the Constitution stipulates that “All citizens of Uganda shall have the right and duty at all times (a) to defend this Constitution and, in particular, to resist any person or group of persons seeking to overthrow the established constitutional order.”

In this connection, Buganda itself needs to discuss the issue of internal democracy; what is Buganda’s constitution?  Throughout Uganda’s colonial and post-colonial history, constitutions have been imposed on Buganda, starting with the 1900 Agreement; but what is Buganda’s constitution today?  Is it the 1955 Constitution?

Is it the constitution of 1961 that was appended to the 1962 Constitution?  Or is it the Institution of  Traditional and Cultural Leaders Act, which the government asserts is the law that governs all such institutions?  Whatever the case, we need to ask: what are the powers of the Katikiro and of his ministers; how far does the power of the Lukiiko extend?

What is the power of the Bataka, and finally, how can the Bakopi and the Bazzukulu ba Kintu be heard?  I am of course aware that many of these questions have well-established answers, but those need to be codified in a comprehensive document to which everybody—Muganda and non-Muganda alike—can refer.

But I am arguing for a Constitution of Buganda for even broader reasons.  In my humble opinion Buganda has been at its strongest when it has embraced democratic and transparent methods of governance; Buganda has been at its weakest (and thus open to exploitation and abuse) when it has tried to subvert democracy.  Buganda needs a firm foundation of democracy if it is to effectively contribute to the wider struggle for democratic change and consolidation in Uganda at large.

A democratic Buganda will force Uganda to look again at its undemocratic practices. Buganda needs to forge closer links with the other cultural and traditional leaders; while there are some contradictions that are still outstanding, e.g. with the ‘old’ kingdoms such as Bunyoro, and some of the newer ones, the larger goals of collaboration, mutual respect and concerted action outweigh the divide-and-rule approach which plays directly into the hands of the central government.

Buganda’s outreach to other communities is especially important if it is to achieve the cherished goal of a federal system of governance.  One does not need to say much about the merits of the case of federalism: I have no doubt that the concentration of central power is a bad thing.  In addition, the regional tier was rejected, which means we are in a kind of a limbo with regard to this issue.

However, there is a need for a serious rethinking of Buganda’s strategy so far in trying to achieve the goal of a federal Uganda.  As a lawyer, I know that it is not always the best argument that wins the case. At the recent school’s debate (Budo and Ntare), the side against federalism won the argument. So far, Buganda has not done enough to articulate and package the federalism it wants in a manner that wins the argument.

Moreover, there are different messages coming from Buganda on the issue.  There is a need for a further internal discussion and a harmonization of the views of Mengo with those who have articulated a different vision for the federal system which should be in place such as Betty Kamya’s Uganda Federal Alliance.

Although the legal/constitutional challenge to the Institution of Traditional & Cultural Leaders Act of 2011 appears to have been put on the back-burner, as a matter of principle, Buganda needs to test this instrument for its constitutionality.  Indeed, many of us have argued that the Act is manifestly unconstitutional and needs to be repealed.

A number of you here were involved in petitioning the Constitutional court, and some of us gave our technical support to the initiative: what has happened to the case and why has Buganda gone silent over it?  Buganda must demonstrate that it is as keenly aware of the future as it is of the past, and part of doing this entails a critical review of the laws and policies that currently govern its operation.

Conclusion

Buganda and Uganda at large today stand at a crossroads; we have a choice between building on this newfound trust or in reverting to the chaos and disorder of the past which we have tried so hard to distance ourselves from.

Thus, both Buganda and Uganda need to have a discussion or a grand ttabamiruka (Ssabamiruka?), which comprehensively engages with the crucial questions of governance and democratization facing the country.

This national conference must comprehensively discuss the state of our Constitution and its violation; it also needs to revisit the phenomenon of executive power which we have still failed to tame.

It must critically devote itself to thinking about ideas on how to reinforce the powers of the judiciary and of the legislature.  Finally, there is also the outstanding question of truth, reconciliation and justice, which we keep sweeping under the carpet.  Unless Buganda and Uganda come to terms with their pasts, both of them will inevitably face a bleak future.

Part I: Uganda on course to become a total dictatorship