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Monday 18 May 2020
Putin and the Russian Orthodox church as the Pharaoh that must let God’s people in Russia Go: Why Russians Are Getting Sick of Church?
An Orthodox priest and cadets of the Nakhimov naval academy take part in
the opening ceremony for the start of a new academic year known as the
"Day of Knowledge" in Saint-Petersburg, on September 1, 2018.
OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP/Getty Images
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Amidst
the geopolitical confrontation between Vladimir Putin's Russia and the
US and its allies, little attention has been paid to the role played by
religion either as a shaper of Russian domestic politics or as a means
of understanding Putin's international actions. The role of religion has
long tended to get short thrift in the study of statecraft (although it
has been experiencing a bit of a renaissance of late), yet nowhere has
it played a more prominent role – and perhaps nowhere has its importance
been more unrecognized - than in its role in supporting the Russian
state and Russia's current place in world affairs.
And while much attention has been paid to the growing
authoritarianism of the Kremlin and on the support for Putin's regime on
the part of the Russian oligarchs whom Putin has enriched through his
crony capitalism, little has been paid to the equally critical role of
the Russian Orthodox Church in helping to shape Russia's current system,
and in supporting Putin's regime and publicly conflating the mission of
the Russian state under Vladimir Putin's leadership with the mission of
the Church. Putin's move in close coordination with the Russian
Orthodox Church to sacralize the Russian national identity has been a
key factor shaping the increasingly authoritarian bent of the Russian
government under Putin, and strengthening his public support, and must
be understood in order to understand Russia's international behavior.
The close relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and
the Russian state based upon a shared, theologically-informed vision of
Russian exceptionalism is not a new phenomenon. During the days of the
Czar, the Russian ruler was seen as God's chosen ruler of a Russian
nation tasked with representing a unique set of value embodied by
Russian Orthodoxy, and was revered as “the Holy Orthodox Czar”. Today, a
not dissimilar vision of Russian exceptionalism is once again shared by
the ROC and the Kremlin, and many Russians are beginning to see
Vladimir Putin in a similar vein – a perception encouraged both by Putin
and by the Church, each of which sees the other as a valuable political
ally and sees their respective missions as being interrelated.
The 70 plus years of Soviet rule wreaked havoc on the Church. The
Church was severely oppressed, with many of its clergy imprisoned,
tortured and/or executed. Parts of it were also co-opted by the Soviet
state, with many clergy becoming KGB informants. (It has long been
rumored that Kirill, the current Patriarch, or “Pope”, if you will, of
the ROC, has KGB connections. And given that Putin served for a time
during the 1980's in the KGB's Fifth Directorate, which was responsible
for oversight of religious groups, it is possible that the two men have
known each other for thirty years.) As soon as the Soviet Union fell in
1991, the ROC began working to rebuild its formerly dominant role in
Russian society. At first, it had competition for religious adherents
and for influence in the religious sphere in Russia. In the newly open
environment of the 1990's, a flood of Western missionaries, including
evangelicals, Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, etc., set up
missions in the former Soviet Union, and in the spiritual vacuum that
accompanied the fall of the atheistic Soviet system these missionaries
found fertile and receptive ground, causing the ROC to fear that its
opportunity to rebuild its social influence would be short-circuited and
it would be merely one of many religious bodies in Russia - not the
dominant religious institution and culture shaper. In response, the ROC
successfully pushed the government to pass a law in 1997 that restricted
the freedom of religious practice of faiths considered “foreign” in
origin and put the ROC back in the driver's seat in terms of its ability
to shape of the emerging national culture.
Russian
nationalism began to rise along with the spread of ROC influence in
society and the diminishing of the influence of alternative religious
groups. This restriction of religious freedom on the part of non-ROC
groups and privileging of the ROC also marked the beginning of a trend
of increasing restrictions on citizenship rights and the beginning of
the slow death of Russia's fledgling democracy, illustrating that
religious freedom is many times the first freedom to be curtailed by the
state. Its demise is usually the metaphorical canary in the coal mine –
indicating that an unhealthy political atmosphere exists and that other
freedoms will soon likewise be curtailed. In terms of church-state
relations, this privileging of the ROC status in Russian society marked
the beginning of a political alliance between the ROC and the Russian
state that has grown increasingly close and formalized under Putin and
which has been beneficial to both parties.
When Putin came to power he shrewdly noted the ROC's useful role in
boosting nationalism and the fact that it shared his view of Russia's
role in the world, and began to work toward strengthening the Church's
role in Russian society. Early in his presidency the Russian Duma passed
a law returning all church property seized during the Soviet era (which
act alone made the ROC one of the largest landholders in Russia). Over
the past decade and a half, Putin has ordered state-owned energy firms
to contribute billions to the rebuilding of thousands of churches
destroyed under the Soviets, and many of those rich oligarchs
surrounding him are dedicated supporters of the ROC who have contributed
to the growing influence of the church in myriad ways. Around 25,000
ROC churches have been built or rebuilt since the early 1990's, the vast
majority of which have been built during Putin's rule and largely due
to his backing and that of those in his close circle of supporters.
Additionally, the ROC has been given rights that have vastly increased
its role in public life, including the right to teach religion in
Russia's public schools and the right to review any legislation before
the Russian Duma.
The glue that holds together the alliance between Vladimir Putin and
the ROC, and the one that more than any other explains their
mutually-supporting actions, is their shared, sacralized vision of
Russian national identity and exceptionalism. Russia, according to this
vision, is neither Western nor Asian, but rather a unique society
representing a unique set of values which are believed to be divinely
inspired. The Kremlin's chief ideologue in this regard is Alexander
Dugin (see a good summary of the historical roots of Dugin's philosophy
and of his impact on the Russian government here.)
According to this vision of the relationship between church, state, and
society, the state dominates, the ROC partnering with the state, and
individuals and private organizations supporting both church and state.
This has provided the ideological justification for Putin's crackdown on
dissent, and the rationale behind the Church's cooperation with the
Kremlin in the repression of civil society groups or other religious
groups which have dissenting political views. And the ROC's hostility
toward the activities in Russia of other religious groups have
dovetailed with that of Putin, who views independent religious activity
as a potential threat to his regime.
Internationally, Russia's mission is to expand its influence and
authority until it dominates the Eurasian landmass, by means of a strong
central Russian state controlling this vast territory and aligned with
the ROC as the arm of the Russian nation exercising its cultural
influence. This vision of Russian exceptionalism has met with broad
resonance within Russia, which goes a long way to explaining Putin's sky
high polling numbers. Putin has successfully been able both to transfer
to himself the social trust placed by most Russians in the ROC and has
also to wrap himself in the trappings of almost a patron saint of
Russia. The conflict between Russia and the West, therefore, is
portrayed by both the ROC and by Vladimir Putin and his cohorts as
nothing less than a spiritual/civilizational conflict. If anyone thought
Europe's wars over religion were finished in 1648, the current standoff
with Russia illustrates that that is not the case.
Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill (L) congratulates Russian President Vladimir Putin during a... [+]
The forceful articulation of a muscular Russian exceptionalism and of
Putin's role as the defender of the Russian nation has become
increasingly important to the Kremlin in the past three years or so –
first as a response to the Moscow street protests that accompanied
Putin's re-election to the presidency in March 2012, and particularly in
the past 18 months as Russia's economic implosion has undermined the
previous foundation for Putin's domestic political legitimacy. The
legitimacy of the Putin regime rested, until relatively recently, on his
ability to raise living standards for everyone and to enrich the
oligarchs surrounding him on the backs of high energy prices that
brought a flood of money into Russia. Putin's system of inefficient,
crony capitalism that left the economy underdeveloped and overly
dependent upon global energy prices worked as long as energy prices
remained high and Russia still had fairly cooperative relations with the
West. With the collapse of that model due to the combination of the
sharp drop in energy prices, the impact of Western sanctions, and
growing antagonism with the West, it has been useful for him to portray
himself as the champion of a Russian nation beset by a hostile West
determined to reshape Russia in its own image. The West's goal, says the
Kremlin, is to spread liberal Western values within Russia and so
dilute the Russian national character and keep Russia weak and divided.
The Russian nation, therefore, must remain united behind Putin's
leadership, and hold fast to its distinctive national identity. Putin
has so successfully tied his fate to the fate of the Russian nation that
a senior Russian government official stated last year that “If there's Putin - there's Russia, if there's no Putin - there's no Russia.”
Putin's sky-high approval ratings are evidence that this message,
repeated by the Kremlin controlled media and reinforced by an ROC whose
reach into Russian society and cultural influence is so extensive, has
been widely accepted by the Russian public.
Taking this a step further, the view of Putin as a quasi-sacral
figure is becoming increasingly widespread throughout Russia. In St.
Petersburg, Putin's hometown, he has been portrayed as an angel reaching
out his hands and blessing the city's inhabitants. Just this past
weekend St. Petersburg unveiled a bust of Putin in the attire of a Roman Emperor. Sects within the ROC revere Putin as the reincarnation of the Apostle Paul and even pray to him.
Drawing an analogy between the Apostle Paul's conversion experience on
the road to Damascus, this sect believes that, just as Paul persecuted
Christians and then became their leader, Putin once was part of the KGB,
which persecuted the Church, and he now works to strengthen it.
(Although it is perhaps of more than passing interest to note that the
leader of this sect began praising Putin so highly only after her
superiors in the ROC asked the FSB (the successor to the KGB) to begin
tailing her. After beginning her sect, the government surveillance
stopped.)
A man bows during the inauguration of a sculpture of Russia's President Vladimir Putin in the... [+]
The Russian Orthodox concept of the spiritual father, which
encourages almost complete deference to the Church's hierarchy and
clergy, is one that most Russians understand, and a defining aspect of
Russian culture. This widely understood theological concept has paved
the way for Russians to accept and defend Putin's authoritarianism and
to see him as the country's spiritual father.
Government officials, as
well as religious leaders, have been known to speak of Putin in
quasi-religious terms. Vladislav Surkov, who has held various senior
positions surrounding Putin, including Deputy Prime Minister, has
referred to Putin as “a man whom fate and the Lord sent to Russia.”
It would not be true to say that here has not been occasional
conflict between the Kremlin and the Church, nor that support for the
Kremlin has been unanimous within the Church, but any opposition has
been nipped in the bud and the public support of the ROC hierarchy for
Putin's regime has grown even stronger since Putin returned to the
presidency. Once considered a liberal, Patriarch Kirill was supportive
of the Kremlin and of then President Medvedev's government when Kirill
became Patriarch in 2009, but the protests that marred Putin's return to
the presidency in early 2012 marked a turning point. At first, Kirill
did not immediately come to Putin's aid, and even made comments vaguely
supportive of the protestors' demands. After stories began appearing in Kremlin-controlled media, however, pointedly criticizing Kirill for lavish material possessions,
he fell into line, repeating the warnings he had made in previous years
of an “apocalypse” if Western-style liberalism was allowed to become
dominant in Russia. Since then, Kirill has given Putin his full spiritual and political backing, labelling him “a miracle of God” and belittled the “ear piercing shrieks” of Putin's political opponents.
Within the Church, those who have dared to say anything critical of
Putin face being defrocked and publicly humiliated. When a priest who
had responsibility for ministering to the Siberian prison camp within
which the former billionaire turned Putin critic Mikhail Khodorkovsky
was imprisoned had the temerity to say that he believed Khodorkovsky to
be a political prisoner, he was defrocked and forced to repent on his
knees. Most clergy, however, appear to be strongly supportive of Putin's
role as the leader of a Holy Orthodox Russia with some making no secret
of the fact that they hope that Russia is on the road to theocracy.
Just how much influence the ROC has within Russian society is is
illustrated by poll numbers that show that the vast majority of Russians
self-identify as Russian Orthodox (estimates range from 68-90%),
although the majority of these do not attend services or otherwise
publicly practice their faith. In fact, a sizeable minority of Russians
(polls have shown around 30%) who self-identify as Russian Orthodox
simultaneously describe themselves as being atheist, illustrating that
many value the Church primarily a symbol of Russian culture and national
identity than as an actual spiritual presence in their day to day
lives. For both those who practice their faith regularly and for those
who view Russian Orthodoxy as primarily a cultural symbol, however, the
Church has a deep well of social trust, and the vast majority of
Russians share the Church's vision of Russian national exceptionalism
and suspicion of the West. Putin has successfully tapped into that well
of social trust, wrapping himself in the trappings of almost a patron
saint of Russia. And because of the depth and breadth of ROC influence
in Russia, the Church's support has helped to dampen any emerging unrest
with his rule.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and Russia's Patriarch Kirill (L) lay flowers on November 4,... [+]
The anti-Americanism that is an important part of the militant
Putin/ROC vision of Russian exceptionalism has found fertile ground in
broad swathes of the Russian public, and although the Russian media,
controlled by the Kremlin, plays a role in shaping such opinions, this
Russian mindset is not dependent upon media stoking – the messianic
sense of national identity is deeply rooted.
A Levada poll that was just released indicates a worrying trajectory
among Russians: nearly 60% believe that the United States poses a
serious threat to their country (a 12% increase since 2007), 40% believe
that the United States would possibly attempt to take control of the
Russian economy, 31% believe that Washington could actually attempt to
invade and occupy Russia, and, perhaps most importantly, 36% are
convinced that the United States is attempting to impose its (alien and
decadent) values system on Russian society.
However, the influential and highly nationalist role of the ROC in
Russian society, the way in which Putin has moved to sacralize the
Russian national identity, and the receptiveness of many Russians to
this messaging on the part of the Kremlin and the Church, all illustrate
that the current conflict is no less an ideological conflict than was
the Cold War. The Marxist historical dialectic may no longer be a point
of debate, but it is an ideological conflict nonetheless
A small Russian sect believes God sent Vladimir Putin to prepare Russia
for the coming of Jesus Christ. Here, members work in the fields in
Bolshaya Yelnya.
Holy Vladimir, Pray for Us
A Russian Sect Honors Putin as a Saint
Mother Fotina once led a "Center for Cosmo-Energetic Medicine," and now
she prays to Vladimir Putin. Her sect, in a village east of
Moscow, honors Russia's once and future president as a reincarnation of
St. Paul. The group represents a rising trend in Russia, but its origins
are surprisingly mundane.
Haggard women hike up a hill near the Volga, saying they're following
"the Law of Love." The law brings them to a three-story building made
of white brick, with golden turrets and a battered gate. They call it
the "Chapel of Russia's Resurrection." At the gate they exchange dusty
boots for green plastic sandals before spreading out prayer rugs made of
foam and pray to their patron saint: Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime
minister and soon-to-be president (again). They believe he's a
reincarnation of St. Paul.
The followers of this Russian Orthodox sect live in the village of
Bolshaya Elnya, near Nizhny Novgorod, a metropolis 400 kilometers (about
250 miles) east of Moscow. Their leader is called "Mother Fotina," a
62-year-old matron who considers herself the reincarnation of Joan of
Arc. "I proclaim what God has revealed to me," she says. Just as Saul
persecuted Christians before his conversion to St. Paul, she believes
Putin once beset the faithful as a Soviet KGB officer.
The
Soviets blew up churches, or replaced them with swimming pools, but
"when he became president," she says, "the Holy Ghost came to him."
Since then Putin leads his flock "wisely, just as the Apostle did."
'We've Prayed for Him to Return'
Across Russia -- not just in Bolshaya Elnya -- popular affection
for Putin has started turning to religious worship. The country's top
rabbi, Berel Lasar, swooned a few months ago that Russians had "every
reason to ask God to bless you. Every day and every hour you do good for
any number of people, you save hundreds and thousands of worlds."
Vladislav Surkow, the influential deputy chief of the Kremlin
administration, sees in Putin "a man whom fate and the Lord sent to
Russia."
In Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg, a proliferation
of posters once showed the prime minister as an angel, with one hand
extended, blessing the city's inhabitants. Putin's face was mounted on a
photo of the cherubim crowning the city's Peter and Paul Cathedral. Any
departure of Vladimir Putin from the national stage seems about as
desirable to bureaucrats, conservative elites and a majority of the
Russian people as a speedy advent of the Last Judgement.
"He has the spirit of a czar in him," says Mother Fotina, clad in a
black robe and a white cap. Golden butterflies and cherubs adorn her
homemade altar. Fotina swings a smoking censer before an icon of St.
Paul-Putin. "Every day we've prayed for him to return to the Kremlin."
Their
pleas, apparently, were heard. In an act of staged self-sacrifice last
weekend, President Dmitry Medvedev recommended to a party congress that
Putin should replace him as a presidential candidate -- and ultimately
as president -- in 2012. The 11,000 delegates and party members of
"United Russia" cheered like true believers in Moscow's Ice Palace, at
what amounted to a Coronation Mass.
"The people's connection to Putin is more emotional than it is to
average politicians," the venerable Russian historian Roy Mevedev (no
relation to Dmitry) once said. "He's seen as a sort of moral leader."
Polls show 57 percent of Russians notice "signs of a Putin cult" in the
country; 52 percent believe it's a positive trend.
For almost four
years, bureaucrats and Russian citizens listened to President
Medvedev's speeches as he campaigned for tough reforms and tried to
modernize the country. Privately, though, they seemed to trust that
Putin would solve any problems by virtue of his aura -- even though
government corruption has flowered for years and the country's
dependence on commodity exports has risen.
Mother Fotina believes
the people have no choice anyway. "God has appointed Putin to Russia to
prepare for the coming of Jesus Christ," she says.
In Volgograd --
formerly Stalingrad -- Putin formed an electoral alliance with the
menacing name of "Popular Front," hoping "to use people with fresh and
interesting ideas." State enterprises like the Russian Post (400,000
employees) and railroads (one million) have declared their membership in
the Popular Front. So has the "Russian agrarian movement," which
supposedly unites Russia's 38 million rural residents, and an unknown
number of participants in the "first all-Russian blondes meeting." 'The New Eve'
In Bolshaya Elyna, Mother Fotina spreads her arms. Born Svetlana
Frolova, she sat for 21 months in jail during the 1990s, because she
embezzled money from the state as a civil servant. After that she opened
a "Center for Cosmo-Energetic Medicine," and later the "Temple of the
Resurrection of Russia."
"Behold, the new Eve has come to earth,"
she declares, referring to herself. Her followers believe that Fontinja
can heal by the laying-on of hands. They believe she can pray diseases
like leukaemia away. For such services they sometimes hand her
envelopes, labelled "For the Love."
The Orthodox Church accuses
her of witchcraft. One reason is that she competes with the local church
of "St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker" and alienates pious donors. "A few
years ago the Orthodox Church put the state police (or FSB, a successor
to the KGB) on her trail," a retired army officer in her neighborhood
said. "After that, she started to praise Putin in public as a saint --
to protect herself from investigation."
As usual, in Putin's Russia, the story is mainly about money.
Russians Are Getting Sick of Church
Orthodox Christianity—and Vladimir Putin—are at the center of the country’s newest culture war.
The local governor, Yevgeny Kuyvashev, agreed in late May for the
construction site to be moved after an opinion poll showed
that 74 percent of city residents were opposed to the plans. President
Vladimir Putin had said he would approve the verdict of a
referendum—though he evidently did not expect the resulting vote, which
was heavily against the construction of the church.
It was just the latest sign that times have suddenly changed in
Russia when it comes to matters of church and society. A recent opinion
poll recorded that 79 percent of Russians think of themselves as
Orthodox Christians. But the church does not command obedience. The
Yekaterinburg protests were much angrier, the views of the protesters
much more passionately held, than the other big recent social protest in
Russia’s regions against a planned landfill site in the northern city
of Arkhangelsk.
Thirty years ago, at the end of the Soviet era, it would have been
unthinkable—an anathema—for the public to protest against the
construction of a church. After all, in living memory thousands of
places of worship had been bulldozed by the Soviet authorities, and
priests has been thrown in jail or executed.
The mood of change of the perestroika epoch and the sense of a
reckoning with the Communist Party were summed up in a line at the end
of one of the defining movies of the time, Repentance, directed
by the Georgian filmmaker Tengiz Abuladze and released in 1987, winning
the Grand Prix of the Cannes Film Festival the same year. An old woman
asks a stranger if she is taking the right road to the church. The
stranger replies in the negative, and the old woman asks, “What good is a
road if it doesn’t lead to a church?”
The line summed up the consensus that the road to a church was the
same as the road to freedom and prosperity—that when Soviet citizens
aspired for their country to have the consumer goods, books, films, and
music enjoyed by Europe and the United States but forbidden, open
churches were one more important category on that list. In those
countries, churches were open and free to visit, unlike in the Soviet
Union, where they were shuttered and ruined.
So the late Soviet intelligentsia, battling against Communist rule,
found common cause with traditional religious believers in demanding
freedom of religion alongside freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.
It was perfectly normal to be both liberal and religious. To open a new
church, if that was possible, was to hammer one more nail into the
coffin of Soviet power.
The protest culture of the time was imbued with religious images.
Cultural figures revered poets from Russia’s Silver Age such as Osip
Mandelstam and Boris Pasternak who had been believers and wrote
spiritual verse about the exaltation of going to church services. At the
same time, the nature of churchgoing in Russia radically changed.
Formerly almost exclusively the preserve of old people, most of them
women, the churches now opened their doors in the 1990s to a new
generation of young people, with a nonconformist outlook.
For many young people of that epoch, taking part in church services,
fasting, and praying at home was an act of generational nonconformism, a
protest against the official atheism of their parents.
Slowly, however, the new romance between church and protest went
sour. Russia’s church authorities did not engage its new parishioners in
serious conversation about the modern world. Instead, they talked to
them with the same didactic tone as the old ladies, telling them about
their formal requirements to light candles before the church icons in a
certain way, how to dress, and how to observe all the Orthodox fasts
properly. Sunday schools, icon workshops, and choirs were formed.
But there was no serious discussion, and the big topics remained
unaddressed. There was no debate about the language and meaning of the
liturgy, the relevance and mission of the church in the modern world, or
greater participation of the laity in the services. The new Christians
wanted the church to disavow the power and wealth of the state and
remain the friend of the oppressed.
Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis Embrace at First Meeting in 1,000 Years
Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis met in
Havana, Cuba for a historic meeting between the two churches, pledging
to come together for the future of Christianity.
“We spent two hours in an open brotherly discussion, with full
understanding of responsibility for our churches, for faithful people,
for the future of Christianity and the future of the human
civilization,” Patriarch Kirill said. “It was a very constructive
conversation that helped us understand each other and get a sense
of each other’s positions.”
Following the meeting, Pope Francis said Patriarch Kirill was open and in the spirit of unity.
“We spoke as brothers, we have the same baptism, we are bishops, we spoke of our churches,” he said.
At the conclusion of their meeting, the two religious leaders signed a
joint declaration which stated “We are not competitors but brothers,
and this concept must guide our mutual actions as well as those directed
to the outside world.”
The document also addressed the problems of capitalism.
“The unrelenting consumerism of some more developed countries is
gradually depleting the resources of our planet. The growing inequality
in the distribution of material goods increases the feeling of the
injustice of the international order that has emerged.”
Both leaders expressed their concern over the decreasing significance
of the traditional family, and stated their positions on euthanasia and
abortion.
“The emergence of so-called euthanasia leads
elderly people and the disabled begin to feel that they are a burden
on their families and on society in general,” the statement reads. “We
call on all to respect the inalienable right to life. Millions are
denied the very right to be born into the world.”
Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis agreed that Europe should remain true to its Christian roots.
“While remaining open to the contribution of other religions to our
civilization, it is our conviction that Europe must remain faithful
to its Christian roots,” the document reads.
“In affirming the foremost value of religious freedom, we give thanks
to God for the current unprecedented renewal of the Christian faith
in Russia, as well as in many other countries of Eastern Europe,
formerly dominated for decades by atheist regimes. Today, the chains
of militant atheism have been broken and in many places Christians can
now freely confess their faith.”
The document also addresses the crisis in Ukraine.
“We deplore the hostility in Ukraine that has already caused many
victims, inflicted innumerable wounds on peaceful inhabitants and thrown
society into a deep economic and humanitarian crisis. We invite all the
parts involved in the conflict to show prudence, to show social
solidarity and show action aimed at constructing peace.”
With the Syrian conflict threatening to push the world to the brink
of war, the document calls on all Christians to pray for peace.
“We exhort all Christians and all believers
of God to pray fervently to the providential Creator of the world
to protect His creation from destruction and not permit a new world
war.”
Friday’s meeting marks the first time that leaders of the Roman
Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches have met in nearly 1,000 years.
The two broke apart over theological differences in 1054, officially
separating in 1438.
Russian patriarch prays at Rio’s Christ the Redeemer statue
His tour of Latin America began last week, with a historic meeting with Pope Francis in Cuba.
He arrived in Brazil after visiting Paraguay and a Russian scientific base in the Antarctica.
From Rio, he travelled to Sao Paulo and held mass at a Russian Orthodox church, in the last stop of his visit.
“I felt an internal joy”: Pope Francis speaks about historic meeting with Patriarch Kirill
Pope
Francis was full of joy and enthusiasm after his meeting with Patriarch
Kirill. His face revealed this clearly as he spoke on the plane to
journalists shortly after departing from Havana and heading for Mexico
City. His face was glowing with happiness, as he confided, “I felt an
internal joy.”
“We spoke together as
brothers, we spoke freely and with frankness about the things that
concern us. We didn’t mince words,” he stated.
“We
spoke as pastors, about our concerns for our churches and for the world
where wars are being fought piecemeal but risk turning into a world
war,” he said.
He revealed that
during their private conversation, at one point he told Kirill that “if
we wait” to work out Christian unity in the study, the Lord would
arrive before it happened. “We make unity by walking together,” he
stated.
He said they had
talked together in the presence of the interpreters and of Metropolitan
Kirill, the head of the Department of External Affairs of the
Patriarchate of Moscow, and of Cardinal Koch, President of the
Pontifical Council for Christian Unity. They also spoke about the
Pan-Orthodox meeting that will take place in Crete in June, he said.
He
and Kirill had discussed “how we can work together,” he said, and in
this context he commented on the joint declaration they had just signed.
That 30 point declaration covers many issues, some of which could give
rise to questions and discussion. Well aware of this, and seeking to
avoid sterile debate, Francis offered an interpretative key to its
reading. “It is not a political or sociological document, it is a
pastoral document written by two bishops in which they express concern
for their churches and for the world’”
It
is clear that for Francis the most important thing was his meeting with
Kirill, not the document, though the latter too has its importance as
it identifies ways in which Catholics and Orthodox can work together on
the road to unity.
The
declaration covers a wide range of subjects, ranging from the unity they
shared in the Christian millennium, to “the wounds” of division “caused
by old and recent conflicts.” Significantly it adds that “mindful of
the permanence of many obstacles” to recovering that unity, Francis and
Kirill express “the hope that our meeting may contribute to the
re-establishment of this unity.” On this road, they committed themselves
“to combine our efforts” to give witness to the Gospel of Christ in the
modern world.
In several
paragraphs, the joint declaration expresses their deep concern at the
suffering and persecution of Christians in the Middle East and in North
Africa. Here, Francis and Kirill call on the international community “to
act urgently in order to prevent the further expulsion of Christians
from the Middle East,” to bring an end to the violence and terrorism
and, through dialogue, to bring peace to Iraq and Syria. In this
context, they denounce the use of religion “to justify criminal acts”
and affirm that God “is not the God of disorder, but of peace.”
In
the declaration, Francis and Kirill says “interreligious dialogue is
indispensable in our disturbing times,” and they emphasize the need for
religious leaders to “educate” their faithful to respect the convictions
of those belonging to other religious traditions. Here too, they affirm
the importance of religious freedom and thank God for the renewal of
Christian faith in Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe that
were once subject to atheist regimes. They express concern at the lack
of religious freedom in some parts of the world, and note “the
transformation of some countries into secularized societies.” Here, they
invite vigilance against a European integration “that is devoid of
respect for religious freedom.”
The
two leaders, in the declaration, also speak about about the great
poverty in the world and the plight of migrants in many countries, and
emphasize the need for the Christian Churches “to defend the demands of
justice, the respect for people’s traditions, and an authentic
solidarity towards all who suffer.”
Their
joint declaration affirms the family, and marriage between a man and a
woman, and underlines the need to respect “the inalienable right to
life.”
The four-page text
reminds Orthodox and Catholics of what they share in common and tells
them “we are not competitors but brothers,” and says that this concept
should guide their actions. They express the hope that their meeting may
contribute “to reconciliation wherever tensions exist between Greek
Catholics and Orthodox,” and they acknowledge that while “unitatism” is
not the method to reach unity, these communities have a right to exist.
The
two leaders in their declaration “deplore” the hostility in the
Ukraine, invite the international community to work for peace there, and
urge all churches in this country to work for “social harmony.” They
also express the hope for the overcoming of the schism between the
Orthodox faithful in the Ukraine, and urge the Catholic communities in
the country to contribute to this.
Near
the end of this long declaration, Francis and Kirill call on Orthodox
and Catholics “to work together” in proclaiming the Good News to the
world, and to give a compelling Christian witness ‘in all spheres of
personal and social life.”
An
analysis of the declaration leads to the clear conclusion that while
this is not a theological document, it is a document that confirms the
theologically based relationship between the two sister churches.
It
deals with many of the questions that have already been addressed in
the discussions and conversations between the Catholic and Russian
Orthodox Churches in recent times.
A
rapid analysis of this declaration suggests that in actual fact there
is nothing really new in this statement in terms of content. Its real
significance is to be found in the fact that it is the first time ever
that the Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches are saying these things
together in the same place, in a common witness on these important
issues,
At the same time, it is
clear that this joint declaration does not mean, nor does it suggest in
any way, that all the questions or all the reasons for tensions between
the two churches have been resolved; rather, it signifies that there is
now the beginning of a new solidarity in facing them.
It
is important, in particular, to underline that this joint declaration
should be understood as a compromise between the positions of the two
churches on several issues, and therefore it can be judged from both
sides as somewhat inadequate. This is indeed a compromise document
coming from different world visions, from different theological
understandings of the modern world. Significantly, each side has given
and taken a little to reach this agreed joint declaration.
Many
times since becoming pope, Francis has emphasized the importance of
encounter, of talking together and then doing things together. He
believes this is the high road to reach other goals, such as the
resolution of theological issues. He believes that by talking, sharing
and working together and building trust over time, it will be easier to
untie the knots of the difficult theological questions.
Essentially the Orthodox Church shares much with the other Christian
Churches in the belief that God revealed himself in Jesus Christ, and a
belief in the incarnation of Christ, his crucifixion and resurrection.
The Orthodox Church differs substantially in the way of life and
worship.
Are Orthodox Churches the same as Eastern Orthodox Churches?
Not all Orthodox Churches are 'Eastern Orthodox'. The 'Oriental
Orthodox Churches' have theological differences with the Eastern
Orthodox and form a separate group, while a few Orthodox Churches are
not 'in communion' with the others.
Not all Churches in the Eastern tradition are Orthodox - Eastern
Churches that are not included in the Orthodox group include the Eastern
Catholic Churches.
The Eastern Orthodox Churches
The nominal head of the Eastern Orthodox Churches is the Patriarch of
Constantinople. However, he is only first among equals and has no real
authority over Churches other than his own.
There are 15 'autocephalous Churches', listed in order of precedence.
Churches 1-9 are led by Patriarchs, while the others are led by Archbishops or Metropolitans:
Church of Constantinople (ancient)
Church of Alexandria (ancient)
Church of Antioch (ancient)
Church of Jerusalem (ancient)
Church of Russia (established in 1589)
Church of Serbia (1219)
Church of Romania (1925)
Church of Bulgaria (927)
Church of Georgia (466)
Church of Cyprus (434)
Church of Greece (1850)
Church of Poland (1924)
Church of Albania (1937)
Church of Czech and Slovak lands (1951)
The Orthodox Church in America (1970)
The Orthodox communion also includes a number of 'autonomous Churches':
Church of Sinai
Church of Finland
Church of Estonia*
Church of Japan*
Church of China*
Church of Ukraine*
Archdiocese of Ohrid*
* indicates a Church whose autonomy is recognised by only some of the other Churches
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The doctrine of the Christian Church was established over the
centuries at Councils dating from as early as 325CE where the leaders
from all the Christian communities were represented. The Eastern Church
recognizes the authority of the Councils of Nicea 325 CE,
Constantinople I (381), Ephesus (431) Chalcedon (451) Constantinople II
(553), Constantinople III (680) and Nicaea II (787).
Although initially the Eastern and Western Christians shared the same
faith, the two traditions began to divide after the seventh Ecumenical
Council in 787 CE and is commonly believed to have finally split over
the conflict with Rome in the so called Great Schism in 1054.
In particular this happened over the papal
claim to supreme authority and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The
break became final with the failure of the Council of Florence in the
fifteenth century.
However, in the minds of most Orthodox, a decisive moment was the sack of Constantinople
in 1204 during the (Western Christian) Fourth Crusade. The sacking of
Constantinople by the Crusaders eventually led to the loss of this
Byzantine capital to the Muslim Ottomans in 1453. This has never been
forgotten.
The divisions between the East and Western Churches happened gradually over the centuries as the Roman Empire fragmented.
Eventually, while the Eastern Churches maintained the principle that
the Church should keep to the local language of the community, Latin
became the language of the Western Church.
Until the schism the five great patriarchal sees were Rome,
Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. After the break with
Rome Orthodoxy became 'Eastern' and the dominant expression of
Christianity in the eastern Mediterranean, much of Asia Minor, Russian
and Balkans.
At the centre of worship and belief is the Eucharist surrounded by
the Divine Offices or the Cycle of Prayer. These prayers are sung
particularly at Sunset and Dawn and at certain other times during the
day and night.
Personal prayer plays an important part in the life of an Orthodox
Christian. For many Orthodox Christians an important form of prayer is
the Jesus Prayer. This is a sentence which is repeated many times; for
example: "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner."
The aim of this repetition is to enable the person to concentrate solely
on God.
The strict life of a monk or nun is seen as an important expression of faith.
Fasting and prayer play an important part of the Orthodox Christian
life. Orthodox believe that fasting can be the 'foundation of all
good'. The discipline of training the body can enable a believer to
concentrate the mind totally on preparation for prayer and things
spiritual.
There are four main fasting periods:
The Great Fast or the period of Lent
The Fast of the Apostles: Eight days after Pentecost until 28th June. The ends with the Feast of Saint Peter and Saint Paul.
The Dormition Fast which begins on 1st August and ends on the 14th August
The Christmas Fast from 15 November to 24th December.
Also all Wednesdays and Fridays are expected to be days of fasting.
Even though today the call to fast is not always strictly followed,
nevertheless many devout Orthodox Christians do undergo a time of
genuine hardship and it has been said that:
Orthodox Christians in the twentieth century - laity as well as
monks - fast with a severity for which there is no parallel in western
Christendom...
Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church
A discussion of self-denial
Contributors from Opus Dei and a Greek Orthodox church discuss self-denial and corporal mortification with a Muslim chaplain.
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The following seven principal Mysteries or sacraments are at the heart of the Eastern Orthodox Church.
Baptism and Chrismation
The first two are Baptism and Chrismation. Baptism of adults and
infants is by immersion in water three times in the name of the Trinity and is both the initiation into the Church and a sign of forgiveness of sins.
Chrismation follows immediately after baptism and is by anointing with holy oil called Chrism. Chrismation is followed by Holy Communion. This means that in the Orthodox Church babies and children are fully communicant members of the Church.
Chrism can only be consecrated by the Patriarch, or chief Bishop, of
the local Church. Some of the old Chrism is mixed with the new, thus
linking the newly baptised to their forbears in the faith.
The Chrism is used to anoint different parts of the body with a sign
of the cross. The forehead, eyes, nostrils, mouth and ears, the chest,
the hands and the feet are all anointed. The priest says the words, "The
seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit" as he makes the sign of the cross
at each point.
The newly baptised Christian is now a layperson, a full member of the
people of God (the 'Royal Priesthood'). All Christians are called to
be witnesses to the Truth.
Chrismation is linked to Pentecost in that the same Holy Spirit which descended on the apostles descends on the newly baptised.
Although the Church is a self-governing community the Church
recognises the diaconate, the presbyterate or priesthood and the
episcopate (bishops).
The Bishops in the Orthodox Church are considered to be the direct
successors of the original Apostles and they are very much a unifying
focus in the Church. Priests in the Orthodox Church are permitted to be
married but may not marry after ordination. Bishops must always be
celibate. Orthodox priests normally do not shave their beards, in
accordance with the Bible.
You shall not round off the hair on your temples or mar the edges of your beard.
Leviticus 19:27
In Greek-speaking Churches this is performed annually for the whole
congregation during Holy Week on the eve of Holy Wednesday. Everyone is
encouraged to come forward for anointing with the special oil whether
they are physically ill or not. This is because it is generally held
that all are in need of spiritual healing even if they are physically
well.
Anointing of the sick can also be performed on individuals. People sometimes keep the blessed oil of the sick in their homes.
The Church anoints the sick with oil, following the teaching of St
James in his Epistle (5:14-15), "Is anyone among you sick? He should
summon the presbyters of the Church, and they should pray over him and
anoint (him) with oil in the name of the Lord, and the prayer of faith
will save the sick person, and the Lord will raise him up. If he has
committed any sins he will be forgiven."
This sacrament,', remarks Sergius Bulgakov, 'has two faces: one
turns towards healing, the other towards the liberation from illness by
death.
Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church
Marriage
Marriage is celebrated through the rite of crowning,
showing the importance of eternal union of the couple. Although
marriage is seen as a permanent commitment in life and in death,
remarriage and divorce are permitted in certain circumstances.
After World War I various Orthodox Churches, beginning with the
Patriarchate of Constantinople, began to abandon the Julian calendar or
Old Calendar, and adopt a form of the Gregorian calendar or New
Calendar. The Julian calendar is, at the present time, thirteen days
behind the Gregorian Calendar.
Today, many Orthodox Churches (with the exception of Jerusalem,
Russia, Serbia, and Mount Athos) use the New, Gregorian Calendar for
fixed feasts and holy days but the Julian calendar for Easter and
movable feasts. In this way all the Orthodox celebrate Easter together.
The Orthodox Church calendar begins on September 1st and ends on
August 31st. Each day is sacred: each is a saint's day, so at least one
saint is venerated daily.