The individual will now be taken to Germany for treatment, they told CBS News, the BBC's US partner.
While
the CDC did not name the American working in the country, medical
missionary group Serge said one of its US doctors, Peter Stafford, had
tested positive for Ebola.
Two others
doctors from the group who were exposed while treating patients,
including Stafford's wife, Dr Rebekah Stafford, did not have symptoms
and were following quarantine protocols, the group said in a statement.
CBS
News also quoted sources as saying that at least six Americans have
been exposed to the Ebola virus during the outbreak in the DR Congo.
The
CDC said it was supporting the "safe withdrawal of a small number of
Americans who are directly affected", but did not confirm how many.
The
US government is reportedly looking to arrange transport for the small
group of Americans in DR Congo to a safe quarantine location, a source
told health news site STAT.
Quoting a
source, the site adds that the group could be taken to a US military
base in Germany, though this has not been confirmed.
The CDC declined to answer direct questions about the US citizens reportedly affected during a press conference on Sunday.
Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo & Uganda
https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON602
16 May 2026
Situation at a glance
On 5 May 2026, the World Health Organization (WHO) was
alerted of a high-mortality outbreak of unknown illness in Mongbwalu
Health Zone, Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
including deaths among health workers.
On 14 May 2026, the Institut national de recherche biomédicale (INRB)
Kinshasa analyzed 13 blood samples from Rwampara Health Zone, Ituri
Province. Laboratory analysis confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD)
in eight of these samples on 15 May, a species of Ebola.
The case fatality rates in the past two BVD outbreaks have ranged from
30% to 50%. Unlike Ebola virus disease, there is no licensed vaccine or
specific therapeutics against Bundibugyo virus, though early supportive
care is lifesaving.
On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene and Social
Welfare, DRC, officially declared the 17th Ebola Disease outbreak in
DRC. Concurrently, the Uganda Ministry of Health confirmed an outbreak
of BVD following the identification of one imported case from DRC, a
Congolese man who died in the capital city of Kampala.
On 16 May 2026, WHO Director-General, after having consulted the States
Parties where the event is known to be currently occurring, determined
that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in DRC and Uganda
constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC),
as defined in the provisions of IHR.
Response measures include deployment of rapid response teams, delivery
of medical supplies, strengthened surveillance, laboratory confirmation,
infection prevention and control assessments, the set-up of safe
treatment centers, and community engagement. WHO is supporting the
coordination of the response, case management, and cross-border
preparedness. WHO advice has been issued to countries.
Description of the situation
On 5 May 2026, WHO received an alert regarding an unknown
illness with high mortality reported in Mongbwalu Health Zone, Ituri
Province, including four health workers who died within four days.
Following an in-depth investigation by the rapid response team in
Mongbwalu and Rwampara health zones (HZ) on 13 May, the outbreak was
subsequently confirmed as Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) due to
Bundibugyo virus (BDBV) (Orthoebolavirus bundibugyoense, species) on 15 May.
On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Public Health, Hygiene and Social Welfare officially declared the 17th Ebola Disease outbreak in the DRC, occurring in Rwampara, Mongwalu and Bunia HZ.
The
first currently known suspected case, a health worker, reported onset
of symptoms including fever, hemorrhaging, vomiting and intense malaise
on 24 April 2026. The case died at a medical centre in Bunia.
As
of 15 May, a total of 246 suspected cases and 80 deaths (four deaths
among confirmed cases) have been reported from three HZ: Rwampara (six
health areas affected), Mongbwalu (three health areas affected), and
Bunia . Twenty four suspected cases are currently in isolation
facilities across the three HZ. In addition, unusual clusters of
community deaths with symptoms compatible with Bundibugyo virus disease
(BVD) are being investigated across other HZ in Ituri and North Kivu.
A
further case reported on 16 May, an individual returning from Ituri to
Kinshasa, has tested NEGATIVE for Bundibugyo virus on confirmatory
testing by the Institut National de la Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) of
DRC, and is therefore not considered a confirmed case.
Most of
the suspected cases are between 20 and 39 years old, with females
accounting for over 60%, suggesting significant risks associated with
household and caregiver transmission.
Initial testing of 20
samples collected in Rwampara HZ and analysed at the Provincial Public
Health Laboratory in Bunia using standard Ebola Xpert were negative for
Ebola virus. Samples were sent to INRB for further analysis, of which
eight samples analysed were confirmed as Orthoebolavirus by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) on 15 May. Genomic sequencing confirmed the virus species as Bundibugyo virus (BDBV).
As
of 15 May, 65 contacts have been listed, with 15 identified as
high-risk. However, follow-up remains weak due to insecurity and
movement restrictions. Several listed contacts became symptomatic and
died before they could be isolated.
On 15 May 2026, the
Ministry of Health of Uganda confirmed an outbreak of BVD following the
identification of an imported case from the DRC. The case is an elderly
man who was admitted to a private hospital on 11 May with severe
symptoms and died on 14 May. The post-mortem transfer of the body to DRC
was completed the same day. A clinical sample collected when the case
was admitted on 11 May was tested at the Central Emergency Surveillance
and Response Support Laboratory, Wandegeya, and was confirmed as
Bundibugyo virus on 15 May 2026. A second imported case was confirmed on
16 May in Kampala, in an individual returning from DRC with no apparent
links to the first case. At the time of reporting, no local
transmission has been identified in Uganda.
On 16 May 2026, the
Director-General of WHO, after having consulted the States Parties where
the event is known to be currently occurring as defined in the
provisions of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR),
determined that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in DRC and
Uganda constitutes a PHEIC.
It is currently thought that the event
originated in the Mongbwalu HZ, DRC, a high-traffic mining area, with
cases subsequently migrating to Rwampara and Bunia to seek medical care.
Ituri province borders South Sudan and Uganda (and Bunia HZ is less
than 500km from Uganda). A full epidemiological investigation and trace
back exercise is ongoing.
Ituri’s role as a commercial and
migratory hub and proximity to Uganda and South Sudan increases the risk
of regional exportation and cross-border transmission.
Figure 1. Health Zones affected by Bundibugyo virus disease in Democratic Republic of Congo, as of 16 May 2026
Epidemiology
Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) is a severe and often fatal form of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus, one of the Orthoebolavirus species.
It is a zoonotic disease, with fruit bats suspected to be the natural
reservoir. Human infection occurs through close contact with the blood
or secretions of infected wildlife, such as bats or non-human primates,
and subsequently spreads from person to person through direct contact
with the blood, secretions, organs, or other bodily fluids of infected
individuals or contaminated surfaces. Transmission is particularly
amplified in health-care settings when infection prevention and control
(IPC) measures are inadequate, and during unsafe burial practices
involving direct contact with the deceased.
The incubation period
for BVD ranges from 2 to 21 days, and individuals are usually not
infectious until symptom onset. Early symptoms are non-specific,
including fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, which
complicates clinical diagnosis and can delay detection. These progress
to gastrointestinal symptoms, organ dysfunction, and in some cases
haemorrhagic manifestations. Case fatality rates in the past two BVD
outbreaks, reported in Uganda and in DRC in 2007 and 2012, have ranged
from approximately 30% to 50%.
Differentiating BVD from other
endemic febrile illnesses such as malaria is challenging without
laboratory confirmation using PCR or antigen/antibody-based assays.
Control relies on rapid case identification, isolation and care, contact
tracing, safe burials, and strong community engagement, as no approved
vaccines or specific treatments currently exist for BVD.
Public health response
Health authorities in DRC are implementing public health measures, including but not limited to the following:
Coordination
- Rapid response teams have been deployed to Rwampara and Mongbwalu HZ.
- Provincial coordination and emergency meetings by le centre d’operation des urgences en sante publique (COUSP) have been held.
Surveillance and Laboratory
- Surveillance for suspected and probable cases is ongoing (including at relevant Points of Entry and borders).
- Operational case definitions have been elaborated in Ituri.
- Sequencing confirmed Bundibugyo virus in positive RT-PCR samples.
Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE)
- Social mobilization meeting was held with community leaders in the Rural commune of Mongbwalu under the leadership of the Mayor.
Infection Prevention and Control (IPC)
- IPC
assessment in key health facilities is ongoing: Bunia Hospital Centre
of the Evangelical Medical Centre (CME), Mongbwalu General Referral
Hospital and Abelkozo Health Centre.
- CME Bunia is maintaining
isolation protocols. Healthcare workers have been briefed on the
specific diagnostic profile of this strain.
Logistics
- Logistical support has been provided for investigations in Mongbwalu and Rwampara Health Zones.
- Support has been provided for the transportation of samples to INRB Kinshasa.
Health authorities in Uganda are implementing public health measures, including but not limited to the following:
- Activating
national and district-level emergency measures, including enhanced
surveillance, screening at borders, deployment of rapid response teams,
isolation of a high-risk contact, and quarantine of all identified
contacts.
- Strengthening of preparedness activities such as mobile laboratory deployment, infection prevention, and risk communication.
- Rapid
response readiness teams have been deployed at all official and
informal points of entry along the western border, major transit routes,
and pilgrimage corridors.
- Advising health workers to remain vigilant and adhere strictly to infection prevention measures.
WHO is supporting the national authorities, including through:
- Deployment of technical expertise and rapid response teams to support response efforts.
- Deployment of IPC, clinical management and sample collection kits.
- Identification of isolation facilities for case management in Bunia, Rwampara, and Mongbwalu HZ .
- Dissemination of WHO case management protocol.
- In-depth investigations and listing of contacts of suspected/probable cases.
- Strengthening epidemiological surveillance, IPC and RCCE at all points of entry.
- Strengthening Point of Entry (PoE) screening and cross border coordination, including mass gatherings.
- Supporting the Ministry of Health in implementation of the Response Plan and WHO internal Response Plan.
- Following
up with the IHR National Focal Points (IHR NFP) in DRC and Uganda on
the official IHR notification while concurrently managing communication
across the IHR NFP network to ensure timely coordination.
- Coordinating the delivery of key supplies.
- Engaging experts on research and development priorities.
WHO risk assessment
On 16 May 2026, WHO Director-General, after having
consulted the States Parties where the event is known to be currently
occurring, determined that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), as per the provisions
of the IHR. Temporary recommendations for State Parties will be issued.
In the meantime, WHO issued advice to countries, as stated below.
This
is the 17th Ebola disease outbreak in the DRC since 1976. The last
Ebola disease outbreak in the country was declared on 4 September 2025
with total of 64 cases (53 confirmed, 11 probable), including 45 deaths
(CFR 70.3%), reported from six health areas in Bulape Health Zone, Kasai
Province. The end of outbreak was declared on 1 December 2025. The last
BVD outbreak was reported on 17 August 2012 by the DRC Ministry of
Health in Province Orientale. A total of 59 cases, 38 confirmed and 21
probable cases, including 34 deaths were reported. The outbreak was
declared over on 26 November 2012 by the MOH.
This outbreak
is occurring in a complex epidemiological and humanitarian context. A
critical four-week detection gap between the onset of symptoms of the
presumed index case (25 April 2026) and the laboratory confirmation of
the outbreak (14 May 2025) suggests a low clinical index of suspicion
among healthcare providers. This is compounded by the presence of
co-circulating arboviruses and influenza-like illnesses, masking the
initial index of suspicion for Ebola disease and exacerbating community
transmission. Furthermore, the infection and death of four healthcare
workers within a four-day span at Mongbwalu General Referral Hospital
underscores critical breaches in IPC protocols. A large number of
community deaths has been reported potentially associated with unsafe
burial practices.
Ongoing conflict in Ituri province
restricts the movement of surveillance teams, limits the deployment of
Rapid Response Teams, and hinders the secure transport of laboratory
samples. Contact tracing is challenging due to difficult access and
highly mobile populations, increasing the risk of high-risk contacts
being lost to follow up or never identified.
Ituri’s role as a
commercial and migratory hub increases the risk of regional
exportation. The proximity to Uganda and South Sudan increases the risk
of cross-border transmission if PoE screening and cross border
coordination and information sharing are not immediately reinforced. On
15 May 2026, the Ministry of Health of Uganda reported an imported case
of BVD.
Humanitarian needs in the area are dire. Ituri has
273 403 displaced people, with a total of 1.9 million people in need
according to the Humanitarian Response Plan 2026 for DRC. From January
to March 2026, 32 600 newly displaced and 30 200 returnees were
recorded. The province recorded 5800 protection incidents and 11
incidents against humanitarian actors.
Unlike Ebola virus disease,
there is no licensed vaccine or specific therapeutics against BDBV.
Research and development activities are activated to coordinate efforts
to advance potential candidate medical countermeasures. Response and
outbreak control relies entirely on a range of interventions and public
health measures that will need to be thoroughly implemented, including
supportive care, early detection, adequate IPC, rigorous contact
tracing, safe burials, and community engagement.
WHO advice
For countries where the event is occurring (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda)
Coordination and high-level engagement
- Activate
their national disaster/emergency management mechanisms and establish
an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State
and relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities
across partners and sectors to ensure efficient and effective
implementation and monitoring of comprehensive Bundibugyo virus disease
control measures. These measures must include enhanced surveillance
including contact tracing, infection prevention and control (IPC), risk
communication and community engagement, laboratory diagnostic testing,
and case management. Coordination and response mechanisms should be
established at national level, as well as at subnational level in
affected areas and at-risk areas.
- Should national
capacities be overwhelmed, collaboration with partners should be
enhanced to strengthen operations and ensure the ability to implement
control measures in all affected and neighbouring areas.
Risk communication and community engagement
- Ensure
that there is a large-scale and sustained effort to fully engage the
community – through local, religious and traditional leaders and healers
– so communities play a central role in case identification, contact
tracing and risk education; the population should be made fully aware of
the benefits of early treatment.
- Strengthen community
awareness, engagement, and participation in particular to identify and
address cultural norms and beliefs that serve as barriers to their full
participation in the response, and integrate the response within the
wider response required to address the needs of the population,
particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in
Eastern DRC.
Surveillance and laboratory
- Strengthening
surveillance and laboratory capacity across affected provinces and
neighbouring provinces, through the establishment of (1) dedicated
surveillance and response cells within affected health zones and across
key at-risk neighbouring health zones; (2) enhanced community
surveillance, particularly focused on community deaths; and (3)
decentralized laboratory capacity for testing of Bundibugyo virus.
Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care
- Strengthen
measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping
of health facilities, triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained
monitoring and sustained supervision.
- Ensure healthcare workers
receive adequate training on IPC, including the proper use of PPE, and
that health facilities have appropriate equipment to ensure the safety
and protection of their staff, their timely payment of salaries and, as
appropriate, hazard pay.
Patients’ referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care.
- Ensure
that suspected cases can be safely transferred to specialized clinical
units for their isolation and management in a human and patient-centred
approach.
- Establish specialized treatment centers or units,
located close to outbreak epicenter(s), with staff trained and equipped
to implement optimized intensive supportive care.
Research and development of medical countermeasures
- Implement clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics and vaccine, supported by partners.
Border health, travels and mass-gathering events
- Undertake
cross-border screening and screening at main internal roads to ensure
that no suspected case is missed and enhance the quality of screening
through improved sharing of information with surveillance teams.
- There
should be no international travel of Bundibugyo virus disease contacts
or cases, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical
evacuation. To minimize the risk of international spread of Bundibugyo
virus disease:
- Confirmed
cases should immediately be isolated and treated in a Bundibugyo virus
disease Treatment Centre with no national or international travel until
two Bundibugyo virus-specific diagnostic tests conducted at least 48
hours apart are negative;
- Contacts (which do not include
properly protected health workers and laboratory staff who have had no
unprotected exposure) should be monitored daily, with restricted
national travel and no international travel until 21 days after
exposure;
- Probable and suspect cases should immediately be
isolated and their travel should be restricted in accordance with their
classification as either a confirmed case or contact.
- Implement
exit screening of all persons at international airports, seaports and
major land crossings, for unexplained febrile illness consistent with
potential Bundibugyo virus disease. The exit screening should consist
of, at a minimum, a questionnaire, a temperature measurement and, if
there is a fever, an assessment of the risk that the fever is caused by
Bundibugyo virus disease. Any person with an illness consistent with
Bundibugyo virus disease should not be allowed to travel unless the
travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.
- Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted.
Safe and dignified burials
- Ensure
funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with
provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices,
and in accordance with national health regulations, to reduce the risk
of Bundibugyo virus infection. The cross-border movement of the human
remains of deceased suspect, probable or confirmed Bundibugyo virus
disease cases should be prohibited unless authorized in accordance with
recognized international biosafety provisions.
Operations, supplies and logistics
- Strong
supply pipeline needs to be established to ensure that sufficient
medical and laboratory commodities and other critical items, especially
personal protective equipment (PPE), are available to those who
appropriately need them. WHO advises against any restrictions on travel
and/or trade to DRC or Uganda based on available information for the
current outbreak.
For countries with land borders adjoining countries with documented Bundibugyo virus disease
- Unaffected
States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with
documented Bundibugyo virus disease transmission should urgently
enhance their preparedness and readiness capacity, including active
surveillance across health facilities with active zero reporting,
enhancement of community surveillance for clusters of unexplained
deaths; establish access to a qualified diagnostic laboratory; ensure
that health workers are aware of and trained in appropriate IPC
procedures; and establish rapid response teams with the capacity to
investigate and manage BVD cases and their contacts.
- Dedicated
coordination mechanisms should be in place at national and subnational
level in all Unaffected States Parties with land borders adjoining
States Parties with documented cases of Bundibugyo virus disease. States
should be prepared to detect, investigate, and manage Bundibugyo virus
disease cases; this should include assured access to a qualified
diagnostic laboratory for Bundibugyo virus disease, isolation and case
management capacity and activation of rapid response teams.
- Any
State Parties newly detecting a suspected or confirmed Bundibugyo virus
disease case or contact, or clusters of unexplained deaths should treat
this as a health emergency, take immediate steps in the first 24 hours
to investigate and stop a potential outbreak by instituting case
isolation, case management, establishing a definitive diagnosis, and
undertaking contact tracing and monitoring as required.
- If
Bundibugyo virus disease is confirmed to be occurring in the State
Party, the full recommendations for State Parties with Bundibugyo virus
disease transmission should be implemented, on either a national or
subnational level, depending on the epidemiologic and risk context.
State Parties should immediately report the confirmation of Bundibugyo
virus disease to WHO.
- Risk communications and community engagement, especially at points of entry, should be increased.
- At-risk countries should put in place approvals for investigational therapeutics as an immediate priority for preparedness.
For all other countries
- No
country should close its borders or place any restrictions on travel
and trade. Such measures are usually implemented out of fear and have no
basis in science. They push the movement of people and goods to
informal border crossings that are not monitored, thus increasing the
chances of the spread of disease. Most critically, these restrictions
can also compromise local economies and negatively affect response
operations from a security and logistics perspective.
- National
authorities should work with airlines and other transport and tourism
industries to ensure that they do not exceed WHO’s advice on
international traffic.
- States Parties should provide travelers
to Bundibugyo virus disease affected and at-risk areas with relevant
information on risks, measures to minimize those risks, and advice for
managing a potential exposure.
- The general public should be
provided with accurate and relevant information on the Bundibugyo virus
disease outbreak and measures to reduce the risk of exposure.
- State
Parties should be prepared to facilitate the evacuation and
repatriation of nationals (e.g. health workers) who have been exposed to
Bundibugyo virus disease.
- Entry screening at airports or other
ports of entry outside the affected region are not considered needed
for passengers returning from areas at risk.
Further information
Citable reference:
World Health Organization (17 May 2026). Disease Outbreak News;
Bundibugyo Virus Disease, Democratic Republic of the Congo (The) and
Uganda. Available at:
https://www.who.int/emergencies/disease-outbreak-news/item/2026-DON602 
.png?sfvrsn=db9a40db_3 "Map_Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus DRC")