Democratic Republic of the Congo – DRC
Independent from Belgium since 1961, the DRC is at the heart of
the equatorial region of Sub-Saharan Africa and includes 47% of the
continent's forest. The Congo River and its tributaries form an economic
lifeline. The population of 71 million is split into many ethnic groups
and it is also divided by at least 210 languages – but mainly French,
Lingala, Kiswahili, Kikongo and Tshiluba.
The DRC is home to vast reserves of a wide variety of natural
mineral resources such as cobalt, copper, gold, tin and diamonds. DRC is
believed to contain about 4% of the world’s copper reserves and
one-third of its cobalt reserves. All mineral deposits in the DRC are
state-owned and the holder of mining rights also gains ownership of the
mineral products for sale. Governed by the National Mining Code, the
Ministry of Mines regulates the Mining Registry, Directorate of Mines
and the Geological Directorate. The country is the world’s second
largest diamond exporter by volume and the fifth-largest producer.
Significant investment in project development and production is
taking place in the DRC. Major copper projects in Katanga include the
Tenke Fungurume mine (130kt copper production expected 2011), the
Kinsevere copper mine (planned 60ktpa copper production). Major gold
projects include the Banro Corporation Twangiza mine and the Randgold
Resources/Anglogold Ashanti Kibali mine (both scheduled for production
in 2014).
Environment, Health, Safety and Sustainability Policy
Casa Mining aims to be a positive force for African gold
exploration within the local communities where it operates, working with
all major stakeholders. The Company makes social responsibility a key
part of its activities, and is currently creating a formal social
development organisation that will work in parallel with exploration,
and later development, activities. 4% of exploration expenditure is
presently spent on Social Programs.
Casa is committed to following the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; Casa’s policy can be viewed here.
The Company aims:
- To encourage its employees and contractors to work with local
communities to ensure that lasting benefits remain in the area as a
result of our presence.
- To prioritise local employment, both directly and indirectly.
- For its employees and contractors to treat local communities
with respect, and to build positive relationships with stakeholders.
- To ensure that the protection of the environment is considered and made a priority in all its activities.
- To ensure that resources are utilized efficiently and effectively for the benefit of the Company and stakeholders.
CASA works to understand in advance the impact of its planned
activities. This facilitates planning to minimize impacts and ensures
that appropriate remediation measures can be selected. Each project
feasibility study will include an environmental impact study, and mine
management and closure plans, which are to include environmental
remediation requirements. These studies are conducted to international
standards by independent consultants. During development and operations
these documents will be continuously reviewed.
At the Misisi prospect, CASA has completed a socio-economic
study, stakeholder analysis and environmental review as the first step
in developing an appropriate and sustainable social and environment
plan. It is now working to initiate community projects in conjunction
with Community Councils, including collaboration on road reconstruction,
health education, and school improvements. Follow up will ensure that
benefit is sustained.
 
Welcome to Kilo Goldmines
Kilo Goldmines Ltd (Kilo) is an exploration and resource development
company with gold and iron ore prospects and resources in the
northeastern portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and a
non-participatory, subject to dilution interest (20%) in an iron ore
prospect in Afghanistan, namely the "Hajigak Project".
We are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange - Ventures ("TSX-V") under the symbol 'KGL' and on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange under the symbol '02K'. Our corporate strategy is to advance solely, or in partnership, our gold and iron ore
prospects and resources, in what is defined as the "Kilo-Moto" region, a
semi-continuous Archaean Kabalian greenstone belt in the northeast DRC.
In the northeast DRC, we have delineated a 1.87 Moz NI 43-101 inferred gold resource estimate on our Imbo Licence, one of the eight exploitation licences which form part of the greater "Somituri Project".
We are now delineating a number of other highly prospective targets
within a 5 km radius of this resource, with the ultimate objective
being; to grow the gold resource base on this licence significantly and
create a multi-pit operating mine of regional significance.
Whilst we believe that Afghanistan offers advantages as an investment opportunity,
we firmly believe that the DRC is significantly underdeveloped with
respect to its resource potential and represents a significant business opportunity for early entrants and for those who understand how to operate in this country.
Due to civil wars post independence, the DRC has been starved of
foreign direct investment (FDI), right through to 2006 and 2007. Since
this time however, the DRC has seen significant growth in FDI and we as a
company believe that the economic, legal and political enablers are now
in place for this to continue, see "FDI Graph" (ANAPI) and "GDP Growth Graph" (Economy Watch).
Loncor Resources Inc.
Loncor Resources Inc. is a gold exploration company
focused on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Company has
exclusive gold rights to an area covering 2,087 square kilometres located along
the Ngayu Archaean greenstone belt in Orientale province. Loncor also owns or
controls 55 exploration permits in North Kivu province, covering 17,760 square
kilometers and located west of the city of Butembo. Both areas have historical gold
production. Loncor's current focus is its Ngayu Project.
A Mineral Resource Estimate was completed for Loncor's Makapela Project in
April 2012 - 4.1 million tonnes grading 7.59 g/t Au containing 1 million ounces
of gold.
Profile
http://www.loncor.com/s/Profile.asp
Loncor Resources Inc. is a gold exploration company focused on the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Company has exclusive gold rights
to an area covering 2,087 square kilometres located along the Ngayu Archaean
greenstone belt in Orientale province. Loncor also owns or controls 55
exploration permits in North Kivu province, covering 17,760 square kilometers
and located west of the city of Butembo.
Loncor's leading project is Ngayu, located in Orientale
Province of the DRC, 270 kilometres
northeast of Kisangani.
The project covers parts of the Ngayu Archaean greenstone belt. A number of
gold occurrences are found within the Ngayu greenstone belt, one of the two
most significant described in the literature being the Yindi gold occurrence, which
occurs within permits where Loncor has the gold rights.
The Company's leading prospect in North Kivu
is Manguredjipa. It is estimated that between 1925 and 1960, approximately
300,000 oz of alluvial gold was produced in the Manguredjipa area from various
tributaries of the Lenda drainage system. These alluvial targets eventually led
to the discovery of numerous primary gold deposits in the Manguredjipa area.
Other gold prospects warranting follow up in North Kivu
include Lutunguru, Lubero, Makwasu, Lutela, Bilolo, Manzia, Mohanga and
Lundjulu.
Loncor began drilling at the Yindi Prospect in September 2010 and at the
Makapela Prospect at Ngayu a month later. Surface exploration work began at
Manguredjipa in August 2009 and is ongoing.
Management
Peter Cowley
President and CEO
Peter Cowley is a geologist with 40 years international experience
in the minerals industry, mainly in Africa. Mr. Cowley was President and
CEO of Banro Corporation from June 2004 to 2008, where he led the
exploration program that delineated 11 million ounces of gold along the
Twangiza-Namoya gold belt. Prior to joining Banro, Mr. Cowley was
Managing Director of Ashanti Exploration, where he oversaw the
exploration of the Geita mine in Tanzania, which resulted in 17 million
ounces being delineated. He holds M.Sc and M.B.A. degrees and is a
Fellow of I.M.M.M. Mr. Cowley is also a director of Cluff Gold plc and
Banro Corporation.
Arnold T. Kondrat
Executive Vice President
The founder of both Loncor and Banro, Mr. Kondrat has been involved
in corporate finance activities for over 20 years. He is also President
and Managing Director of Sterling Portfolio Securities Inc., a private
venture capital firm based in Toronto.
Howard Fall
Exploration Manager
Mr. Fall is a professional geologist with more than 30 years of
experience in various countries in Africa. Previous to his role with
Loncor, Mr. Fall served as Exploration Manager for Banro Corporation (11
million ounces of gold delineated), Anglogold Ashanti and Gencor. Mr.
Fall also led the exploration team which discovered the Ahafo and Akym
deposits in Ghana, West Africa, totalling some 20 million ounces.
Fabrice Matheys
General Manager, DRC
Mr. Matheys is a professional geologist with more than 21 years of
experience in Africa. Prior to his role with Loncor, Mr. Matheys served
as Exploration Geologist for De Beers in Botswana, West Africa and South
Africa and spent eight years as Exploration Manager in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo with exploration programs focused on gold,
diamonds, niobium and tungsten.
Mark Hannam
Chief Geologist
Mr Hannam is a professional geologist with more than 35 years of
experience in Africa including seven years in Tanzania with Anglogold
Ashanti focused on the Geita Greenstone Belt, eight years in the DRC at
Mongbwalu with Anglogold Ashanti and at Twangiza with Banro Corporation.
Désiré Sangara
Government Relations
Mr. Sangara manages Loncor's government relations and is based in
Kinshasa. Mr. Sangara also serves as Banro's Vice-President, Government
Relations. He has a Master's degree in management from E.D.C. (Paris)
and has over 17 years professional experience in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo's exploration and mining sector. He previously held senior
positions with the Belgium-Luxemburg mining company, Mindev, and with
Ashanti Goldfields, where he was the company's country manager for seven
years.
Donat Madilo
Chief Financial Officer
Mr. Madilo has more than 17 years of experience in finance and
administration and holds a Bachelor of Commerce (Honours) from Institut
Supérieur de Commerce de Kinshasa, a B.Sc. (Licence) in Applied
Economics from University of Kinshasa and an Honours Master of Science
in Accounting from Roosevelt University in Chicago.
Naomi Nemeth
Vice President, Investor Relations
Ms. Nemeth is a seasoned investor relations professional with more
than 25 years' experience, the majority of which has been focused on the
mining industry with companies such as Desert Sun Mining (acquired by
Yamana Gold), Wolfden Resources (acquired by Zinifex), African Copper,
Homeland Energy and Continental Gold. Naomi began her career as a
geologist working in the Yukon, Northwest Territories and Ontario and
has an undergraduate degree in geology and biology from Brock University
and a Master's degree in journalism from the University of Western
Ontario.
Martin Jones
Loncor Foundation
Mr. Jones served as Vice President, Corporate Development, with
Banro for seven years following a career as a consultant in corporate
communications. In 2007, Mr. Jones took over management of the Company's
registered charity, the Banro Foundation, and in 2011, became the
Foundation's Chairman. The award-winning Banro Foundation has been
formally recognized in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Canada
for its contributions to social and economic reconstruction in the
Congo. Mr. Jones advises and supports the management of the Loncor
Foundation, and is actively involved in furthering this foundation's
mandate to ensure that local communities share in the benefits of
mineral development through initiatives to promote social and economic
development, as well as through job creation and skills development.
Loncor Resources Projects
July - September 2012
click to enlarge
Makapela Prospect, Ngayu Project
November - December 2010
Drilling at the Makapela prospect, Ngayu Project, began in early
November. Below are recent photographs of the Makapela diamond drilling
program and of core samples containing visible gold from the North Pit.
click to enlarge
Yindi Prospect
September 2010
In September 2010, Loncor invited a group of financial analysts and
investors
on a tour of the Ngayu Project. Below are photos of the Yindi prospect
at Ngayu taken during the visit. These show drilling operations - two
drills are currently deployed - the core shack, core cutting and core
samples, the tents and kitchen and office buildings at the Yindi
exploration camp, and a number of adits created during the colonial era.
Project Geology
Introduction
The Ngayu project covers an area of 2,087 square kilometres and is
found within the Orientale Province of northeast DRC, some 270
kilometres northeast of Kisangani and 380 kilometres west of Lake Albert
on the border with Uganda. The project covers prospective parts of the
Ngayu Archaean greenstone belt, which is one of a number of greenstone
belts in the north-east Congo Archaean craton and includes the Kilo and
Moto greenstone belts. These Archaean greenstone belts are the
northwestern extensions of the Lake Victoria greenstone belt terrain
which hosts a number of world class gold deposits, including Geita,
North Mara and Bulyanhulu that were found and developed during the
1990s.
Loncor's Ngayu project property location
click to view larger version >
Loncor Resources Inc. has an option agreement with Rio Tinto Exploration
RDC Orientale SPRL for the exclusive gold rights at Ngayu covering 13
PRs ("Permits de Reserches" - exploration permits) totaling 2,087 square
kilometres. Initially, Loncor's option agreement had an area of 4,550
square kilometers and covered most of the Ngayu belt but after a
regional assessment of the belt, using airborne geophysical and
geochemical surveys over a two year period, the area was reduced in
February 2012 to 2,087 square kilometers.
Ngayu Project Infrastructure and Legal Tenure Plan
click to view larger version >
Exploration commenced at Ngayu in the first quarter of 2010 following construction of the main field camp at Yindi.
A two pronged exploration strategy has been undertaken over the last two
years at Ngayu: ground follow up (gridding, soil and auger sampling,
pitting, trenching, geological mapping and core drilling) of known
prospects within the Ngayu PRs such as Makapela, Yindi and Itali; and
regional reconnaissance geochemical (Bulk Leach Extractable Gold,
"BLEG") and airborne geophysical and remote sensing techniques in
corporation with Newmont under a Technical Services Agreement to target
additional new prospects in this densely forest terrain.
The Ngayu Greenstone Belt has a length of approximately 80 kilometres
and a width of 40 kilometres and bears geological similarities to the
Geita Archaean greenstone belt of Tanzania. In terms of size, the Ngayu
belt is approximately three to four times the size of Geita, where the
gold deposits which currently total 17 million ounces are found within
banded ironstone formations ("BIF") or in close proximity to the BIF in
other host lithologies. Similarly, the Ngayu project has well developed
BIFs with a total potential prospective strike length of 130 km.
Ngayu Project: Archean Greenstone Belt geology with similarities to
the prolific Geita Greenstone Belt in Tanzania (black line is original
Loncor property boundary, prior to February 2012)
click to view larger version >
A number of gold occurrences are found within the Ngayu greenstone belt,
including the Company's current most advanced prospect, Makapela (more
information on Makapela is available in the Map section of this page,
below), Yindi and Itali. Yindi and the Imva Fold area have been the
sites of historical alluvial and hardrock gold production during
colonial times and Kilo Gold's Adumbi deposit is to the east of the
Ngayu belt.
The following prospects, with details below, are located within Loncor's Ngayu Project area:
Makapela Prospect
Yindi Prospect
Itali Propsect
MWANA PROFILE
Mwana Africa PLC is a pan-African, multi-commodity resources
company focused on the production, development and exploration of gold,
nickel, copper and diamonds.
Mwana is carrying out an exploration programme on vast copper prospective land in the Katanga region of the DRC.
Directors
Executive Directors:
Kalaa Mpinga (52)
Chief Executive Officer
Kalaa Mpinga, who is a citizen of the DRC, has held a number of
senior positions in different locations around the world. His career has
included working for Bechtel Corporation in San Francisco and Anglo
American Corporation of South Africa from 1991. In 1995 he joined the
New Mining Division, the division responsible for exploration and the
acquisition of resources in Africa. He was appointed a Director of Anglo
American Corporation in 1997. Mr Mpinga left the group in December 2001
to pursue business opportunities in mining, founding Mwana Africa
Holdings (Pty) Limited, the forerunner of Mwana Africa, in 2003. He is
also a Non-executive director of Group Five Limited, a South African
leasing, engineering and construction company.
Yim Chiu Kwan (58)
Finance Director
Mr. Kwan, a chartered accountant, has over 30 years experience in
finance and commercial roles accumulated from positions in accounting
firms and private and public corporations. He is currently Chief
Financial Officer and board director of MBMI Resources Inc., a mining
company focused on the exploration and development of nickel projects in
the Philippines that is listed on the TSX-V in Canada.
Non-Executive Directors:
Mark Wellesley-Wood (61)
Non-Executive Chairman
Appointed to Board in September 2013, Mark Wellesley-Wood has over
40 years experience in both the African mining industry and investment
banking. Prior to joining Mwana, Mark was a director of Investec
Investment Banking and Securities in London prior to which he was Head
of Corporate Finance at Ambrian Partners. He has been closely involved
in mining activities in Southern Africa, having started his career on
the Zambian copper-belt and held the positions of Executive Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of South African gold miner, DRDGold Limited.
He has also been the CEO of Metallon Gold (Redwing Mining), which
operates gold mines in Zimbabwe. Mark is a qualified mining engineer and
fellow of the Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining.
Ning, Yat Hoi (57)
Non-Executive Director
Mr Ning Yat Hoi joined the Board in June 2012. He is the Chairman
of Hoi Mor Industrial (Group) Limited, China International Mining Group
Corporation, Hong Kong Mining Exchange Company Limited and MBMI
Resources Inc. Mr Ning also sat as the Vice Chairman of China
Non-ferrous Metals Council. He has more than 20 years experience in the
trading, investing and managing of non-ferro and precious metals
businesses.
He is the founder of a number of mining companies including Congo
International Mining Corporation Sprl, African PGM Processing Sprl and
Fareast Nickel Mining Corporation.
Hu, Yuan Ching (39)
Non-Executive Director
Mr Hu, Yuan Ching joined the Board in July 2012. He was born in
1974 in Taipei, Taiwan. He studied Architecture and Environment Design,
graduating from Taiwan Shu Te University in 2000. He also has a
Fiduciary Broker Licence, a Marketing Immovable Property Licence and is a
qualified Professional Financial Supervisor.
Between 2001 and 2006 Mr Hu was General Manager of Taiwan A-Life
Company, where he was made an Executive Director in 2005 and in 2006 he
established Taiyou Investment Co Ltd in Hong Kong.
Johan Botha (64)
Non-Executive Director
Johan Botha joined the Board in January 2012. Johan is a South
African citizen with over 40 years experience in the African mining
sector, 26 years of which were spent working across AngloGold’s
portfolio, as well as working as Manager in the Technical Development
Division. Since leaving Anglo Johan has assisted and managed in the
development and bringing into production of a number of mines, working
for BHP and Randgold. In more recent years Johan was the VP for Gold
Fields Ghana Ltd and then joined Banro to initiate the build of the
Twangiza mine in the DRC.
Stuart Morris (67)
Non-Executive Director
Stuart Morris was appointed to the Board in December 2005. He
became a partner of KPMG South Africa in 1976, later becoming Senior
Partner and a member of the KPMG International executive and board. He
was Chairman of the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants
Ethics Committee; President of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and
Industry; a Public Investment Commissioner; and a Council member of
Witwatersrand University. From 1999 until 2004, when he retired, Mr
Morris was Group Financial Director of Nedbank Group Limited. He is
currently an independent Non-executive Chairman or Director, including
Chairman of the audit & risk and remuneration committees, of several
other listed and unlisted entities.
Banro is a Canadian
gold company with production from its first gold project, Twangiza, which is
located in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Banro is also focused
on the development of its second open pit project Namoya and is undertaking
exploration on two further fully permitted and licensed projects, Kamituga and
Lugushwa. All Banro's current projects lie along the 210 km long
Twangiza-Namoya gold belt in the South Kivu
and Maniema provinces of the DRC.
Banro's Twangiza oxide mine began production in October 2011 and is projected
to produce approximately 100,000 ounces of gold per year with plant
modifications increasing production in 2013 and 2014. Led by a proven
management team with extensive gold and
African experience, Banro's business
model is to focus on the substantial and open pit-able oxide resources it has
delineated to date. Banro has identified 10.18 million ounces of Measured and
Indicated Resources, plus Inferred Resources of 7.01 million ounces along this
highly-prospective gold belt.
Corporate profile
AngloGold Ashanti,
one of the world’s foremost gold exploration, mining and marketing companies,
holds a portfolio of operations and projects on four continents, and has a
worldwide exploration programme. We work across the full spectrum of the mining
value chain, and are concerned with the impact of our activities on the diverse
communities and environments in which we operate.
Headquartered in Johannesburg, South Africa, AngloGold Ashanti has 23 operations in 11 countries with
a major development project La Colosa in Colombia.
Our extensive brownfield, greenfield
and marine exploration programmes extend to 12 countries, in both established
and new gold-producing regions through managed and nonmanaged joint ventures,
strategic alliances and wholly owned ground holdings. We have an interest in
Rand Refinery in South Africa,
and own and operate the Queiroz refinery in Brazil.
The group is managed according to four
geographic regions, namely:
· South Africa,
which comprises two mining areas and associated infrastructure – namely West
Wits and Vaal River, which together comprise six
deep-level mining operations and surface operations. In July 2012, AngloGold Ashanti concluded the acquisition of First
Uranium (Pty) Limited, the owner of Mine Waste Solutions, which operates in the
Vaal River
area of South Africa.
· Continental Africa, which comprises
the operations in Ghana, Guinea, Mali,
Namibia, Tanzania and
the DRC.
· Americas,
comprising operations in Argentina,
Brazil and the USA, as well as projects in Colombia. AngloGold Ashanti concluded the acquisition of the
remaining 50% interest in Serra Grande in Brazil during the year.
· Australasia, which has two mines in Australia
AngloGold enters joint venture to develop Congo gold project
Business Day, 29 march 2010
By BHEKI MPOFU
Photo by americanartmuseum / Flickr
"ANGLOGOLD Ashanti said on Friday that it had entered into a joint
venture deal to develop the Ashanti Goldfields Kilo (AGK) project in the
Democratic Republic of Congo with L’Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto
(Okimo) as a minority partner.
“This agreement allows us to move forward with an enormously
prospective exploration programme from which we expect to develop
another world-class gold project,” AngloGold CEO Mark Cutifani said. “It
also allows us the opportunity to generate prosperity for local
communities and the country as a whole, which is a critical part of
creating a sustainable operating model in this region.”
AngloGold holds an 86,22% interest in AGK and Okimo holds the
remaining 13,78%. AngloGold said the agreement provided for the
exploitation permits to be transferred from Okimo to AGK covering an
area of approximately 6000km² in the Ituri district in the northeastern
Congo .
This included the Mongbwalu project, where a mineral resource of
about 3-million ounces had been identified by previous exploration work
and where further exploration and feasibility studies are taking place.
Under the joint-venture agreement, 1,25m was payable by AGK to the
government of the Congo and about 10,6m was payable to, or on behalf of,
Okimo as compensation for the loss of rent and payment of surfaces
rights arrears, AngloGold said.
It said that of this amount, about 4,33m was repayable by Okimo to AGK under a loan agreement between the venture and Okimo.
“By signing this agreement, the parties responded positively to the
requirements of the government in relation to the review of the AGK
mining convention,” Okimo CEO Willy Bafoa Lifeta said.
“This agreement also has the advantage to allow Okimo to regain its
position as a mining operator in the Ituri district by having its own
infrastructures and mineral deposits outside of the AGK project area.”
Source: http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=104804
60 Miners Killed in Congo Shaft
Collapse
http://www.energydigital.com/global_mining/60-miners-killed-in-cong-shaft-collapse
7 Aug 2012 Carin Hall
While violent mining protests play out in South Africa, even more miners are
killed in another part of the continent. At least 60 miners died Thursday when
a shaft collapsed in a remote part of northeastern Democratic Republic of
Congo.
Local miners had been digging for gold in shafts as deep as 100 meters when
a landslide caused the collapse. Simon Pierre Bolombo, the provincial head of
mines, told Reuters the death toll is at least at 60 people.
A miner in the Democratic Republic of Congo inspects a rock for gold
Current mining codes require that mining shafts be no deeper than 30 meters.
However, hundreds of thousands of Congo workers make a living in the
illegally operated mines, where safety precautions are almost nonexistent. Many
are operated by rebels to help fund their activities, despite international
efforts to deplete the region of “conflict minerals.”
AngloGold Ashanti and Randgold operate in the
region, rich in tin and gold, but have no correlation to the incident.
"Eastern Congo has been under a near-total de facto ban on mineral
exports from the conflict areas since last April, when the Malaysia Smelting
Corporation decided to stop buying Congolese minerals as it could not guarantee
them to be conflict-free," Laura Seay, a Texas-based academic and leading
voice on conflict minerals, told Australian Mining. "According to the UN,
this ban has reduced the trade in conflict minerals, but we have also seen an
uptick in smuggling and no reduction in violence."
Corruption runs deep in gold mines
of Congo
By Mike Pflanz
12:01AM GMT 14 Mar 2007
Sounds of metal against rock echoed up the narrow mine shaft from dozens of
men chipping at the ore face in pitch darkness a mile beneath a low,
palm-covered hill.
At the surface, at the mouth of the water-logged passageway, Kakule Ndondo
stood in gumboots, squinting at chunks of quartz he had spent two days
underground hammering from the cave wall.
He is looking for gold.
With copper, diamonds and coltan - crucial to the manufacture of mobile
phones - the precious metal holds the potential to make the 25-year-old, and
his country, the Democratic Republic of Congo, very rich indeed.
Proven mineral reserves are worth an estimated £175 billion over the next 25
years, but so far the bounty has brought only misery and conflict to people
like Mr Ndondo.
Corrupt government officials, following the lead of the former dictator
Mobutu Sese Seko, who amassed a personal fortune of £2.5 billion in a 32-year
rule, have been bought off by multinational firms
who paid huge kickbacks to plunder Congo's loot.
Neighbouring countries including Rwanda, Uganda
and Zimbabwe have all sent
troops into Congo,
ostensibly to fight political wars, but happy to
reap rewards from what lay beneath the rich soil.
Now Joseph Kabila, the newly elected president who took office in November,
has promised to clean up his country's mining industry.
According to the recommendations of a 2005 parliamentary commission headed
by Christophe Lutundula, a Congolese MP, 16 questionable mining contracts are
up for review.
The Lutundula Commission's findings followed a United Nations report in
October 2002 that identified 114 companies and 54
individuals either in breach of international guidelines on corporate
responsibilities, or who should face global financial sanctions - 16 of the
firms were British.
"None of these recommendations has been implemented, and none of the
contracts has been renegotiated, despite the new government's promises,"
said Sonya Maldar, a policy analyst with the British Roman Catholic development
charity Cafod.
"To do so requires a strong level of political will, and there are a
lot of powerful interests who will be reluctant to upset the status quo."
Even before Congo's
elections last July, things should have been changing.
In May 2005, Congo signed the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary code of conduct launched
by Tony Blair in 2002 to cut corruption by pressing companies to publicise
their payments to state authorities.
In Mongbwalu, Mr Ndondo's home town, close to Congo's border with Uganda,
hopes for a fresh start after five years of war were boosted when AngloGold Ashanti began prospecting for gold in 2004.
The South African company, part-owned by the British giant Anglo-American,
which has a 41.8 per cent holding, took over a huge concession in the hills around Mongbwalu which was previously mined by the
state-owned firm, Kimin.
Kimin had provided jobs for local workers,
supplied the hospital and paid teachers' salaries. Expectations were high that
AngloGold Ashanti would do the same.
Yet, three years later, the firm has ducked requests from local civil
society leaders, and Cafod, to publish its government contract and detail
payments to the Congolese state.
It pays £850 a month to the local hospital, and £350 to the school, to pay
65 staff, but it is unclear if this will continue.
Our executive team
|
(as at 1 June 2013) |
 | MR S VENKATAKRISHNAN (VENKAT)
BCom, ACA (ICAI)
Chief Executive Officer
Venkat
was appointed CEO on 8 May 2013, after holding the position of joint
acting CEO since April. He was previously the Chief Financial Officer at
Ashanti Goldfields until that company’s merger with AngloGold in May
2004, creating what is now AngloGold Ashanti. Shortly after the merger
Venkat became Chief Financial Officer of the combined entity and joined
the board on 1 August 2005. He is also a member of the Executive, Risk
and Information Integrity and Investment committees.Venkat has also
previously been a Director of Corporate Reorganisation Services at
Deloitte & Touche in London. He has an extensive knowledge of the
Company and its international portfolio of assets, as well as
significant financial and capital markets expertise. In his role as CFO
he has overseen funding for all of AngloGold Ashanti’s operating
activities, giving him a detailed knowledge of all of our mines and
operating jurisdictions. He was the executive responsible for
eliminating a 12Moz hedge book, generating significant value for the
company, and was the key executive behind rebuilding the balance sheet
through a series of successful debt financings that introduced long-term
tenor and more favourable funding terms to the company’s credit
profile. Venkat is a member of the audit committee of the World Gold
Council and is on the Financial Reporting Investigation Panel, an
advisory panel of the JSE. |
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 | MR MP O'HARE
BSc Engineering (Mining)
Chief Operating Officer - South Africa
Mike
O’Hare joined Anglo American in 1977, and has held a number of
positions at various gold mining operations within the group. His roles
have included General Manager of Kopanang Mine (1998), Great Noligwa
Mine (2003) Head of Mining and Mineral Resource Management for
Underground African Mines (2006), Vice President: Technical Support for
African Mines (2008), Senior Vice President: Operations and Business
Planning for South Africa Region (2010), and in 2011, was appointed as
Executive Vice President: South Africa Region. Mike has the leadership
role as co-Chief Operations Officer in the South African operations with
responsibility for the three operating regions (West Wits, Vaal River
and Surface Operations) and continues the accountability for the
Company’s technology project in South Africa. |
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 | MS I BONINELLI
MA (Psychology), Post Graduate Diploma in Labour Relations
Executive Vice President – People and Organisational Development
Italia
Boninelli joined AngloGold Ashanti on 15 October 2010 as Senior Vice
President: Human Resources, Strategy and Change Management and was
appointed to the Executive Committee on 1 December 2011 where she is
responsible for the company’s people strategy, transformation and change
management initiatives. She is now Executive Vice President: People
& Organisational Development, with accountability for the company’s
System for People, Human Resources, corporate services and
organisational redesign. Italia has more than 25 years’ experience in
human resources, marketing communications, customer relationship
management and business transformation, in a variety of industries
including mining, manufacturing, healthcare and banking. She is a
registered industrial psychologist with the Health Professions Council
of South Africa, holds a masters degree in psychology and a postgraduate
diploma in labour relations. |
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 | DR CE CARTER
BA (Hons), DPhil, EDP
Executive Vice President – Strategy and Business Development
Charles
Carter has worked in the mining industry in South Africa and the
Americas since 1991, in a range of corporate roles with Anglo American
Corporation, RFC Corporate Finance and AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. In 2012 he
took on executive responsibility for the company’s business in
Colombia. Prior to this he was Executive Vice President: Business
Strategy, responsible for Corporate Strategy and Business Planning, Risk
Management, Project One implementation and Corporate HR. He now retains
the role of Executive Vice President: Strategy and Business
Development, with accountability for the Group’s strategy, business
development, corporate finance, Investor Relations, communications and
will also deputize for the CEO in his absence. Charles will continue to
work closely with Ron Largent on the approach and strategy for the
company’s activities in Colombia. |
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 | MR RN DUFFY
BCom, MBA
Chief Financial Officer
Richard
Duffy was appointed to the board of AngloGold Ashanti on 1 June 2013.
He has 25 years of global mining industry experience, initially with
Anglo American, from 1987 and then AngloGold Ashanti, from its inception
in 1998. At AngloGold Ashanti, he has worked across a number of key
areas. He was appointed Executive Officer: Business Planning in 2004
during which time he also deputised for the CFO. From 2004 to 2008,
Richard was Executive Vice President: Business Development, accountable
for mergers and acquisition activities as well as greenfields
exploration. He was appointed as Executive Vice President: Africa in
June 2008 and Executive Vice President: Continental Africa in February
2010. He has a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce and a Master’s Degree in
Business Administration. |
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 | MR GJ EHM
BSc Hons, MAusIMM, MAICD
Executive Vice President – Planning and Technical
Graham
Ehm has, since 1979, gained diverse experience in mine operations and
project management, covering the nickel, phosphate, copper, uranium and
gold sectors. He was appointed General Manager Sunrise Dam Gold Mine in
2000, Regional Head: Australia in 2006 and Executive Vice President:
Australasia in December 2007. He assumed the role of Executive Vice
President: Tanzania on 1 June 2009 and during August 2010, resumed the
position of Executive Vice President: Australasia. He is currently
working closely with Tony O’Neill as he takes on the role of Executive
Vice President: Planning and Technical, which includes oversight over
safety, business planning, asset optimisation, capital investment
optimisation and monitoring (including projects, studies, and
exploration), Project ONE, risk management and other technical
disciplines and related centres of excellence. |
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 | MR RW LARGENT
BSc (Min. Eng), MBA
Chief Operating Officer - International
Ron
Largent has over 30 years of experience in the mining industry in both
domestic and international operations as well as project management. He
has served on the Board of Directors of the Colorado Mining Association,
the Nevada Mining Association and the California Mining Association. He
joined the company in 1994 as Manager of Gold Operations for CC&V.
He was named Vice President (VP) and General Manager of the Jerritt
Canyon Joint Venture in 2000 and VP and General Manager of CC&V in
2002. In January of 2007 he was named VP for the North America Region
followed by his appointment to the position of Executive Vice President:
Americas in December of 2007. Ron is now co-Chief Operations Officer,
adding the Continental African operations to his current Americas
portfolio, with the addition of the Australian operations once Tropicana
completes its first gold pour later in the year. Ron leads the team
aimed at removing $500m from our operating cost base within an 18 month
period. |
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 | MR D NOKO
MBA; Post Graduate Diploma in Company Direction; Higher National Diploma – Engineering
Executive Vice President: Sustainability
David
Noko joined AngloGold Ashanti on 15 June 2012 and assumed
responsibility for social and sustainable development, global security,
Infrastructure and development strategies, human rights and public
affairs. David supports the CEO and COO’s on matters relating to
AngloGold Ashanti’s involvement in industry institutions in South Africa
and global institutions relating to sustainable development. Prior to
joining AngloGold Ashanti, David served as the Managing Director of
CelaCorp (Pty) Ltd and as the Chief Executive Officer and Managing
Director of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. He was previously Vice
President of the Chamber of Mines, South Africa, and is a member of the
Institute of Directors, among a host of other directorships. His most
recent position was Deputy Chairman of the Board at Harmony Gold Mining.
David has strong experience in business leadership and in the
sustainable development function in other mining organisations and has
developed his skills across a broad platform of environmental and
sustainability issues. |
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 | MS ME SANZ PEREZ
BCom LLB, H Dip Tax, Admitted Attorney
Executive Vice President: Group General Counsel and Company Secretary
Maria
(Ria) Sanz Perez joined AngloGold Ashanti in June 2011 having worked in
a number of industries and major corporate organisations. She has held
legal roles at Investec Bank, Basil Read, Afrox and Sappi. She was also
Group Head of Sustainability at Sappi. She is responsible for Group
legal services as well as compliance and was appointed Company Secretary
in September 2012. Ria’s role is Executive Vice President: Group
General Counsel and Company Secretary, with accountability for legal
affairs, compliance, Company Secretarial and integrated reporting. |
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 | MS YZ SIMELANE
BA LLB, FILPA, MAP, EMPM
Executive Vice President – Stakeholder Relations and Marketing
Yedwa
Simelane joined AngloGold in November 2000, as Managing Secretary to
the Board and Executive Committee. Prior to joining AngloGold she was in
financial services and has experience in the retirement funding
industry. She was appointed an executive officer in May 2004 and Vice
President: Government Relations in July 2008. In November 2009, she was
appointed Senior Vice President: Corporate Affairs responsible for
Government Relations, Corporate Communications, Marketing and the
Sustainability Report. Yedwa is now Executive Vice President:
Stakeholder Relations and Marketing, with accountability for stakeholder
and government relations, marketing and sustainability reporting. She
will also support the Chairman and CEO’s offices in relation to
government relations and the company’s involvement in multilateral
organisations and the World Gold Council. |
Randgold Resources
Randgold Resources is an African focused gold mining and exploration company with listings on the London Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.
Major
discoveries to date include the 7.5 million ounce Morila deposit in
southern Mali, the 7 million ounce Yalea deposit and the 5.5 million
ounce Gounkoto deposit, both in western Mali, the 4 million ounce Tongon
deposit in the Côte d’Ivoire and the 3 million ounce Massawa deposit in
eastern Senegal. Randgold financed and built the Morila mine which,
since October 2000, has produced more than 6 million ounces of gold and
distributed more than US$2 billion to stakeholders. It also financed and
built the Loulo operation which started as two open pit mines in
November 2005. Since then, two underground mines have been developed at
the Yalea and Gara deposits.
The
company’s Tongon mine in Côte d’Ivoire poured its first gold in November
2010. Randgold’s latest mine, Gounkoto, south of Loulo, delivered first
ore to the Loulo plant in June 2011 and paid its first dividends to
shareholders in mid 2012 and the second in November.
In
2009, the company acquired a 45% interest in the Kibali project in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which stands at 10.9 million ounces
of mineral reserves and is one of the largest undeveloped gold deposits
in Africa. Open pit mining has started at Kibali and construction of the
gold mine has been ramped up for expected fourth quarter 2013 first
gold production, while underground mine development has also begun. The
first full year of production is planned for 2014. Randgold also has a
major project at Massawa in Senegal and an extensive portfolio of
organic growth prospects, supported by intensive exploration programmes
in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Mali and Senegal. A new joint
venture with Kilo Goldmines Limited has extended Randgold’s footprint in
the DRC.
http://www.miningne.ws/2013/02/02/taking-african-gold-mining-to-new-heights/
Posted on 02 February 2013
African gold miner and explorer Randgold Resources
is a ‘pro’ at developing large-scale gold mines in the remotest African
regions. Its latest project, Kibali, fits this profile
perfectly, writes Laura Cornish.
Not only is Randgold Resources capable of finding
large-scale gold deposits in Africa, but has
developed and perfected its skill of converting the properties into profitable
operating gold entities in the face of ‘typical’ African continent challenges.
“No other mining company has achieved the delivery of so many new mines in Africa,” says Randgold Resources CEO, Mark
Bristow.
Construction of the Kibali plant
The Kibali project is the company’s latest venture
(together with AngloGold Ashanti) and remains on track to
start producing at the end of 2013, and reach full production the year after.
With a 10 Moz mineral reserve (and 18 Moz resource), the project
represents one of the largest undeveloped gold deposits in Africa.
It is set to deliver an average of 600 000 ozpa for the first
11 years with an average grade of 4.2 g/t. The project has a 17-year
lifespan, although ongoing exploration is expected to see this extend
substantially.
Situated in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Kibali will include an integrated underground and opencast
mine, a twin-circuit sulphide and oxide plant with a run-of-mine (ROM)
throughput of 6 Mtpa. The project covers an area of 1 836 km² in
the Moto gold fields in the north east of the DRC and is located some
560 km north-east of the city of Kisangani and 150 km west of the
Ugandan border town of Arua.
Once in production, the Kibali project is expected to
contribute about 20% towards Randgold Resources’ entire
portfolio. This is significant considering it owns just 45% of the project,
with AngloGold owning another 45% and the Congolese parastatal, Sokimo owning
the remaining 10%. “We have a long-term working relationship with AngloGold
and like sharing the commercial risk. Both companies have very different DNAs
and as such bring different strengths to the venture. Our strength of course
lies specifically in successfully managing technical and political risks,” says
Bristow.
The project’s development is broken down into two phases. The Phase 1
capital programme is estimated at US$920 million (R8.34 billion) (before
escalation provisions and contingencies) and will cover the metallurgical
facility, a hydropower station and back-up thermal power facility, construction
of the tailings storage facility, relocation of villages, opencast mining and
all shared infrastructure. This will run over a two-year period.
The Phase 2 capital programme is estimated at US$650 million (before
escalation provisions and contingencies), which will run concurrently with
Phase 1 but will extend over four years, is focused primarily on the
underground development and includes a twin decline and vertical shaft system
as well as three hydropower stations. This is expected to bring the underground
into first production by the end of 2014, with steady state production targeted
for the end of 2015.
The mine
Randgold Resources is considered an expert in interpreting
and understanding the nature and geology of gold deposits in Africa,
“which are generally high grade ore bodies, with narrow seams,” says Bristow,
adding that Kibali is no exception.
The project is on track to deliver its first gold from the plant at the end
of 2013 and will ramp up to deliver about 550 000 oz of gold in 2014.
The underground mine will be accessed via a twin decline system (men and
material and rock hoisting) as well as a 2.8 Mtpa, 770 m deep,
8 m diameter production vertical shaft. Mining methods will be a
combination of long-hole open stoping, longitudinal (along strike) and
transverse (multiple stope accesses), depending on the height of the stope,
which varies between 25 and 40 m. The mine will employ about 3 500
people once the underground mine is operational and at nameplate capacity, of
which 90% will be Congolese nationals.
“The plan is to mine our opencast reserves while simultaneously developing
underground. This will ensure we start generating cash early. Because our
opencast reserves are substantial, there will be an overlap of production from
surface and underground.”
On surface, Kibali will comprise six individual pits, which
will be mined over a 10-year period, with the potential for another two. Even
though underground material is higher in grade, the intention is to convert
more opencast reserves. Kibali will, however, be a long life
underground mine.
“We have already started with additional resource conversion and believe
there is huge upside potential. As such, our exploration strategy is threefold.
We want to extend our current underground ore bodies (by about 1 Moz by
March/April 2013), which appear to continue their down-dip nature; convert some
of our 8 Moz inventory (including near-mine targets) to resource category
and continue with our Greenfields exploration,” Bristow
outlines.
The metallurgical plant
Even though Kibali will be a 6 Mtpa operation,
initially, the process plant’s design capacity is 7.2 Mtpa, accommodating
future possible expansions. All ancillary project infrastructure has been
designed and built to accommodate expansions down the line as well.
The plant incorporates a carbon-in-leach circuit stream to process the
oxides and a flotation circuit stream for the sulphides. Upfront commissioning
and early stage production using softer, ‘easier-to- process’ oxide material
will ensure a smooth start-up process, says Bristow. Both
streams are capable of processing hard ore (sulphide material), because the
surface oxide material will deplete first. The overall plant recovery rate is
expected to be about 87.8%.
“This is the first Randgold operation to incorporate a full
flotation circuit, which is something we are particularly proud of. It shows
our ability to implement appropriate and advanced mining technologies and
improve on previous mine designs.”
The company also does not believe in the traditional EPCM
model. “We have an extensive owners’ team on-site, which works closely with our
appointed engineers and contractors.” There are currently about 5 000
people on-site as construction momentum continues to advance.
Power
As a strategy to combat the insufficient, erratic and unreliable power
supply in the DRC, Randgold Resources is investing
in the construction of four hydropower stations and the upgrade of a fifth, all
based in close proximity to the mine.
During the rainy seasons, the hydropower stations will
provide 47 MW of power to the project, which will drop to 40 MW in
the dry season when diesel-driven thermal power generators will make up the
supply difference.
Once completed, the upgraded Nzoro 1 power station (an
old Belgium
power station) will supply 1 MW of power to the local community. The
combined target output for Nzoro 2, Azambi,
Ambarau and Sessenge equates to 47 MW in
total.
The community
A critical component of the Kibali project is the
18 000 strong community, which until recently, was located above the
mine’s resource.
“We have had to relocate the entire town, which comprised 14 separate
villages. This involved building new homes, and relocating 3 000 graves,
14 schools, 17 churches, five clinics, an entire catholic church complex,
markets, farms, a nunnery and a monastery. Village relocation may be typical
practice in the mining sector, but rarely on this scale.”
To date, a total of 1 407 families (from eight villages) have been
resettled and a total of 1 780 houses completed. 50 000 bricks a day
are being used to build nearly 60 houses a week.
The current status
The 180 km road linking the mine to the Ugandan border was upgraded,
along with 14 bridges to accommodate the significant levels of traffic required
to transport all equipment items to site. “The mills alone required 57 t
truck payloads. We are clearing up to 200 trucks on the border post every
week.”
“Looking forwards, our target for this quarter is to start the pre-sink of
the vertical shaft (construction of the declines has already commenced),”
Bristow continues.
Kibali has advanced its status from ‘manufacture and
procure’ to ‘erect’. All major items, including the mill shells and gearboxes,
CIL tanks, 70% of structural steel, 13 gensets (of 36) on-site, primary
crushers, secondary crushers, the kiln, interstage screens, overhead cranes,
discharge screens, fuel farm tanks, are already on-site. “We are pouring about
200 m 3 of concrete a day.”
The girth gears, elution columns, agitators, remaining gensets, 30% of
piping, apron feeders, hydro equipment turbines, heat exchangers,
electro-winning cells, conveyor idlers, cabling, electrical and instrumentation
equipment and cyclones are all en-route.
Sidebar: The key to working in Africa
“We have been operating since 1995 in sub-Saharan Africa,
and while every country is different, there are always similarities.. But
governments have grown to recognise us and see the benefits our mines bring to
their countries. It is important to be completely transparent.”
Sidebar: Contractors
Metallurgical plant/tailings storage facility/hydropower
plants/infrastructure:
- GPS (Group 5 Civils, Protech,
Safricas)
- Group 5 Projects (SA)
- Weldcon (from Kenya)
- M&T (from DRC and RSA)
- DRA Mineral Projects (SA)
- Polysius (German)
- Traminco (Congolese)
- Civicon (Uganda)
- Bell (SA)
- PMES
Mining:
- KMS (French)
- Shaft Sinkers (SA)
- Byrnecut (Australian)
Relocation assistance programme:
- Kingdom Building Company
(Congolese)
- Optimum Consult (Congolese)
- Inter Orientale
Builders(Congolese)
- ADCR (Congolese)
- Kibali Construction
(Congolese)
- Chez Bibas (Congolese)
- SCBC (Congolese)
- MBOSAC (Congolese)
- El Shaddai Construction
(Congolese)
- Ethagec SPRL (Congolese)
- Algro Consult (Congolese)
- Plumbcore (RSA expats)
- EFB (Congolese)
- Kokwo Construction
(Congolese)
Logistics:
- FFK/Tradecorp – Kenya
- ETS (Congolese)
Drilling / exploration:
Congo seizes 375 kilos of coltan, Concern At
Escape of Two Convicted Army Officers
Congo seizes 375 kilos of
coltan being smuggled to Rwanda
http://str8talkchronicles.com/?p=39036
By Daily
Economic, September 29, 2013
Customs officers in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have seized 375
kilograms of coltan, a precious mineral used in electronics, en route to Rwanda, an official in Kinshasa said on Saturday.
The seizure was made Thursday at the “Great Barrier” border crossing, said
the minister of mines in North Kivu province,
Jean Ruyange.
Officers stopped a jeep headed towards Gisenyi, across the border in Rwanda, because
their suspicions were raised on seeing that the tires were depressed even
though no cargo was visible.
The following day “they noticed unusual work around the chassis, removed a
metal plate and found a quantity of coltan, around 375
kilos (825 pounds),” Ruyange added.
Gold Mining in Mali
The metallic ore is used in electronic devices such as mobile phones and
laptops.
Ruyange said the driver was taken away for questioning and an investigation
was under way to determine the origin of the ore and whether other shipments
have already crossed the border.
In November 2011, Rwanda
returned to the DR Congo more than 80 tonnes of
cassiterite, coltan and wolframite that had been smuggled out of North Kivu.
The top United Nations official in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) on Saturdayvoiced deep concern at the escape from prison of two
national army officers who were convicted of gross human rights violations,
including rape and murder.
A colonel in the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) escaped from Bukavu prison
in the eastern province
of South Kivu during the
night of 21-22 September, less than two weeks after he was sentenced to life
imprisonment by a military court.
The colonel escaped along with another inmate, an army major, according to a
news release issued by the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO).
“I am appealing to the Congolese officials to take the necessary actions to
provide security for the witnesses, lawyers and magistrates who participated in
the trial that led to the conviction of the two fugitives, as well as to open
judiciary investigations with a view to determining the exact circumstances of
the escape and the responsibilities of the suspected accomplices,” said the Secretary-General’s
Special Representative and head of MONUSCO, Martin Kobler.
“I also urge them to take the necessary actions to arrest the escapees,” he
said.
MONUSCO said the escape represents “a step backward” in the fight against
impunity for the perpetrators of gross human rights violations.
It also voiced concern over the faulty security and surveillance system of
the prison, which led to the escape of the two FARDC officers.
|
Giving pea nuts
back to Africans
Economic Development: Growing Together
Mining has a potentially huge contribution to make to sustainable economic development through the creation of jobs and prosperity and the payment of taxes and royalties.
"We hope that our success will encourage other leading global companies to invest."
By creating value for stakeholders we benefit as a business and grow
together with the countries in which we operate. The industry also plays
an important role in the creation of secondary businesses, the
development of infrastructure and the transfer of technical skills.
We believe that less developed countries derive great benefit from
the presence of responsible, world-class companies and we hope that our
success will encourage other leading global companies to invest there.
This section gives a consolidated picture of the economic value
contributed by Randgold in 2011, including taxes, duties, and dividends
paid to governments and investment in countries through local community
budgets, infrastructure and other benefits. It also sets out our current
approach to engaging with local suppliers and partners for mutual
economic benefit.
OUR APPROACH
Our philosophy of partnership with
the African countries in which we operate means that all our projects
are geared towards mutual benefits. As well as driving profits for the
company and tax revenues for our host countries, Randgold's mining
projects create a series of local economic benefits including
employment, revenue for local businesses and funding for community
development projects.
Our aim is to build capacity in the countries where we operate, and
we hope we can play a part in kick-starting national economies using
mineral wealth. We also understand the risks involved in African
investments and all our projects are preceded by a qualitative
assessment combining governance, geological prospectivity, commercial
infrastructure, environmental and social as well as other potential
country risks.
Where possible we work with governments and international agencies
such as USAID to ensure that as much social tax proceeds as possible
return to those local communities most affected by our mines.
"In Mali we have contributed more than US$1 billion dollars to the Treasury through taxes and other payments."
Our procurement policy is to form mutually beneficial relationships
with the best localsuppliers. This enables us to build trust on the
ground and also learn more about the business culture of the countries
where we are operating.
OUR PERFORMANCE
The economic value statement and
graph below show how our policy of creating value for all stakeholders
has translated this year into more than US$167 million in taxation and
dividend payments to host governments (attributable portion), and more
than US$18.6 million in direct community investment (attributable
portion).
The information in the economic value statement below has been
extracted from the financial statements and underlying accounting
records, except as stated. However, this non-GAAP information is
intended to summarise the overall contribution of the group to its
stakeholders and is not intended to replace or provide an alternative to
the IFRS financial statements.
In Mali, where our oldest mines exist, we have now contributed more
than US$1 billion dollars to the Treasury through taxes and other
payments. In the case of the Morila mine, the State of Mali has received
almost twice as much as have either of the joint venture partners.
Wherever possible and feasible, we procure goods and services from
local suppliers. By doing so, Randgold stimulates the local economy. Our
main supplier of hydrocarbons in Mali and Côte d'Ivoire is Ben & Co
Holdings, which has become one of the biggest fuel delivery businesses
in the region. In 2011, several small and medium size steel and tank
manufacturers were identified within Côte d'Ivoire and use of these for
sourcing construction materials is actively pursued. During 2011, Tongon
spent US$52.4 million or one out of each six dollars of its total costs
on local suppliers of goods and services. Where local suppliers are not
able to meet our needs we encourage international service providers to
partner with leading African companies and pass on their expertise. So
we invited multinational supply chain managers to work with our
logistics partners Multilog (formerly Afrilog) to train their employees
in stock control mechanisms.
DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE
As a gold mining
company, we are frequently the major catalysts behind some vital
infrastructure projects in the countries where we operate. These include
power stations, roads, electrical lines, water and sanitation. Improved
infrastructure provides the necessary foundation to supply our mines as
well as driving economic growth for local communities.
Our strategy is to leverage the sustainable development benefits of
these investments as much as possible. For example, a key focus for
national energy policy in the DRC is the construction of hydroelectric
power stations throughout the country. These will increase access to
sources of energy after years of armed conflict and civil unrest that
made such access impossible.
We are now investing US$165 million to develop the 20MW Nzoro
hydropower station adjacent to the Kibali River and other new power
stations in the wider region. Taken together these developments will
provide both a sustainable source of power for our mining activities as
well as helping local agencies to provide a safe and reliable
electricity supply for the local community.
"We are frequently the major catalysts behind some vital infrastructure projects in the countries where we operate."
Forging a pact with communities
Our mines cannot
operate without the goodwill of the communities in which they are based.
Given the frequent lack of development and the complex social and
political environments in which we operate, community relations are
probably the single biggest risk factor we face. We strive to both
minimise negative impacts on communities and to make the most of the
economic and social benefits that our presence brings.
OUR APPROACH
Our policy is to maximise local
economic development by empowering local communities and to act with the
highest ethical standards when managing issues such as grievances or
resettlement requirements.
We work with communities by supporting and participating in the
development of elected local community development committees. We
provide the funding and resourcing for these committees which allocate
money to community development projects within a strategic framework set
by our 'sustainable development filter' (see details on page 79).
Committee budgets are approved at mining company board level and these
funds are entirely separate from payments to governments, such as the
'Patent' social tax, resettlement related compensation or medical care
through our clinics. They are also complemented by charity fundraising
events initiated by our employees and joint ventures with charitable
bodies such as the medical charities Doc to Dock and CURE.
Artisanal and small-scale mining
As a mining
company, we are sensitive to the potential for community issues to
appear due to tension between our operations and artisanal and
small-scale miners (ASM). To mitigate the business risks from alienating
the ASM community the company invests in creating alternative available
livelihood activities such as agriculture. We also seek to build
effective co-habitation partnerships with legal ASMs based on work close
to, but not on, our permits. This has been particularly relevant this
year to the Gounkoto and Kibali areas. Randgold always tries to find
effective ways to manage the artisanal mining issue in compliance with
national laws and best practice guidelines such as the IFC Guidelines.
A ROAD MORE TRAVELLED
The upgrading of roads is a usual consequence of our operati ons
and this has been the case in Southern Mali, Western Mali, Northern
Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC. For example, the network of roads in the
region surrounding the Kibali project in the DRC is generally poor,
consisting entirely of unmaintained gravel roads.
As part of the Kibali project, Randgold has funded and managed the
upgrade of the main access route between the towns of Doko and Aru on
the Ugandan border. The Doko-Aru road is particularly significant as it
links Kibali with international ports.
A journey that used to take around five days now takes approximately
four hours. The upgraded road is having a highly positive economic
impact: it has reduced the cost of transporting food and other
essentials to the northeastern DRC, halved living costs and increased
the availability of public transport. The new road ser ves
as the primary land transport route for equipment and supplies to and
from the Kibali project. Its upgrade has also benefited the many weekly
markets located throughout the project area, which have seen a
considerable rise in the influx and trade of a variety of goods. The
road is now considered a national public route and the ongoing
maintenance of the road will largely be the responsibility of the DRC
government.
WORKING WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES
All our community
activity is carried out with respect for the cultures, customs, values
and heritage of local communities, including indigenous peoples. At the
exploration stage, the exploration teams consider social issues in their
research.
At the pre-construction/construction stage in our projects we ask the
communities to select representatives for a local community liaison
committee (CLC). A public participation process (PPP) is launched and
the CLC members are also taken on a visit to an operating mine, so they
get a deep understanding of our proposed project. The CLC assists us
with local recruitment of construction employees, our communications and
other actions around our projects. When the project becomes a mine a
new election is held and the CLC, changes its name and focus to the
community development committee (CDC). The CDC prioritises community
development projects and decides how its own budget will be spent.
Members of a local community committee may include local authority
leaders, village-level traditional leaders, representatives and
delegates from women, youth and hunter associations alongside company
representatives. Our general manager: human capital attends two
community committee meetings on each mine each year. Our CEO also holds
mass meetings and takes every opportunity that presents itself to
interact with communities, to underline our commitment to the local
community and to hear feedback directly.
Randgold provides a 'sustainable development filter' to help guide
the CDC in selecting and prioritising projects. This has the dual
purpose of bringing projects in line with industry, national and
international guidelines and focusing them around five main priorities:
improving basic health, improving basic education, establishing food
security, improving access to a potable water supply and creating
non-mining employment opportunities.
OUR PERFORMANCE
Our total spend on community
development and related projects more than tripled this year to a total
of US$18.6 million (attributable portion). This came from our community
development budgets, advantageous infrastructural development for the
community and philanthropy. Some of the many individual projects
supported by these funds in 2011 include the construction of a school in
the Massawa area of Senegal, the creation of a market gardening
programme for women in Côte d'Ivoire and the drilling of water boreholes
for a number of organisations in Mali. At more mature mines, such as
Morila, emphasis has shifted towards local economic development schemes
such as agriculture projects.
In Sitikily, near the Loulo mine, we have also funded an initiative
with USAID that enables one of their governance committees to work with
the local mayor to ensure that as much as possible of the patent tax
paid by the mine is returned to the local community.
Ongoing work at all our mines includes analysis on the feasibility of
agribusiness. In particular we encourage each mine to form alliances
with agricultural entrepreneurs and businesses to train local farmers to
produce agricultural products. The local farmers then sell their
produce to a central co-operative set-up on or close to our mines'
locations. When set up the owners of the co-operative include the mine,
the joint venture partners from formal agribusinesses and entrepreneurs.
The farmers, who supply the agribusiness with produce – such as honey,
chicken, eggs and vegetables – will inherit the mining company's share
of the co-operative as part of our closure plan. The agribusiness also
has the aim of increasing non-mine employment opportunities during the
operation of the mine.
POST-CONFLICT REBUILDING IN TONGON
The Tongon
mine is located in the north of Côte d'lvoire, 55 kilometres south of
the border with Mali. It started operations in 2010, coinciding with the
50th anniversary of Côte d'lvoire's independence.
Up to 30 000 people live in the eight villages which are directly
affected by the Tongon mine and since 2008 three representatives from
each village have joined officers from town councils and others on a
local committee to manage community development in the area. According
to director of community action at Tongon Denise N'gom, the creation of
the community liaison committee in 2008 was an important factor in
building trust between the local community and the company. Mr N'gom
said, "At first people in M'bengue and Diawala districts didn't believe
they'd see any real benefits from the mining project. Now their minds
are changing. They feel positive towards the mine and they want to work
together with the company and the committee to build more schools,
clinics and new farms."
Côte d'lvoire is still recovering from a full-scale civil war.
Although most of the fighting ended in 2004 the country has remained
tense and there were violent skirmishes at the start of 2011 following
disputed elections. The committee has helped to maintain peaceful and
constructive community relations at Tongon throughout this transitional
period and has helped contribute to a brighter future by funding the
repair of infrastructure damaged during the war including bridges and
administrative buildings in M'bengue.
This year the local committee has been responsible for distributing a
community development budget of around US$160 000 on new projects.
Projects taken forward by the committee this year include:
- New classrooms for the Katonon and Kationron communities.
- Rehabilitation of the M'bengue secondary school laboratory building.
- Contributions towards the M'bengue health clinic, including an electricity generator.
- Supplying hand pumps and repairing water pumps in a number of areas.
- A market gardening project aimed at women in all the local villages.
The latter project includes training women and men in farming methods
and providing them with materials such as seeds and fertiliser to grow
crops including tomatoes, rice and onions. The project links with our
larger strategy to ensure a viable agribusiness economy is in place to
provide non-mine and sustainable employment opportunities during and
after the life of the mine. A further US$500 000 has been committed by
Randgold for this project. This sustainable employment creation and food
security scheme also requires partnering with local entrepreneurs and
farmers and the initiation of a microlending scheme.
A lack of jobs for youth is a priority identified by all the villages
on the committee. It is a problem made worse by high levels of
illiteracy. The committee has therefore focused a number of projects on
basic education, including the rebuilt school laboratory and invested in
new businesses including farmland and chicken farming. A dam has also
been constructed near the mine which can be used to irrigate the farms
during the dry season long after the mine has closed.
"Transparent and two-way consultation is fundamental to our resettlement process."
GRIEVANCE MECHANISM
Randgold has a grievance
procedure in place that all members of the local community can access if
they believe that they have been unfairly treated or discriminated
against. The procedure has been set up using guidance laid out by the
IFC Performance Standards and the Equator Principles. This process aims
to maintain a peaceful social atmosphere in the case of a non-work
related disagreement. A total of 395 grievances were registered at our
five major sites through our grievance mechanism in 2011 (Refer to the
table below). In total, 97% of these grievances have now been resolved
with the remaining 11 under review at the time of writing.
Resettlement
Large areas of land are required to
manage a successful gold mine and that unfortunately can mean some
people must be displaced. At Randgold, we are committed to minimising
involuntary resettlement and, where it does need to take place, to
ensuring resettled people have their standard of living improved, or at
least restored. We conduct our resettlement process in full consultation
with the affected parties and in accordance with legislative
requirements. We are guided by the IFC's Performance Standards in
regards to land and resettlement.
OUR APPROACH
The focus for our resettlement
process is the 'affected person'. Transparent and two-way consultation
is fundamental to our resettlement process and a public participation
process (PPP) is the starting point for all our resettlement activity.
PPPs use the locally elected community committees as a key mechanism for
discussing options, alongside radio broadcasts, meetings with tribal
and religious leaders and open forums attended by the CEO. The results
of the PPP are incorporated in a RAP which is also put forward for
further consultation.
Our policies are designed to maintain community structures wherever
possible and ensure that we compensate fairly in mitigation for any
adverse effects on the community where they cannot be avoided. On the
ground in many of the places we work financial compensation is not
considered best practice. In the vast majority of cases we have a policy
of a 'like for like' asset replacement.
OUR PERFORMANCE
In 2011, we spent an attributable
US$18 million (US$41 million on a 100% basis) on RAP implementation. In
all cases those people who were relocated moved to an improved
socio-economic situation, while maintaining their neighbourhood
relationships in their new homes and farms.
The Tongon resettlement process began in 2008 and, despite the
complexities caused by the ongoing legacy of the recent civil war, the
successful resettlement of more than 400 people, their
extended families and agricultural land was completed in 2011.
Relocations were focused around new hamlets located where good farmland
was available.
The Kibali RAP is the company's biggest to date involving up to 17
000 people from more than 3 600 households. The two largest villages
have now been successfully relocated. June 2011 saw the official opening
of the new Kokiza resettlement, which will include over 4 000 brick
houses, 20 schools, police stations, clinics, new gardens and several
churches including a large Roman Catholic Church.
At Gounkoto, we have completed the resettlement of all affected
households and all affected farmers have been satisfactorily
compensated. This includes the resettlement of Faraba village (eight
households) and the resettlement of the chief of Sansamba and his
extended family to Sakola, with their full co-operation.
"We do not see human rights as a passive responsibility,
we take positive steps to ensure our projects do not infringe on the
enjoyment of rights in our areas of impact."
Human rights
If a mining project infringes on
people's human rights it can face real financial, reputational and in
some cases legal risks. Our overall objective is to uphold fundamental
human rights wherever we do business. Operating with respect for human
rights is a particularly relevant consideration in post-conflict zones,
such as the DRC and Côte d'Ivoire, where there is a greater exposure to
human rights risks.
OUR APPROACH
We recognise our responsibility to
respect human rights by essentially doing 'no harm' to the individuals
and groups within the sphere of impact of our mines. We do not see this
as a passive responsibility, we recognise that it requires us to take
positive steps to ensure our projects do not infringe on the enjoyment
of rights in our areas of impact.
We identify any potential human rights issues at an early stage as
part of the ESIA that we carry out on all projects. As projects develop
we then put in place management structures to mitigate those risks.
It is Randgold's policy not to arm any security forces on our mines.
Instead, we agree legally binding contracts with the relevant local
authorities that take into account the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and aim to ensure safety and security for any military or
policing matters. We also include a human rights clause in our
agreements with all suppliers. This binds them to comply with Randgold's
ethics and our 'zero tolerance' anti-bribery policy. It also puts a
legal duty on the supplier to ensure there is no child or forced labour
within the supply chain.
However, we recognise that in areas of weak governance, legal
compliance based approaches cannot always guarantee that companies are
fulfilling their responsibility to respect the full framework of
fundamental rights. We therefore also provide relevant staff, including
security personnel, with appropriate cultural and human rights training
and guidance and where possible invite relevant agencies of the United
Nations to conduct training.
We also work with partners in both the local and international
community to raise awareness and education levels concerning fundamental
human rights.
OUR PERFORMANCE
Although our mines are located in
relatively stable locations within each country, the fundamental
protection of human rights for our employees and the communities in
which we operate remains a challenge.
The DRC remains an active conflict zone where the Lord's Resistance
Army and other militia operate and we have therefore fixed detailed and
binding human rights agreements with the regional governor in the Haute
Orientele area where the project is situated.
This year security guards at the Kibali gold project as well as the
Tongon, Morila and Loulo mines received training from the human rights
and child protection officers of either MONUC, the United Nations
Organization Mission in the DRC or ONUCI, the UN operation in Côte
d'Ivoire.
Plans have been prepared for the remainder of the security personnel
in the group to receive human rights training in 2012. From 2012, human
rights appreciation training will be incorporated into induction
training for all employees.
NEXT STEPS
We are proud of the real partnerships
we have built up with all our local communities, but we understand that
our license to operate is not indefinite. It is important that we are
constantly and consistently active on the ground to ensure that we
incorporate
community feedback and expectations into both our
business planning and day-to-day activities at our mines. This involves
resolving all outstanding grievances alongside any future ones.
In the coming year, we face particular challenges with two mines at
very different stages of their life. As construction at the Kibali site
continues, the increased building activity makes ongoing communication
with all local stakeholders vital. At Morila, although we have extended
its life beyond its original closure date, the mine is winding down
production and our detailed closure plan, including a strategy for
agribusiness, needs to be implemented to ensure we reduce the impact of
mine closure on the local economy.
We also have planned steps to improve our reporting on issues such as
human rights and resettlement. In particular, the management of human
rights is an issue that we expect to attract increasing attention. Our
policies and operational management of this issue are currently site
specific and while this has been very effective on the ground, we
recognise that we need to bolster these efforts. In 2012, we will
undertake work to establish a more structured company wide human rights
policy and control system. This will include consideration of extending
the formal embedding of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights into our security management practices in West Africa and also
the consideration of the guiding principles on business and human rights
formulated by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative on
Business and Human Rights, Professor John Ruggie. |
Randgold seeks arbitration in Mali tax dispute
August 14 2013 at 03:52pm
By Reuters
Reuters.
A worker wears protective glasses at the Randgold Resources' Tongon mine in northern Ivory Coast in this file picture.
Bamako -
Africa-focused gold miner Randgold Resources is seeking international
arbitration in a dispute over 23 billion CFA francs ($46.5 million) in
taxes which Mali says the company owes the West African state, a company
executive told Reuters.
Mahamadou Samaké, group regional
manager for West Africa, said Randgold was contesting the bill
“The government is asking us for a tax adjustment of 23 billion CFA francs, which we dispute,” he told Reuters.
The state had already reduced its
claim from 43 billion CFA francs in the case, which concerns tax
payments for 2008 to 2010 on the salaries of foreign employees, he said.
The company has taken the case to
the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
There is no deadline for a decision, he said.
“The state should not see this as a hostile act,” Samake said.
He said the firm's mining convention stipulated that the company would only be liable to taxes included in that agreement.
“The problem is that there are
taxes which have been created since the signing of the agreement... For
us, based on our convention, we are not liable for what is being asked
of us,” he said.
Mining Minister Amadou Baba Sy
said Randgold had sought international arbitration after talks at a
ministerial level had failed.
“Mali has lawyers which are going
to defend its interests and Randgold also has its advisers... At the end
of this international arbitration, we will have a verdict.”
Randgold announced a 62 percent
fall in second-quarter profit last week to $54 million and pledged to
cut costs, including at its Loulo-Gounkoto mine in Mali.
Samake said the company was seeking to reduce the cost of inputs such as energy but had sought to avoid laying off staff.
Precious
metals mining companies are under intense pressure to cut costs after a
20-percent slump in gold this year sent prices to a near 3-year low. -
Reuters
Gertler Earns Billions as Mine Deals Fail to Enrich Congo
By Franz Wild, Michael J. Kavanagh & Jonathan Ferziger -
Dec 6, 2012 1:00 AM GMT+0300
Bloomberg Markets Magazine
Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
Israeli billionaire Dan Gertler -- a friend of Congo's president -- has
amassed a fortune via private deals for mining assets in the world's
most destitute nation. Gertler poses for a photograph in his office at
the Israel Diamond Exchange in Ramat Gan, Israel, in June.
Dan Gertler’s bearded face lights up as he looks out the
helicopter window. Below, an installation twice the size of Monaco rises
from a clearing in the central African forest, where it transforms ore
mined from the ochre earth into sheets of copper.
Dec. 6 (Bloomberg) --
Israeli investor Dan Gertler, a personal friend of Congo President
Joseph Kabila, earns billions by secretly buying mining assets at
bargain prices from the poorest country on earth. Bloomberg's Michael
Kavanagh, Franz Wild and Jonathan Ferziger report.
This story is featured in the January issue of Bloomberg Markets
magazine. (Source: Bloomberg)
Gertler, left, whose love affair
with Congo began in 1997, when the country was one of the top five
producers of diamonds in the world, tours a Katanga Mining Ltd. mine
Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
Gertler, whose grandfather
co-founded Israel’s diamond exchange in 1947, arrived in Congo in 1997
seeking rough diamonds. Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
Diamonds have been a backdrop to
Dan Gertler’s life since his childhood in affluent northern Tel Aviv,
where he had a secular upbringing. Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
As a 23-year-old trader Dan
Gertler struck a deep friendship with Joseph Kabila, who then headed the
Congolese army and today is the nation’s president. Photographer:
Naashon Zalk/Bloomberg
Billionaire Dan Gertler speaks
during a Bloomberg interview at his office in the Israel Diamond
Exchange in Ramat Gan. Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
The open pits of the Mutanda
copper mine are seen from the air in Katanga province, Democratic
Republic of Congo. Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
The belt of earth that stretches
from northern Zambia into southern Congo holds one of the world’s
biggest reserves of copper. Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
Billionaire Dan Gertler walks
through the Katanga Copper Co. mining complex during a tour of
operations in Kolwezi, Dmocratic Republic of Congo, on Wednesday, Aug.
1, 2012. Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
Giant mining trucks remove ore
from an open pit during excavations at a Katanga Mining Ltd. mine.
Photographer: Simon Dawson/Bloomberg
“Look at it, look at it,”
the Israeli billionaire, 38, shouts through the headset above the thrum
of rotors. “This is what life is all about,” Gertler says as the chopper
lands in the scorching, dry afternoon heat of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
“Everyone comes with dreams and illusions and promises. Everyone wants quick deals. They don’t want to invest. We are real.”
Wearing a black suit by French fashion house Zilli, ritual white tassels hanging off both hips and a black-velvet yarmulke, Gertler hops out into the dust of Mutanda, a mine controlled by his partner, Glencore International Plc (GLEN), that holds cobalt and some of the highest-grade copper in the world, Bloomberg Markets magazine reports in its January issue.
He climbs into an air-conditioned Toyota Land Cruiser to tour
the mine, tapping messages into one of his three BlackBerrys, whose
batteries, like those of smartphones and laptops everywhere, often
depend on cobalt to keep their charge.
Gertler has stakes in companies that control 9.6 percent of world cobalt production, based on U.S. Geological Survey data and company figures.
Diamonds and Gold
That’s
just the beginning of Gertler’s influence in Congo, the largest country
of sub-Saharan Africa, with the world’s richest deposits of cobalt and
major reserves of copper, diamonds, gold, tin and coltan, an ore
containing the metal tantalum, which is used in consumer electronics.
His Gibraltar- registered Fleurette Properties Ltd. owns stakes in
various Congolese mines through at least 60 holding companies in
offshore tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands.
Gertler,
whose grandfather co-founded Israel’s diamond exchange in 1947, arrived
in Congo in 1997 seeking rough diamonds. The 23-year-old trader struck a
deep friendship with Joseph Kabila, who then headed the Congolese army and today is the nation’s president. Since those early days, Gertler has invested in iron ore,
gold, cobalt and copper as well as agriculture, oil and banking. In the
process, he’s built up a net worth of at least $2.5 billion, according
to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.
Roster of Critics
He’s
also acquired a roster of critics. Many of the government’s deals with
Gertler deprive Congo’s 68 million people of badly needed funds,
according to the London-based anticorruption group Global Witness and lawmakers from Congo and the U.K., the country’s second-biggest aid donor after the U.S.
“Dan
Gertler is essentially looting Congo at the expense of its people,”
says Jean Pierre Muteba, the head of a group of nongovernmental
organizations that monitor the mining sector in Katanga province, where
most of Congo’s copper is located.
“He has political connections,
so state companies sell him mines for low prices and he sells them on
for huge profits. That’s how he’s become a billionaire.”
In the
eight months preceding November 2011 elections, in which Kabila won a
second five-year term, companies affiliated with Gertler bought shares
in five mining ventures from three state-owned firms, according to
minutes of board meetings, company filings and documents published
later. The state companies didn’t announce the sales.
‘Lies Are Screaming’
In
at least three of the cases, prices paid were below valuations of the
projects made by analysts at Deutsche Bank AG, London-based Numis Securities Ltd. and Oriel Securities Ltd. and Atlanta-based consulting firm Golder Associates Inc.
Gertler denies that he purchased companies at below-market rates or that any of his deals have involved kickbacks.
“The
lies are screaming to the heavens,” he says in his native Hebrew in a
June interview, during three days Bloomberg reporters spent with him in
Congo and Israel.
He returns from Congo to his home in Bnei Brak,
an ultra- Orthodox suburb of Tel Aviv, each week to spend the Sabbath
with his wife, Anat, and their nine children.
Congo has a history of making deals out of the public view. The International Monetary Fund
this month halted a $532 million loan program with the country. The IMF
said the government didn’t adhere to its demand to publish the full
details of a 2011 mining deal between a state-owned miner and a company
that two people familiar with the matter say is affiliated with Gertler.
Losing Disbursements
Congo will lose out on three loan
disbursements worth a total of about $225 million, according to Oscar
Melhado, the IMF’s resident representative in Congo.
The
Washington-based lender already froze payments to Congo in December
2011, because a lack of transparency made it hard to track whether funds
from mineral deals were flowing into state coffers, Antoinette Sayeh,
director of the IMF’s African Department, said in March 2012.
“Given
the significance of natural resources in this economy and the huge
impact that natural resources can have, we think it’s very important to
help DRC improve in terms of its governance,” she said.
As the
country’s mineral wealth is developed, the lot of Congo’s people isn’t
improving. Congo remains the world’s most- destitute nation, according
to the UN Development Programme’s
measure of health, education and income. Most of the country lives
without electricity or running water, and one in five children dies
before his or her fifth birthday. Armed groups continue to destabilize
the country.
Election Irregularities
Congo’s per capita
income of just $280, in 2005 dollars, is below what it was in 1960, when
the country -- formerly called Zaire -- gained independence from
Belgium. The World Bank ranks Congo No. 181 out of 185 in its Ease of Doing Business Index for 2013, down from No. 180 a year earlier.
Kabila’s
re-election was marred by irregularities and violence, according to
observers from Congo’s Catholic Church and the European Union. Kabila’s
opponent, Etienne Tshisekedi, contested the 49 percent-to-32 percent vote, charging it was fraudulent. The Congolese Supreme Court ruled it valid.
In August, U.S. Senator Tom Coburn,
an Oklahoma Republican, wrote to Meg Lundsager, the U.S. representative
to the IMF, demanding better oversight of the loan program in Congo.
“Billions of dollars of state assets have been transferred for a
fraction of their value to nebulous international firms on the IMF’s
watch,” Coburn wrote in the letter, a copy of which was obtained by Bloomberg News. The U.S. gave $268.2 million in aid in 2011.
Glencore’s Role
Lawmakers
from the U.K. are demanding that aid to Congo be slashed because the
country can’t show that earnings from its mines are benefiting its
people.
Global Witness has called on Glencore and FTSE 100 Index- listed Eurasian Natural Resources Corp., (ENRC)
two companies involved in the pre-election deals with Gertler, to
publish details of the transactions and dispel the anti-corruption
group’s suspicions that Congolese officials received kickbacks in return
for selling assets to Gertler.
“Offering, paying, authorizing,
soliciting or accepting bribes is unacceptable to Glencore,” company
spokesman Charles Watenphul said in an e-mail. ENRC declined to comment.
Gertler says disclosing the deals to the public is the Congolese
government’s responsibility, not his. “We’re a private company. Why
should we announce?” he says.
“I should get a Nobel Prize,” adds Gertler, who paces around and waves his arms as his demeanor swings between anger and boyish charm during interviews.
“They need people like us, who come and put billions in the ground. Without this, the resources are worth nothing.”
‘Braved the Hurricane’
The
government insists it’s following the rules of the IMF agreement, which
calls for it to disclose deals for its natural resources. And Kabila,
41, defends Gertler as a man who staked his fortune on Congo at a time
when the country was wracked by war and in desperate need of cash.
“The
truth is, during our very difficult times, there were investors who
came and left and others who braved the hurricane,” he said of Gertler
in a brief interview at his riverside palace in December 2011. “He’s one
of those.”
The bond between the two men is so strong that Kabila
at times uses Gertler as a special diplomatic envoy, including in 2002,
when the Israeli businessman met with then-U.S. National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice in Washington to ask for help ending Congo’s war with its neighbors.
Secular Upbringing
Diamonds
have been a backdrop to Gertler’s life since his childhood in affluent
northern Tel Aviv, where he had a secular upbringing. His mother ran a
pop-music radio station, and his father was a goalkeeper for Maccabi Tel Aviv, a top-division pro soccer team, before becoming a diamond dealer.
As
a youth, Gertler got up at 5 a.m. to learn how to polish gems before
heading to school. He joined his grandfather, Romanian emigre Moshe
Schnitzer, at business meetings to watch him negotiate diamond deals.
When Schnitzer died in 2007, Benjamin Netanyahu, who’s now Israel’s prime minister, gave a eulogy.
Gertler, sitting below a stained-glass dome at his office in one of the Israel Diamond Exchange’s four towers in Ramat Gan,
just east of Tel Aviv, turns wistful when he talks about Schnitzer. He
recalls a business lesson his grandfather imparted: “He told me: ‘Dan,
you meet your bankers and you ask for credit only when you don’t need
it. Just to secure it. Because when you need it, it is too late.’”
‘Guy Has Guts’
At
age 22, Gertler started buying rough diamonds so he could work with
larger volumes, he says. Gertler flew between war-torn nations such as
Liberia and Angola and the major diamond centers in the U.S., India and
Israel, buying and selling gems, he says.
“From the beginning, he
went his own way,” says his uncle, Shmuel Schnitzer, 63, who was
president of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses from 2002 to
2006.“The guy has guts. This is the basic thing about him.”
Gertler
broke with his family’s secular tradition when he and Anat decided to
adopt an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle. They’ve banned television and
computers from their five-story, terraced house in Bnei Brak, whose
crisp stone finishing and verdant shrubbery lining each floor contrast
with the neighbors’ concrete apartment buildings.
Charitable Giving
Today, Gertler donates to Jewish charities in Israel, including Migdal Ohr,
which runs boarding schools for indigent children and orphans. He also
helped finance a Jewish bone- marrow registry at the Ezer Mizion medical
charity in Tel Aviv, which says it’s the largest in the world of its
kind.
In Congo, he supports the Chabad-Lubavitch center, which
provides religious and educational services to Jews throughout Africa.
Gertler’s family foundation also contributes to charities operating in
Congo, including health centers and Operation Smile, which performs
surgery on children born with cleft palates. He has also put $12 million
into building an agricultural academy on the outskirts of Kinshasa, the
capital, that co-founder Gil Arbel likens to a “Congolese kibbutz.”
Gertler’s
love affair with Congo began in 1997, when the country was one of the
top five producers of diamonds in the world. In May of that year,
insurgents led by Laurent Kabila, the father of the current president,
overthrew the corrupt regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, a U.S. ally who had
ruled for 32 years. After taking Kinshasa on May 17, Laurent Kabila
declared himself president and renamed the country Democratic Republic
of Congo.
Befriending Kabila
A few days later, Gertler’s
plane touched down. Shlomo Bentolila, chief rabbi of Kinshasa’s
Chabad-Lubavitch center, arranged for the young diamond merchant to meet
Kabila’s son Joseph, the new army chief, at the InterContinental hotel,
Gertler says.
The two clicked immediately, Gertler recalls. Both
carried a heavy responsibility at a young age: Kabila was the commander
of tens of thousands of troops, and Gertler was trading $2 billion of
diamonds annually, he says.
For the next year, they would often
get together before sunrise at Kabila’s compound. One day, Kabila
suggested that Gertler meet the president. Laurent needed money to fight
his war and wanted to offer Gertler a monopoly on Congo’s diamond
sales, Gertler says. Kabila asked for $20 million in cash, Gertler says.
Gertler agreed.
A few days later, he was back in Israel, still
celebrating the deal, when the Congolese president called. He needed the
money immediately.
Grandfather’s Teachings
At 8 a.m.,
Gertler called Union Bank of Israel Ltd., where he successfully put his
grandfather’s teachings on building bankers’ trust to the test. Using a
combination of bank credit, inheritance, cash reserves and liquidated
stocks, Gertler scraped together the payment and sent it to the Swiss
account of Congo’s central bank, he says. Gertler had bet his fortune on
a president at war.
The risks he faced became evident in January
2001, when a bodyguard shot Laurent Kabila dead and his son took power.
To Gertler’s surprise, his friend canceled his diamond monopoly and
never explained why, Gertler says. Rather than hold a grudge or sue,
Gertler sold diamonds without the monopoly and maintained his ties to
Kabila, whom he refers to as “my friend Joseph.”
The young
president needed friends: When he took over, vast swaths of the country
were under the control of rebel factions backed by neighboring Uganda
and Rwanda.
Role as Envoy
Kabila asked Gertler to help
woo support from the U.S., which had been suspicious of his father’s
Marxist pedigree -- Che Guevara fought alongside Laurent in Congo in
1965 -- to bolster his position as leader and help start peace
negotiations with his neighbors.
In April 2002, Gertler says, he
secretly shuttled between Washington, Kinshasa and Kigali, Rwanda,
relaying letters between Kabila and Rice. Jendayi Frazer, a former
special assistant to then-President George W. Bush,
says she met with Gertler several times, both with Rice and on her
behalf. Gertler’s intervention was instrumental to talks that resulted
in a peace accord, says Frazer, who now teaches international politics
at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh. “He was serious and credible,” Frazer says of Gertler. “He wasn’t just trading on his friendship with Kabila.”
By
the time the peace deal was signed between the government and rebel
factions in 2002, millions of people had died in Congo -- if not from
bullets or machete blows, then from the breakdown of health services and
sanitation.
Diamond Sales
Gertler, meanwhile, won back a
near monopoly of Congo’s diamond trade. One of his companies,
Canada-based Emaxon Finance International Inc., paid $15 million in cash
and loans to the country’s state-owned diamond miner, known as MIBA,
for a four- year contract to sell 88 percent of its production.
Congo
was desperate for investment at the time, Frazer says. “It’s not like
he crowded out a lot of other investors,” she says. “There weren’t
many.”
Kabila, who had formed a government in which former rebel
chiefs were cabinet ministers as part of the peace deal, tried to
kick-start Congo’s economy. The ministers signed dozens of deals to
exploit the country’s natural resources with foreign companies, many of
them at prices that undervalued the assets, according to reports by the
World Bank and the Congolese Parliament.
In 2006, Kabila’s
People’s Party for Reconstruction and Development, with a platform of
rebuilding the country’s war- ravaged infrastructure, was elected in
Congo’s first free elections in four decades, certified by the UN.
Mining Review
Kabila
promised to tackle corruption and launched a review of mining
contracts, observed by several Congolese organizations as well as the
Atlanta-based Carter Center, the human rights group founded by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter.
The backroom deals continued, says Peter Rosenblum, a professor of law at Columbia University
who headed the Carter Center’s mission to observe the mining review.
“What happened in 2008 and 2009 really proved that the Gertlers of the
world would win by doing business the way they’d been doing it all
along,” Rosenblum says. Today, Transparency International ranks only a dozen countries below Congo in its Corruption Perceptions Index.
As
Kabila cemented his hold on power, Gertler expanded beyond diamonds
into mining of other minerals and metals, forging ventures with
government firms and foreign partners. Gertler also controls companies
that won the rights to two oil blocks along the Ugandan border on Lake
Albert, according to three people familiar with the matter.
Charm and Aggression
When
asked whether his companies have stakes in the blocks, Gertler replies,
“If there is the right opportunity for us to have a big oil play in
Congo or somewhere else, we will definitely go for it.”
Six
mining executives who have done business with Gertler say he mixes charm
and aggressiveness to make deals. During negotiations, which are often
in French -- a language Gertler only partially understands -- he will be
hunched over his BlackBerry, seemingly oblivious to the debate, says
Pieter Deboutte, the Belgian who runs Gertler’s business in Congo.
Then,
suddenly, he’ll catch everyone off guard by interjecting, “Stop, wait a
bit!” and launch into a list of orders in English to his staff,
Deboutte says.
Big Profits
Gertler’s dealings can be
wildly profitable. In one case, he earned a 500 percent return in just
six months without risking a single penny as the middleman in a deal for
Societe Miniere de Kabolela & Kipese SPRL, or SMKK, which owns a copper and cobalt deposit in the heart of Katanga’s richest mining zone.
In 2009, SMKK was half-owned by the state’s Gecamines, short for La Generale des Carrieres & des Mines,
and half-owned by ENRC, the Kazakh-founded mining company that’s listed
on the London Stock Exchange. ENRC wanted to acquire all of SMKK but
didn’t exercise its right of first refusal to buy the government’s
stake, according to the joint-venture agreement.
Instead, ENRC
made a deal with a company controlled by Gertler’s family trust --
Emerald Star Enterprises Ltd., based in the British Virgin Islands. On
Dec. 21, 2009, ENRC paid the Gertler firm $25 million for an option to
buy the remaining 50 percent stake of SMKK, according to filings ENRC
made with the London Stock Exchange.
Gertler didn’t even own the asset he was selling the option on -- at least not yet.
‘Maximize Value’
In
February 2010, Gecamines agreed to sell its shares in SMKK to Gertler’s
Emerald Star for $15 million, according to the sales agreement
published by the mines ministry.
Four months later, ENRC
completed the transaction by buying Gertler’s Emerald Star for $50
million -- paying a total of $75 million, or five times the price
Gertler paid for the asset. Gertler says it’s not his fault if the
government didn’t get a good price for its SMKK holding.
“That is
what we know how to do better than anyone else: We know how to maximize
value for our projects,” he says. “If the government would like to hire
my services to maximize value for their stake, they should approach me.
No problem.”
Gecamines’ current managers declined to comment
because, they said, they took over the company after the transaction,
which was detailed in an ENRC earnings report released in May 2010. ENRC
declined to comment.
Copper’s Attraction
Copper is what
attracts most miners to Congo, Gertler says. The metal traded at $7,991
a ton in London on Dec. 5, more than double its price of $3,190 on Jan.
5, 2009. The belt of earth that stretches from northern Zambia into
southern Congo holds one of the world’s biggest reserves of copper.
About
37 miles from SMKK, Gertler has a copper and cobalt joint venture with
ENRC known as Comide SPRL. Touring around the mine, Gertler jumps behind
the wheel of a small bus. While his associates laugh nervously, Gertler
almost crashes into two parked helicopters and then speeds around the
mounds of ore, sending his passengers reeling across their seats.
“He’s
like a kid,” Yariv Bahat, Gertler’s exploration manager, yells, sweat
streaming down his face. Gertler says he hasn’t had a driver’s license
for years.
Gertler increased his stake in the mining property in
2011 -- one of at least six assets the state sold to him that year,
according to company documents obtained by Bloomberg.
A company
based in the British Virgin Islands, Straker International Corp., bought
state-owned Gecamines’ 25 percent stake in the Comide project in 2011,
according to Comide board minutes from June 29, 2011. Gertler controls
Straker, according to two people familiar with the matter.
Unannounced Deal
The
full details of the sale weren’t published, in breach of the terms of
the IMF’s loan agreement with Congo, resulting in the Fund’s decision
this month to cancel its program with the country, the IMF says.
Gecamines Chairman Albert Yuma says he wasn’t aware of the sale. Gertler
refuses to discuss it.
In another deal, in June 2010 and March
2011, state-owned miner Societe de Developpement Industriel & Minier
du Congo, or Sodimico, sold more than 30 mining licenses, including
those for two copper projects, to Gertler-linked companies based in Hong
Kong and the British Virgin Islands for a total of $60 million. Numis
Securities and Oriel Securities estimated the two projects to be worth
$1.6 billion, though their valuations included ore- processing plants as
well as the licenses.
Sodimico didn’t even get to keep all of
the money it made from Gertler’s companies, Laurent Lambert Tshisola
Kangoa, its chief executive officer, told Bloomberg News in July 2011.
He said the mines ministry demanded he give $10 million to the country’s
general election fund.
‘Not Economic’
“It was not an
economic decision by Sodimico,” he said of the sale. Gertler’s joint
venture relinquished the rights to the biggest of the mines, Frontier,
according to the mines ministry. In July 2012, Congo sold ENRC the
license for Frontier, which in 2009 had been the country’s biggest
taxpayer, for $101.5 million.
“When you see similar things with
slightly different variations happening again and again, you have to
stop and think, ‘Obviously something is going wrong,’” Daniel Balint-
Kurti, chief researcher at Congo for Global Witness, told the U.K.
Parliament’s International Development Committee in 2011.
At
the Mutanda project, too, Gertler paid far less for his 20 percent than
his partner, Glencore International, paid for similar assets. Gertler’s
stake came to light only in May 2011 - - months after it was purchased
-- when Glencore spelled out the mine’s ownership deep in the 1,637-page
prospectus for its initial share sale.
Stake’s Value
Glencore’s
outside consulting firm valued the entire mine at about $3 billion.
Based on net present value calculations using figures from Glencore’s
May 2011 prospectus, Gertler’s stake, including royalties and other
payments, was worth $849 million at the time.
One of Gertler’s
British Virgin Islands-based companies bought the stake from Gecamines
for $120 million in March 2011, according to a copy of the contract
Gecamines published under pressure from the IMF. About a year later, in
May 2012, Glencore paid $340 million, plus $140 million in assumed debt,
for 20 percent of the mine, increasing its holding to 60 percent.
Gertler says Glencore’s 20 percent purchase was worth more than his
because it gave them control of the company.
Glencore CEO Ivan Glasenberg says Gertler has played an important role in Congo.
‘Supportive Shareholder’
“His
involvement has helped to attract much-needed foreign investment to the
DRC,” Glasenberg says. “He has been a supportive shareholder with us in
our largest operation in the country, Katanga,” he says, referring to Katanga Mining Ltd. (KAT), a nearby copper producer that they co-own.
Surveying
the land around one of his cobalt mines, Gertler says he will stick by
Congo. “I took a decision that I wanted to be a long-term player in
Congo,” he says, adding that his aim is to help develop Congo as well as
to enrich himself and his family. “At the end of the day, yes, I’m
looking to create a lot of wealth.”
Gertler dismisses critics who
say he’s amassed a fortune at the expense of the world’s poorest
people. “Our deals and performance speak for themselves,” he says. “And
whoever doesn’t feel comfortable investing with us will not.”
Mining in DRC
The DRC's formal economy is dominated by the
mining sector. Minerals account for the vast majority of exports and represent
the single largest source for foreign direct investment (FDI). Growth slowed in
the second half of 2008 due to renewed strife and the fall in world market
prices. The country is endowed with vast potential natural mineral resources
including cobalt, copper, cadmium, niobium, tantalum, petroleum, industrial and
gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium,
bauxite, iron ore and coal. The DRC is the world’s largest producer of cobalt
and naturally occurring industrial diamonds accounting for 41.6% and 30.7%
respectively of total global output. It is also the seventh largest producer of
gem diamonds (5.7%) and a major producer of copper (1.5%). Within Africa in 2008 it was the leading producer of tin
(65.4%), is ranked second for copper (23.1%) and tungsten (26%), third for
silver (10.2%) and coltan metals (11.9%), fifth for zinc (3.07%) and equal
sixth for gold (2.18%). In 2007 the DRC was estimated to have over 48% of the
world’s cobalt and about 26% of the industrial diamond reserves. Diamond
production, which is totally artisanal, increased by an estimated 17.4% in
2008. During the same period production of cobalt increased by an estimated
20.8%, copper increased by 54.7% and tin increased by 32.6% whereas silver
output halved. Gem and industrial-grade diamond sales were around US$875
million in 2008 accounting for about 10% of D.R.C.'s export revenue.
Oil & Gas
DRC is a relatively
small producer of hydrocarbons. As of the beginning of 2009 it was estimated to
have proven reserves of 24.5Mt of crude petroleum and 991.1 million m3 of
natural gas.
Key Minerals
The Copperbelt area
(estimated to contain 55.5m tonnes of copper and 3.6m tonnes of
cobalt), which runs through Katanga contains 34% of the world’s cobalt
resources and 10% of the world’s copper resources, and during the 1960s
and 1970s the DRC was the world’s leading producer of these metals.
Copper concessions were formerly managed by Générale des Carriers et des Mines (Gécamines), the state owned parastatal mining company. Since the 1990s the facilities of the Gécamines (currently managed by SOFRECO)
have seriously deteriorated, and production in Katanga stagnated with
total capacity utilisation estimated at less than 10%, and an alleged
external debt of US$2.5 billion. However, Katanga is currently
witnessing something of a renaissance with several industrial mines
already in production (e.g. Anvil Mining, First Quantum Minerals, Metorex, Forrest, et cetera.) and some massive new plant facilities are in the construction phase (e.g. Katanga Mining, CAMEC, Nikanor’s DCP, Freeport McMoran’s
famous Tenke Fungurume Mine) Investment is really booming and the
Cadastre Minier has recorded data for 792 granted concessions in Katanga
– 70 new ones in the last six months alone, and there are currently 207
mining companies established in Katanga. However, as noted by the
recent DfID trade flows study, one of the greatest challenges is the
endemic corruption, the involvement of the military and local
authorities in the illegal mineral trade, and the failure to enforce the
rule of law. There is a general consensus from most agencies that
around 60% of mineral produce passes through illegal channels, through
Kasumbalesa on the Zambian border (with small amounts passing westwards
via Lake Moero).
Staniferous minerals (Coltan and Cassiterite)
are widely distributed in the Eastern DRC, particularly throughout the
Kivus and Maniema. Key mining areas in the Kivus and Maniema include
Bunia, Kalima, Lugushwa, Masisi, Walikale, Kamituga and Mwenga, with
most mining rights previously held by the state company Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI).
These minerals occur in streambeds, alluvial deposits and soft rock,
and are easily extracted by artisanal mining methods. Allegedly 75% of
coltan within the DRC occurs within and around Kahuzi Biéga National
Park which has created concerns regarding the destruction of the
environment and protection of endangered species.
The Enterprise Minière de Kisenge Manganese
aims to raise manganese production by 40,000 tonnes per year from the
Lulua basin in western Katanga. The company already has a stockpile of
540,000 tonnes of 47-50% manganese carbonate.
Gold was
first discovered in north eastern DRC in 1903 and a number of mining
companies entered the region to exploit its resources. Following
independence in 1960, the state nationalised many existing companies
including the Belgian company Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo – Moto (SOKIMO) which became the Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto (OKIMO),
and around 400 tonnes of gold have been extracted from their
concessions in Orientale. The three OKIMO concessions in Haut Ulélé and
Ituri are believed to be particularly mineral rich by many in the
industry. In the early 1990s OKIMO entered into arrangements with many
multinational mining companies including AngloGold Ashanti, Mwana Africa and Moto Gold Mines.
At present gold exploration has been confined to the Kilo-Moto
Goldfield (Orientale) with the above companies and also the Canadian
major Barrick, Banro Corporation in the Twangiza Namoya gold belt (Sud Kivu and Maniema) and the South African major Gold Fields Ltd and Cluff Mining in the Kisenge area in Katanga.
Diamonds
were first discovered in the DRC in 1907 in the Kasaï region and the
DRC is currently the third largest exporter by volume with diamonds
having the highest relative revenue contribution to Congolese mineral
exports. The DRC is recognised as one of the leading sources of alluvial
diamonds, principally from Kasaï Occidental, with kimberlite diamonds
occurring more sporadically in locations within the southwest, northern
and northeastern areas. The principal areas include Mbuji-Mayi
(Kasaï-Orientale), Tshikapa (Kasaï Occidental) and Kisangani
(Orientale). Large deposits are also found in Orientale (Bafwasende and Watsa),
Équateur (Gbadolite), Kasaï Orientale (Lodja), Bandundu (Tembo),
Maniema (Puna and Lubutu) and Tselha and Louzi in Lower Congo Bas. One
of the major players in diamond mining in DRC is La Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA)
an 80% state owned company with a 78,000 km 2 concession area; although
after production fell 80% in 2006 (2.22 million carats with only four
shipments and around 6% gem quality) leaving 6,500 employees unpaid MIBA
has been bankrupt, and Sengamines (previously with Oryx Natural Resources and now Enterprise Minière de Kasaï Orientale (Emikor)) halted production at Tschibue in 2005. Many larger companies are exploring Kasaï Oriental, with First African Diamonds gaining access to the 800 km2 Eminkor concession, BHP Billiton and Southern Era Diamonds have access to a 16,000 km2 concession, and De Beers
(who held a virtual monopoly on diamond production until 1997) and
twelve local companies having access to concessions covering 60,000 km2
Other companies include Alrosa, Pangea DiamondFields, Gee-Ten, and BRC Diamond Corp.
In 2004 a new polishing plant opened at Kananga (Emaxon Finance
International and Dan Gertler International (DGI)) and more recently Mwana Africa acquired a 20% stake in MIBA (through Umicore’s subsidiary Sibeka) a company that already owns Gravity Diamonds.
- BHP Billiton
is investigating a bauxite deposit in the country's southwest Bas-Congo
province, near the Inga hydropower station on the Congo river with the
view of opening up a mine and refinery. BHP Billiton already produces
aluminum at refineries in South Africa and Mozambique, where it secured
cheap supplies of power from Eskom. The company and the DRC government
announced in October, 2007 that they are together investing about $8bn
in a planned hydro power station at Inga and smelter. The DRC government
was planning the giant Inga 3 power plant on the Congo River to produce
a maximum of about 4,000 megawatts. BHP Billiton signed an agreement
with the government to fund the project's feasibility study in exchange
for up to 2,000 megawatts of its power to keep its smelter running.
Production would be about 800,000 t of metal. Timing of first
production depended on when the power station was built as the building
of a power plant takes a minimum of five years and an aluminium smelter
around three years.
| Year | Production | Unit of Measure | % Change |
|---|
| 2002 | 14600 | Metric tons, cobalt content | NA |
| 2003 | 14800 | Metric tons, cobalt content | 1.37 % |
| 2004 | 20200 | Metric tons, cobalt content | 36.49 % |
| 2005 | 24500 | Metric tons, cobalt content | 21.29 % |
| 2006 | 27100 | Metric tons, cobalt content | 10.61 % |
| 2007 | 25400 | Metric tons, cobalt content | -6.27 % |
| 2008 | 32300 | Metric tons, cobalt content | 27.17 % |
| 2009 | 35500 | Metric tons, cobalt content | 9.91 % |
Source:USGS
Africa produces
42% of the world’s cobalt. Cobalt is produced primarily from the
Zambian/DRC Copperbelt along with copper and as a by-product of the
Bushveld Platinum mines in South Africa.
Click HERE for an overview
| Year | Production | Unit of Measure | % Change |
|---|
| 2002 | 27500 | Metric tons | NA |
| 2003 | 30300 | Metric tons | 10.18 % |
| 2004 | 31800 | Metric tons | 4.95 % |
| 2005 | 44200 | Metric tons | 38.99 % |
| 2006 | 83000 | Metric tons | 87.78 % |
| 2007 | 108000 | Metric tons | 30.12 % |
| 2008 | 189000 | Metric tons | 75.00 % |
Source:USGS
For over 70
years, the Katanga Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been
an important producer of copper and cobalt to the world markets. In the
1980s, the country’s copper output amounted to around seven per cent of
global production.
Since the early
1990s, the unstable social and political environment in the country has
led to a gradual decline in production. Without ongoing maintenance,
the condition of most of the facilities has deteriorated and production
has declined to virtually zero.
Following
independence from Belgium, the mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo
were nationalised in 1967 and became owned by Gécamines (La Générale des Carrières et des Mines), a state owned mining company.
- Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation plc (ENRC) produces
and processes copper and cobalt ore, and includes a road logistics
business operating in Central and Southern Africa and a number of
development projects in coal (Mozambique), bauxite (Mali), platinum
(Zimbabwe) and fluorspar (South Africa). Boss Mining is
responsible for the copper and cobalt mining and processing operations
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with the state-owned Gécamines as a
minority (30%) partner. The operations include open cast mines,
crushing, beneficiation, concentrator plants and an electro-winning
facility. Assets also include:SMKK holder
of exploration permit assets contiguous to the Group’s existing
operations in the DRC. ENRC owns 100% of SMKK.In January 2012, ENRC
agreed to pay $1.25bn to settle a long-running dispute with Canada's First Quantum Minerals
over assets in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. ENRC sparked
uproar when it bought the Kolwezi copper mining project in the
war-ravaged African country. The operation had belonged to First Quantum
but it had been seized by the DRC government, which accused the
Canadians of contract violations. City analysts said ENRC's action had
alienated shareholders and several big investors, including Standard
Life, sold their holdings in protest. The agreement was struck on the
basis that First Quantum drops all legal claims against the DRC and
ENRC; the DRC has also pledged to terminate its claims against First
Quantum.
- Tenke Mining Corporation (Canadian) has completed a feasibility study for the first phase of production at the Tenke Fungurume copper/cobalt project
in Katanga Province. Facilities have been designed to initially produce
approximately 115,000 metric tonnes per annum of London Grade A quality
copper cathode and 8,000 tpa of cobalt in any combination of cobalt
metal or intermediate cobalt hydroxide. Freeport-McMoran,
who now controls operations, announced in May 2007, that the mine is to
start up in October 2008 and would ship copper first. Shipment of
cobalt hydroxide, an intermediary product, would begin in December 2008.
Tenkwe is owned 24,75% by Tenke Mining Corp, 57,75% by Freeport through
Phelps Dodge Corporation ("Phelps Dodge") and 17,5% by Gecamines, the DRC State mining company. Lundin Mining Corporation (LUN.TO, AMEX:LMC)
and Tenke Mining Corp. announced on 10 April 2007 that they have
entered into a definitive agreement to combine the two companies to form
an intermediate base metals company. The 40-year mine plan is based on
first developing the Kwatebala, Fwaulu and Goma deposits.
Proven/probable ore reserves developed by Phelps Dodge to U.S. SEC
standards for these three areas are 103 million metric tonnes, grading
2,1% copper and 0,3% cobalt (proven 22 million tonnes grading 2,2%
copper and 0,30% cobalt, probable 81 million tonnes grading 2,1% copper
and 0,31% cobalt). During 2006, approximately 16,000 meters of drilling
was performed under the direction of Phelps Dodge for infilling, reserve
confirmation, step-out exploration and condemnation. During the 2006
drilling program, mineralization in three new areas just west of
Kwatebala was discovered (Mwinansefu, Ditoma and Shinkusu). Concession
exploration for 2007, which includes further resource definition
drilling at these new areas, is budgeted to accomplish approximately
45,000 meters of drilling. The intent is to have significant additional
proven/probable ore reserves defined by the time the initial facilities
go into operation to support potential expansions in the early years of
initial operations. In accordance with Canadian National Instrument
43-101 standards, the Measured and Indicated Resources for the Tenke
Fungurume concessions are 235 million tonnes of 3,01% copper and 0,31%
cobalt (Measured 126 million tonnes grading 3,44% copper and 0,33%
cobalt and Indicated 109 million tonnes grading 2,52% copper and 0,28%
cobalt), with Inferred resources providing an additional 265 million
tonnes of 2,6% copper and 0,19% cobalt.
Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mineralization
- Nikanor plc, through the company’s joint venture agreement with Gécamines, owns mining permits for three open-pit mines in the DRC: KOV, Tilwezembe and Kananga.
The company plans to redevelop these mines, bringing Tilwezembe and
Kananga into production in the second half of 2006 and the second half
of 2007 respectively, and KOV, the company’s principal asset, by the end
of 2009. The KOV mine consists of 4
ore bodies: Kamoto, Oliveira, Virgule, FNSR. It was mined from 1960 to
2000 and 38 million tonnes of ore were mined at an average grade of
5,8% Cu. The resource estimate is 172 million tonnes of ore averaging
5,1% Cu and 0,5% cobalt; theestimated contained metal at 9 million tonnes copper, 800,000 tonnes cobalt. Planned estimated mine life is 30 years. The Kolwezi concentrator is currently processing ore from both Kananga and Tilwezembe. Resources
are estimated for Tilwezembe: 5,7 million tonnes (indicated) at 5%
copper, 1.0% cobalt, and for Kananga: 6,9 million tonnes (inferred) at
1% copper, 1,3% cobalt. Drilling to increase resources are taking place.
Katanga Mining Ltd
agreed in November, 2007,to buy Nikanor Plc for about $2 billion to
create the world's largest cobalt producer and save both companies about
$700 million.
Katanga Mining Ltd , in a joint venture with the Congolese state-owned mining company, Gécamines, is rehabilitating a major copper-cobalt mine at Kolwezi
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Production at the high-grade
Kamoto Mine will begin in late 2007. Once fully operational, it will
produce 150,000 tonnes of copper and 5,000 tonnes of cobalt a year at
one of the world’s lowest operating costs. The Kamoto mine complex was
one of the most productive parts of its operations. The Kamoto
underground mine began operation in 1969. It produced an average of
three million tonnes of ore a year during the 1980s and to date has
produced 59,3 million tonnes of ore, with an average copper content of
4,21 per cent and an average cobalt content of 0,37 per cent. The open
pit mines, Dikuluwe, Mashamba East and Mashamba West (together known as
DIMA) began operation in 1975, 1984 and 1978 respectively. To date, 57,7
million tonnes of ore has been produced with an average copper content
of 4,96 per cent and an average cobalt content of 0,16 per cent. At the
peak of production in 1986, a total of 5,5 million tonnes was mined from
these pits. By 1998, due to lack of funds, the pits were allowed to
flood. No significant production has so far come from the Musonoie-T17
open pit mine. Central African Mining & Exploration Company plc
obtained a 11,37% shareholding in Katanga Mining which was increased to
22% by a further purchase of shares on 4 May 2007. Katanga Mining has
raised $150m towards its project in the Democratic Republic of Congo in a
transaction that has a ten-year offtake agreement.
The one-year loan from Glencore is at an interest rate of LIBOR plus
four percent. Glencore can convert to loan into 9.16 million Katanga
shares. Katanga has 78 million shares in issue.
Glencore will buy 100% of Katanga's copper and cobalt output for a decade at market terms. Katanga
Mining agreed in November, 2007,to buy Nikanor Plc for about $2
billion. The combined assets will have an annual output of 400,000
tonnes of refined copper and 40,000 tonnes of cobalt a year by 2011.
- Katanga Mining's DRC/China copper/cobalt conundrum (Source: Mineweb)
- Katanga agrees to sell DRC deposits to govt for $825m (Source: Mining Weekly)
- DRC/Chinese/Katanga Mining copper/cobalt deal explained (Source: Mineweb)
Central African Mining & Exploration Company plc (CAMEC),
who owns a copper and cobalt processing facility at Luita, Katanga
Province, is exploring the C19, C21 concession areas, using existing
data obtained from Gecamines and Union Miniere, with an indicated total
resource of 1,5 million tonnes of copper and 500,000 tonnes of cobalt,
contained in 70 million tonnes of ore. Camec built up a 22 per cent
stake in Katanga Mining. It has also secured soft irrevocables for a
further 54 per cent, including the 24 per cent stake held by George
Forrest, the largest shareholder in Katanga and one of the powerbrokers
in the DRC's mining industry. In August, 2007, Camec was about to make
an £800m offer for Katanga Mining. Organic growth alone will enable
Camec to produce some 100,000 tonnes of copper and between 6,000-12,000
tonnes of cobalt by the end of 2008. But by taking over Katanga, the
company could be producing as much as 250,000 tonnes of copper,
according to the company. The justice ministry released a statement at
the end of August, 2007, detailing the revocation of the licences. It
said C19 has reverted to state-owned miner Gecamines. Camec withdrew its
bid for Katanga.
Camec said in an overview of the company its Luita metallurgical plant
in DRC would be supplied by concessions C19 and C21 and would produce at
an annualised rate of 40,000 tonnes of copper and 6,000 tonnes of
cobalt by March, 2008. However, the licences to these two concessions
are amongst those revoked by the government. C19 is the most important
to Camec. CAMEC announced in November, 2007, that it had formed an
alliance with Prairie International Ltd,
whose investors include the family of Israel's Dan Gertler, to develop
the Mukondo deposit and four other areas in Democratic Republic of
Congo. The joint venture company will own, operate and develop Mukondo
Mountain as well as the mining concession areas previously known as C17,
C18, C19 and C21. CAMEC will transfer its 80% stake in BOSS Mining, a
DRC-registered company, into the joint venture company. BOSS holds half
of Mukondo Mining and concessions C19 and C21, for which the government
has revoked the licences. The matter is before the courts in the Congo.
Central African Mining and Exploration plans to re-start production at
what it says is the world's largest cobalt deposit Mukondo with its
joint venture partner Prairie International at the beginning of 2008 to
supply the market with 6,000 t of cobalt in 2008. The Mukondo deposit
contains 350,000 t of cobalt, of which 250,000 t would be recovered over
a period of 15 years.
- Anvil Mining Ltd (AVM.TO, AVLMF.PK) (now Minmetal Resources Ltd)
has one high-grade copper-silver open pit mine that has been in
production since 2002, a high grade copper tailings retreatment
operation that entered production in late 2005, and an advanced
copper-cobalt project currently under evaluation. The Dikulushi mine,
Lake Mweru, Katanga Province, has a resource (Dec 2004) of 2,44 million
tonnes of ore averaging 7,9% copper and 208 g/t silver. Production in
2005 amounted to 17,816 tonnes copper, 1,7 million ounces silver at an
operating cash cost of $0.42/lb Cu. The Mutoshi project includes the
Kulu copper tailings mine and the Mutoshi copper-cobalt mine in the
Kolwezi region. The estimated resource amounts to 255,000 tonnes of
contained copper. In 2005,16,500 tonnes of copper were recovered. At the
Kinsevere, Tshifufia, Tshifufiamashi projects, 50 km north of
Lubumbashi, estimated resources are 1,582,000 tonnes of contained copper
from ore averaging 3,8% copper. The company is also exploring prospects
at Lungeshi and Kapulo. Anvil Mining forecast a 10 percent increase in
2008 copper production but a big drop for silver on Wednesday, as it
announced record 2007 production from its three mines in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. The Toronto-listed miner expects to produce more than
55,000 tonnes of copper and 1.3 million oz of silver in 2008. That
compares with 47,633 tonnes of copper and 2.45 million oz of silver in
2007. Anvil operates and has majority stakes in the Dikulushi
copper-silver mine, Kinsevere copper mine, and Kulu copper tailings
operation.
Chalcopyrite ore at Kinsevere
Mining begins at Kinsevere pit
- International Barytex Resources Ltd (Canadian) holds an option to earn a 65% interest in the Shituru high grade copper-cobalt deposit located at Likasi,
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Shituru deposit is expected to
support a high grade open pit mine with low operating cost and has
untested underground potential. Barytex has an option to acquire up to
an 86,67% interest in stages in East China Capital Investments Ltd.
(ECCI) whose sole asset is an option to acquire a 75% share interest in
the Shituru Copper-Cobalt deposit from Generale Des Carrieres et des
Mines ("Gecamines"). When fully exercised the interests in the Shituru
Property will be indirectly held as follows: 65% by Barytex, 25%, by
Gecamines and 10% by the Optionors, Ever Noble Group Ltd. and Megatrend
International Holdings Ltd (ENG-MIH). The zone of mineralization is
approximately 800 m in strike length with widths of 17 meters for each
of the zones exposed at surface.
- Mwana Africa plc purchased Anmercosa Exploration (Congo) s.p.r.l. from Anglo American plc
in early 2004. Anmercosa has mining exploration rights over
approximately 10,000 square kilometres in the Katanga copper belt, which
has showings of copper, zinc, cobalt and gold. As part of the purchase
arrangements, Mwana Africa entered into a joint venture with Anglo
American in respect of these mining exploration rights. Under the joint
venture, Anmercosa is responsible for all feasibility study and other
costs, and Anglo American has a carried interest in the joint venture.
Anglo American may increase its stake in the joint venture if particular
metal or mineral concentration is discovered, and will fund those
discoveries to bankable feasibility study. Mwana Africa is also
currently in negotiations with Gecamines, the DRC state copper mining
company, relating to a previously worked copper/cobalt mine near
Anmercosa’s exploration ground in Katanga. Production of copper/cobalt
could begin soon after the finalisation of the agreement with Gecamines.
- Africo Resources Ltd (Canadian, ARL.TO)
is developing the Kalukundi Project located within the Kolwezi District
of Katanga Province in the south-east of the DRC. The Kalukundi deposit
has been defined through the evaluation of 4 fragments of Mines series
rocks. An ore reserve of oxide materials has been defined within these 4
fragments of 7,8 million tonnes grading 2,44% Cu and 0,69% Co. The
economics of the deposit are based on a production rate of 800,000
tonnes per year for nominal annual production of 16,400 tonnes per year
copper and 3,800 tonnes per year cobalt.
- Metorex
reached an agreement with the Government of the DRC, La Generale et des
Mines [“Gecamines”], and Sentinelle Global Investments (Pty) Ltd
[“Sentinelle”] to mine and treat the high grade copper/cobalt orebody at
Ruashi, and the Ruashi and Etoile stockpiles situated in the Katanga
Province of the DRC in May 2004. Probable mineral reserves are
24,120,000 at a grade of 3,78% Cu and 0,79% Co. Planned eventual
production is 45,000 tonnes of copper and 3,500 tonnes of cobalt per
annum. Metorex increased its effective interest in the two-phase Ruashi
project to 80% from 67.2% by buying out the private Sentinelle for R60m
in cash and the issue of 12.5m shares at R21.35 each in March, 2007.
State-owned Gecamines owns the other 20% of Ruashi. The company
announced in July, 2007, that it had acquired 38.7% of Copper Resources Corporation (CRC)
and a 5% stake in Miniere De Musoshi Et Kinsenda Sarl (MMK), a 75%
owned subsidiary of CRC, for £42.85m, about R600m. Metorex said on 18
January, 2008, that it had unconditionally contracted to acquire a
further 6,6% of Copper Resources Corporation, lifting its total holding
to 45,6% of the firm. CRC holds a 75% interest in MMK which owns the
Kinsenda, Musoshi and Lubembe copper deposits as well as various
exploration permits in the southern portion of the Katanga Province of
the DRC. Metorex is also drilling the Musonoi copper deposit, close to
the two deposits the group is mining at Kolwezi.
Copper Resources Corporation
(AIM:CRC) has three projects that include the Kinsenda copper restart
project; completing a feasibility study at Musoshi, an underground
copper mine, and starting exploration at Lubembe, an advanced copper
exploration project. It has raised £56.3 million, by placing 45 million
new common shares with Glencore International AG
at 125 pence per share, which it said was enough to develop its three
projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Glencore's stake currently
represents 35.7% of the enlarged share capital of Copper Resources,
which presently stands at 126,065,064 common shares in issue. On
November 5, 2007, Metorex
offered 73 of its shares for every 100 Copper Resources' shares with
cash alternative, overvaluing the company's stock at £1.49 per share,
with its CEO Charles Needham saying this would provide the company's
shareholders with an exposure "to Metorex's established projects in the
DRC and a diversified mineral portfolio". It was announced on the 20
November, 2007, that CRC will revoke the issue of 45 million shares to
Glencore as Metorex prepared to issue documents to minority shareholders
and made plans around CRC’s assets in the Congo.
The board of AIM-traded CRC decided the independent directors Sam Jonah
and Mitchell Alland –both of whom subsequently resigned their positions –
had acted outside their mandate by offering the shares to the
Swiss-based commodity trader.
The motivation for the placing of shares with Glencore is not
understood. It would have given Glencore a 36% stake in CRC just as
Metorex launched its offer to mop up minorities' shares.
- First Quantum Minerals Ltd acquired 100% of Adastra. Adastra was a listed international mining company with its principal asset being the Kolwezi Copper-Cobalt Tailings Project
in the DRC. Due to the poor recoveries obtained from the conventional
concentrating techniques used, valuable amounts of copper and cobalt
were discharged into two tailings dams known as Kingamyambo and Musonoi.
The two dams contain 112,8 million t of oxide tailings grading a
remarkable 1,49 % copper and 0,32 % cobalt. The company is considering
the construction of an initial 35,000 tonne per year copper facility and
5,800 tonne per year cobalt facility which would be designed to be
expanded to 105,000 tonnes of copper per year and 17,400 tonnes of
cobalt per year.
The huge Kingamyambo tailings dam (above) is a smaller resource than the Musonoi tailings dam.
Source: Adastra
First Quantum is also developing the Frontier deposit, near the town of Sakania in the DRC, within 2 km of the Zambian border. The estimated resource is 161 million tonnes grading 1.17% copper (0.5% Cu cut-off) or 1.9 million tonnes of copper.
Frontier Copper Mine
- Ivanhoe Nickel and Platinum Ltd. (Ivanplats), controlled by Robert Friedland of Ivanhoe Mines,
has rights to about 20,000 square kilometres and, besides the copper
and cobalt at the Kalongwe copper-cobalt project 10 kilometres north of
Tenke Fugurume, also plans to develop the Kengere project, near the town
of Kolwezi, which holds zinc, lead, silver and germanium. Investment
banking sources expect an initial public offering of Ivanplats shares in
2007 with a dual listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange and in London. Ivanplat's
95%-owned Kamoa property hosts a large stratiform copper deposit on the
Central African Copper belt in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC)
Katanga province. Sitting roughly 270 km west of the provincial
capital, Lubumashi, Kamoa represents one of the more promising
undeveloped copper deposits worldwide in terms of tonnage and grade. The
company has delineated 348 indicated tonnes grading 2.64% Cu —
representing roughly 9.2 million contained tonnes — in addition to 462
million inferred tonnes averaging 2.72% Cu. The resources are defined
over a 20-km-by-15-km wide zone contained primarily within an area where
Ivanplats has acquired its exploitation licenses, which were granted in
late August and carry a 30-year term. The company has agreed to sell an
additional 15% of the project to the DRC government, which will bump
domestic ownership to 20%. Ivanplats completed a preliminary economic
assessment (PEA) on Kamoa that modelled a US$2 billion mine with a
61-year life. The operation would run at an average throughput rate of 5
million tonnes per year, and produce roughly 143,000 tonnes of copper
annually over the first 10 years at cash costs totalling $1.19 per
lb. At a $3.50 per lb copper price, the PEA returns a $2 billion after
tax net present value and 21.5% internal rate of return, assuming a 10%
discount rate. The company intends to spend roughly US$70 million over
the next two years at Kamoa on drilling and modelling work.
- TEAL Exploration & Mining Incorporated (Canadian, TSX:TL; JSE:TEL)
is exploring the Kalumines Copper-Cobalt Project, a joint venture with
La Générale des Carrières et des Mines ("Gécamines"), which comprises
approximately 77 square kilometres. The project area hosts four near
surface areas of copper mineralization that the Company believes may be
exploitable using open-pit mining techniques. Drilling, trenching and
pitting were undertaken by previous owners and copper and cobalt
mineralization was identified over a strike length in excess of 3
kilometres. The Company has agreed with Gécamines to conduct a drilling
program to define the resource and to complete a feasibility study on
the project by May 2007. TEAL announced in November, 2007, that its
planned mining rate at the Lupoto Copper Project, which forms part of
the Kalumines property was achieved in September, 2007. TEAL could also
begin producing 12,000 tonnes of copper in early 2008 at the company's
70-percent owned Mwambashi copper project. TEAL Exploration & Mining
said in February, 2008, that it had discovered copper and cobalt
mineralisation in the Karu East block some 5 km SSE of the Lupoto Copper
Project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Some of the drilling
highlights include: 21 metres grading 2.57% copper; 39 metres grading
3.25% copper, including 15 metres at 0.46% cobalt; and 16 metres grading
0.33% cobalt, it said.
- El Nino Ventures Inc (Canadian, ELNOF.OB, ELN.V) announced
in May, 2007, that it had acquired a 70 percent interest in a Joint
Venture Agreement with GCP Group Ltd, a private Congolese company. El
Nino holds it's initial 70 percent interest in Research Permits No.
5214, 5215, 5216 and 5217. These permits were granted by the Cadastre
Miner of the DRC and cover 352 square kilometers in the DRC-Zambian
Copperbelt. The permits are located between Lubumbashi and Likasi.
Gecamines will
contribute 10 million metric tonnes of copper deposits to a $6bn joint
venture with two Chinese companies. he company will also contribute half
a million tonnes of cobalt to a partnership that has been agreed with Sinohydro Corporation and China Railway Engineering Corporation.
The two Chinese entities will own a 68% stake in the venture. Under the
deal deal signed in January, 2008, by China's Exim Bank and the
Kinshasa government, Congolese state miner Gecamines, China's Sinohydro
Corp and China Railway Engineering Corp will create a joint mining
venture with rights to two mining concessions.
Together the Mashamba and Dikuluwe mines contain 10 million tonnes of copper and 2 million tonnes of cobalt, he said.
The Chinese investment would be repaid with revenues from the joint venture, called Sicomines.
- Katanga Mining's DRC/China copper/cobalt conundrum (Source: Mineweb)
The Congo (DRC)
is presumed to be Africa's largest diamond producer, but production
figures are not available. Most of the DRC's production is produced by
the informal sector. In mid-2004 the Kimberley Process struck the
country off its list of certifiable diamond producers accusing it of
dealing in blood diamonds which resulted in the DRC ceasing exports of
diamonds. It is estimated that roughly a third of the DRC's production
is smuggled out of the country every year.
- Artisianal mining
of placer diamond deposits in the DRC takes place along the Bushimaïe
and Lubilash tributaries to the Sankuru River near the town of
Mbuji-Maye (formerly Bakwanga) in the Kasaï-Oriental province of
souther-central DRC, and along the Tshikapa River in the
Kasaï-Occidental province.
- Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), which is a joint venture between Belgian company Sibeka (20%) and the DRC government (80%), owns the only functioning mine in the country, Mbuji Mayi. The shareholders of Sibeka were Umicore, 80% and De Beers, 20%. In May 2006 Mwana Africa plc
acquired Umicore’s subsidiary, Sibeka. Over the past five years MIBA
has produced an average of 6 million carats of diamonds per year. It has
mining and exploration titles covering an area in excess of 45,000 km2
where it is discussing joint ventures with major diamond producers.
- De Beers signed a confdentiality report with Oryx Natural Resources as part of a due diligence exercise for the possible development of the Sengamines diamond concession in 2004.
- BRC Diamond Corporation (Canadian and in which gold junior Banro
holds a 27,5% stake) controls 5,426 square kilometres and retains a
further 11,100 square kilometres through option agreements on ground
that historically has been the largest diamond producing region of the
DRC. The
geology of the region represents an extension of the Angola Craton,
which underlies the diamond fields of Lunda Norte Province, in northeast
Angola. The company is involved in early stage exploration of both
the kimberlite and alluvial potential of the area. By the end of 2007,
BRC proposed merging and acquiring all of the outstanding shares of Diamond Core
, the South African diamond exploration company, in exchange for BRC
shares. BRC had been awarded a further 58 diamond exploration permits
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the firm said in December, 2007.
The Toronto-based company now holds directly, or controls through option
agreements, a total of 116 exploration permits, covering an area of 38
140,5 km² in the provinces of East and West Kasai and Bandudu in the
south, Equateur and Oriental in the north, and Maniema in the
central-east of the DRC.
- SouthernEra has secured 56 exclusive diamond exploration permits
covering more than 16,000 square km in the diamond-rich Kasaï
Provinces. This area is producing up to 20 million carats of diamonds
per year. In a joint venture formed in October 2005 with BHP Billiton on
39 of SouthernEra’s 56 permits, exploration has commenced for primary
diamond deposits. In May 2006, SouthernEra signed an agreement with Nyumba Ya Akiba SPRL,
a local Congolese company, acquiring an immediate 74% undivided
interest in eight exploration permits covering 2,744 km2 of diamond
prospective ground in the Kabinda area of the Kasai Oriental Province.
SouthernEra has also secured alluvial diamond permits within the Tshikapa / Kasai / Luebo
alluvial diamond field in the Kasaï-Occidental Province, and also
within a second major alluvial diamond field in the Kasaï-Oriental
Province. SouthernEra controls a 34 kilometre stretch of Kasai River and
2 kilometres of the Tshikapa River within this diamond producing area
of southwestern DRC. SouthernEra owns a 100% interest in four permits
covering 80,35 km2 and a 70 percent interest in a further four permits
covering 77,73 km2.
- Gem Diamonds
holds various concessions in the Mbelenge, Lubembe, Longatshimo and
Tshikapa areas in the Kasai Occidental Province, and the Mbelenge area
to the north of this. The Mbelenge project comprises four concessions,
each with mining permits, along the Kasai River from the port of Djoku
Punda, south for approximately 20km. The Lubembe project comprises 22
concessions on the Tshiumbe and Lubembe Rivers. The area was previously
prospected in some detail with small alluvial mines established. Lubembe
is considered to have significant kimberlite potential with 17 targets
identified in a limited survey in 2005. The Longatshimo project
comprises 12 concessions on or around the Longatshimo River, with a
combination of mining and reconnaissance permits. The Tshikapa project
hosts two concessions on the bank of the Tshikapa River each with mining
permits.
- African Diamonds plc (AFCDF.PK,
also active in Botswana, Guinea, Sierra Leone), the AIM and
Botswana-listed diamond explorer, has acquired a 35,42 percent share in Bugeco S.A.,
a private Belgian company and with it, the right to appoint a director.
The total consideration paid was $1,616,420 in cash. The key asset of
Bugeco is a joint venture with De Beers on 21 licences in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), covering 807 000 hectares of prospective
diamondiferous ground. Initial exploration has discovered several new
kimberlites, in an area where alluvial diamonds are already in evidence.
Analysis indicates the presence of microdiamonds in several of the
newly discovered kimberlites, n what appears to be two new kimberlite
clusters. Reconnaissance magnetic and detailed airborne magnetic (DAF)
geophysical surveys have been completed over the entire licence area and
ground magnetic, gravity and electromagnetic surveys over specific
anomalies have resulted in the identification of new drill targets.
Extensive ground sampling using helicopter and vehicle access is
ongoing. The 2007 work programme will focus on further discovery
drilling and delineation. This work will prioritise bulk sampling.
- Pangea Diamond Fields plc
is exploring the the Yusufu and Ikulu alluvial projects on the
Longatshimo River, and intends bulk sampling the properties. A plant
site has been identified and an operational team is in the process of
being assembled. The required plant has been designed and is currently
being manufactured, with operations expected to commence mid 2007. It
was reported in January, 2008, that a bulk sampling plant had arrived at
Pangea Diamondfield's Longatshimo River project and plant construction
was in progress.
- Mwana Afica plc bought Australian firm, Gravity Diamonds, which has been exploring rights held by BHP Billiton in the Kasai Crater region, in November 2006, for $34m , and announced on March 16, 2007, a C$69.7 m share offer for SouthernEra which has adjacent properties.
- Lindian Resources Ltd
is exploring the Tshikapa diamond field, in the West Kasai region of
the DRC. The area is about 600 km east-southeast of Kinshasa, the
capital of DRC. The Tshikapa Diamond Project consists of four licence
areas covering about 800 sq km.
Historical background (1904-2012)
The rise of gold-mining related abuses
The
earliest exploration for gold deposits in the DRC began in 1904,
shortly after two Australian explorers working for the administration of
King Leopold II discovered alluvial gold along the Angola River. The
discoverers, Hannam and O’Brien, quickly recruited local workers to
start exploiting this rich resource. Long before they found gold, King
Leopold had issued decrees designed to maximise the exploitation of the
Congo’s many natural resources. According to these decrees, each village
chief would be subject to ‘prestations’ – a system that forced them to
assist in the requisition of workers and porters, food, and construction
material. The decrees also established the Force Publique, the police
and security units composed of locals and led by European mercenaries,
which enforced the King’s will by wielding the chicotte, burning
villages, and torturing, flogging and raping villagers.
By
August 1906, Hannam and O’Brien reported a monthly output of 600 ounces
of gold and they shipped the first consignment of gold to Brussels.
Other gold veins were subsequently discovered in parts of eastern Congo,
increasing the pressure to coerce locals into mining. During the First
World War, the lives of the people of eastern Congo became even more
difficult. The Belgian colonial authority forcibly recruited Congolese
into the Force Publique to fight against the forces of German East
Africa. To support the Belgian Congo’s military adventure, Congolese
were forced to work as porters or to grow food for the soldiers. The
colony could afford the military effort because of the ‘voluntary’
payment of taxes, and the Congolese Central Bank’s increasing intake of
Ituri gold. Meanwhile, the Germans exploited the Sekenke Mine in
Tanzania in order to finance their war effort.
Little
is known about the situation of Congolese gold miners after the First
World War because international attention on the abuses perpetrated in
the Congo subsided considerably once Leopold II was forced to cede
control of the country to the Belgian government. Internal reporting by
the colonial administrators provides some glimpses into the continuing
abuses – including in the copper mines of Katanga, which were by far the
most important sector of the mining industry – and reflect scandalously
high mortality rates. David Northrup, who has researched the labour
situation in the Congo extensively, concluded that the method of abuse
changed over time but not the actual abuse: “expanding demands for
labour brought many more people under some sort of coerced labour
system. Thus, for the affected Africans, slavery had changed its form
more than its character.”
After
the Congo gained independence in 1960, looting Congo’s gold became the
pastime of the leaders of the government military and rebel groups. The
Simba insurrection led by Christophe Gbenye took much of north-eastern
Congo and established the ‘People’s Republic of the Congo’, making
Kisangani (Stanleyville) the new capital. Gbenye occupied and looted the
Moto mines around Watsa. According to Time magazine, he stole 1500
pounds of gold from the safe of the mining operations.
When
Joseph Mobutu seized power at the end of 1965, he consolidated the
gold-mining operations of the eastern Congo under SOKIMO (or OKIMO) in
which he integrated the industrial production of the Kilo and Moto gold
mines. SOKIMO was soon known to be Mobutu’s personal piggy bank.
Mismanagement
led to the gradual dismantling of the industrial structures, and by the
late 1980s OKIMO generated revenue only by taxing informal, artisanal
and small-scale miners. The economic collapse was made worse by the
First Congo War. Once Laurent-Désiré Kabila assumed leadership of the
Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre
(AFDL) and launched an armed revolt with his allies Presidents Paul
Kagame (Rwanda) and Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), he systematically occupied
and exploited the gold-rich mining areas. Long before he had deposed
Mobutu and taken full control of the country, he started to sell gold
concessions to the highest bidders.
A
new wave of violence, coerced labour and economic disruption crashed
over the artisanal and small-scale miners with the Second Congo War. The
occupying forces of Uganda and Rwanda raided the gold-mining centres of
the east, followed by waves of Congolese militia groups. RCD-Goma,
RCD-K-ML, RCD-K, MLC, UPC, FNI, FAPC, FPJC and finally CNDP and FDLR all
occupied and looted the gold-mining centres and the surrounding
villages. In some instances, they established quasi-administrations and
issued new gold-mining permits. In all instances, they imposed taxes,
coerced other payments, killed, maimed and took revenge on artisanal
gold miners for the most spurious reasons.
National and international reactions to gold-mining related abuses
The
horrors of the First and Second Congo Wars, and the Ugandan-Rwandan
occupations of the country’s most important mining sites, mobilised
significant resistance by Congolese civil society. Justice Plus, for
example, organised a campaign against ethnic persecutions and the
illegal exploitation of natural resources. Activists from local
organisations, such as ASADHO-Beni, were routinely arrested for
denouncing mining activities by Ugandan forces. Officers of the Ugandan
military, their local allies from RCD-K-ML and other rebel groups
attempted to silence this resistance. However, they did not succeed
because many Congolese activists denounced these abuses and contributed
significantly to raising national and international attention. One
important milestone towards greater recognition of the atrocities linked
with gold-mining was reached when Congolese researchers and
investigators supported Human Rights Watch and its landmark report “The
Curse of Gold” published in May 2005.
Civil
society campaigns against the untransparent and unfair allocation of
mineral rights by rebel-leader-turned-President Lauren-Desiree Kabila
had already started after the First Congo War. In the year 2000, SYPA
was established in Butembo as a network of local groups, including the
Catholic Church and civil society organisations of the Kivus. The
organisation grew quickly to national stature and became an important
actor in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which was one of the principal
peace initiatives created under the Sun City Accord in 2002. The
Inter-Congolese Dialogue helped to ensure that the Congo’s Transitional
Parliament would set up a parliamentary investigative committee to look
into, among other things, the links between mining contracts and the
continuation of war.
This
critical initiative, which would eventually be known as the Lutundula
Commission, received very little – or no – backing from representatives
of the international community. According to the report of the Lutundula
Commission, countries such as the United States, Canada, Belgium and
others refused to grant members of the Commission visas to investigate
in companies in their countries of origin that were suspected of feeding
into the conflict and mining cycle in the DRC.
The
international community largely ignored Congolese efforts – at times
even undermining them – in order to pursue its own ideas for resolving
the Congo’s natural resource problems. A pivotal moment came when the
Permanent Representative of the US to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, and US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright decided that January 2000 (the
month in which the US delegation was going to preside over the Security
Council) would be dedicated to defining a global strategy to tackle the
most persistent problems on the African continent.
Holbrooke
planned open meetings to discuss the conflicts in Burundi, the DRC,
Angola and Sierra Leone and the scourge of AIDS. On 24 January 2000, the
Security Council chaired by Albright welcomed the presidents of seven
African countries; Laurent-Desire Kabila was the first president invited
to the round table of the Security Council, followed by the presidents
of Rwanda, Zambia, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola.
Kabila
had funded his long years hidden away in the Itombwe Mountains of South
Kivu in part by gold smuggling and other commercial activities. When he
went to war to oust Mobutu, the military forces of Rwanda and Uganda
were important allies. Eventually they turned against each other, and
the Second Congo War turned into a vicious war of attrition. Rwanda,
Uganda and their Congolese allies were involved in resource extraction
as they fought the Kabila regime. The fact that Kabila paid his foreign
allies and their fighters with access to the Congo’s natural wealth did
not stop him from stating bluntly to the Security Council: “Is there
anyone here who is unaware of the systematic plundering of Congolese
resources on and below the ground by the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian
occupiers? Their booty – wood, diamonds, gold, cobalt and zebras – is
all being sold on the open market, including in some of the countries
represented here today.”
What is illegal?
With
his reference to the ‘systematic plundering of Congolese resources’,
Kabila set into motion a new dynamic in the conflict resolution
dialogue. Following Kabila’s call for an intervention by the
international community, the Security Council decided to send a mission
led by Ambassador Holbrooke to Central Africa to define the steps to be
taken in support of peace-making in the DRC. After a four-day blitz
mission, Holbrooke and his colleagues delivered the defining report for
all future Security Council actions on the Congo’s natural resources.
The key recommendation was that the UN Secretary General should create a
‘UN Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources
and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’.
A
critical point in the language, which was first suggested by Kabila and
expanded on by the Holbrooke mission, was the concept that the Congo’s
natural resources were exploited ‘illegally’. This term introduced an
extremely contentious concept and the Panel of Experts described its
struggle to define illegality in its first report. The report offered
four criteria to determine illegality: violation of sovereignty; respect
by actors for the existing regulatory frameworks in the country or
territory where they operate; discrepancy between widely accepted trade
and business practices and the conduct of business in the DRC; and, the
violation of international law, including ‘soft’ law. The Panel further
stated that it was going to ‘utilize the aforementioned elements in a
complementary manner, refusing to be exclusive or to focus on one single
element’. However, the Panel’s subsequent reports revealed that their
work focused on one single element – the fourth criteria, using
definitions derived from the OECD’s emerging guidelines.
Based
on this definition, the Panel released a report on 16 October 2002 with
annexes of names of individuals and companies that it accused of
exploiting the Congo’s natural resources illegally. Subsequently, the
OECD guidelines and the associated national contact points were supposed
to assume an adjudicatory role. However, it never proved particularly
effective, especially where companies or individuals from OECD member
states were involved.
The
Panel’s work have had more legitimacy had there been less reliance on
the OECD guidelines and more grounding in the laws of the Congo. There
is not one attempt in the Panel’s report to define the documented abuses
as violations of Congolese laws, although President Joseph Kabila had
signed the new Congolese Mining Law on 15 July 2002, three months before
the release of the UN Panel report.
Apparently
relying on emerging Congolese legal structures was not an option.
Indeed, using Congolese legal structures to define a strategy against
illegal exploitation of the country’s natural resources would remain
unacceptable for years to come, as the fate of Ministerial Decree 2503
of February 2007 would demonstrate. The international community –
especially the highly industrialised, mostly western members of the
international community – wanted to build on the evolving standards of
corporate social responsibility that were under development at the OECD
at the time. However, the OECD’s voluntary Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises turned out to be ineffective in regulating the DRC’s mining
sector. Eventually, investigations by the British NGO RAID revealed that
virtually none of the companies and individuals identified by the Panel
as being in violation of the OECD guidelines were subjected to any
administrative procedure by their governments, as the OECD process
promised.
UN Sanctions against illegal exploitation of natural resources
With
the OECD process turning into a paper tiger, those in the DRC who had
hoped to receive assistance from the international community in the
rebuilding of a legitimate natural resource sector saw their options
diminishing. By 2004, the UN’s natural resource Panel was discontinued,
partly in response to heavy criticism of their evidentiary standards and
methodology. However, the Security Council accepted one of their
recommendations to impose an arms embargo on the Congo and established
another UN Expert group to monitor compliance with the embargo. By 2004,
the Group of Experts was appointed with a very narrowly defined arms
embargo-monitoring mandate.
While
the natural resource panel had stirred up a lot of media attention, it
was the new Group of Experts that convinced the Security Council in
November 2005 to impose targeted UN sanctions against all major
Congolese militia leaders and their affiliated businesspeople. The
measures imposed on those most responsible for massacres in eastern
Congo included the freezing of their assets and a travel ban. Although
effective implementation of these measures would remain challenging,
singling out these individuals as outcasts of the international
community blocked their chances of ever achieving legitimacy.
The
Group also succeeded with its recommendations to the Security Council
to further investigate individual culpability in the use of natural
resource revenues to finance violations of the arms embargo. With the
establishment of a hard standard for illegal exploitation of natural
resources and strict evidentiary standards, people or companies
‘illegally’ exploiting or diverting minerals from eastern Congo moved
into the crosshairs of targeted sanctions.
Using
the threat of UN sanctions certainly was a valuable addition to the
arsenal against perpetrators of violence, but to achieve lasting peace
and security the linkages between natural resource exploitation and
trade had to be based on a stronger footing. Both the UN Panel and
senior officials within the DRC Ministry of Mines had come independently
to the same conclusion: enhanced institutionalised solutions, such as
mechanisms to trace natural resource origins, were required.
The
Ministry of Mines and CEEC were already seeking ways to develop a
certification system, but it may have been somewhat premature for the
officials of the transitional government since the mineral deposits in
both North and South Kivu, the eastern sections of Maniema and Katanga,
and Orientale were beyond the authority of the government. Customs
agents at border crossings, tax collectors, and the officials of the
subsidiaries of the Central Bank in the eastern provinces, along with
many other government functionaries, did not accept the transitional
government’s authority. In Bunia, the local headquarters and operations
of OKIMO were taken over by the Ituri rebels, who also took all income
from the artisanal gold-mining sites situated on the parastatal’s three
huge gold concessions. At the same time, FDLR, Mayi-Mayi and other
groups overran the artisanal and small-scale miners operating within the
concession areas of SOKIMO. So why were the new functionaries in
Kinshasa interested in devising traceability and certification systems?
During
that pre-election chaos, it was evident that the Congo and its natural
resource sector would never find peace and prosperity unless at least
two conditions could be fulfilled. Firstly, physical security in all
parts of the Congo was key. And secondly, property rights and trading
mechanisms for natural resources had to be secured. The same conceptual
approach dominated the UN Panel’s agenda: first monitor compliance with
and investigate violations of the arms embargo; and second investigate
diversions of natural resources and interdict the revenue streams to
illegal armed groups whenever possible.
By
early 2007, the democratic multi-party elections had given Joseph
Kabila the presidency. On 5 February 2007, days before the new
government took over, the outgoing Minister of Mines, Professor Matthieu
Kalele-Ka-Bila, signed Ministerial Decree 2503, which laid out the
administrative processes for the certification of precious and
semi-precious stones and minerals. The new law was unequivocal: without
CEEC certification, no minerals or stones could be exported. To further
buttress the Congolese effort, the Group of Experts made two key
recommendations in its next report. It recommended that the
international community should provide financial, technical and
administrative support to the implementation of the Congolese law. It
also recommended that companies that could not demonstrate adequate due
diligence practices should be sanctioned.
Parallel
to this development, Belgium, the former colonial power, wanted to play
a leading role in the development and implementation of a natural
resource certification system. A task force of Belgian specialists was
set up and a study group was begun to not only devise a tracking
methodology for copper and cobalt, but also to establish a
Lubumbashi-based commodity exchange. Belgium was one of the elected
members of the Security Council at the time and used this position to
develop a high profile on natural resource and conflict issues.
Simultaneously, Belgian representatives to the UN became particularly
hostile to the UN Group of Expert’s recommendation to support the
Congolese natural resource certification mechanisms. They also rejected
an effort to clarify due diligence principles for anyone involved with
the Congo’s natural resources as well as the Group’s evidence for the
dominant role that Belgian companies played in Congo’s natural resource
trade.
Belgium
succeeded in the short-term in stopping the Experts’ efforts. However,
thanks to an initiative by the German government, the original concept
of supporting the DRC government’s certification mechanism finally
succeeded. But it would take another three years (and another Panel)
before the Security Council endorsed the recommendation to impose UN
sanctions against anyone who could not demonstrate adequate due
diligence in the trading of minerals from eastern Congo. It would also
take another violent convulsion of the east, pitching the Congolese army
(the FARDC) and the peacekeeping forces of MONUC (later MONUSCO)
against the renegade CNDP forces under General Laurent Nkundabataware
and against the FDLR. Nkunda’s troops took control of numerous mining
sites, collected taxes and imposed fees at will. Meanwhile, FDLR forces
challenged the CNDP’s grab of mining properties and revenues. Mayi-Mayi
militia forces and certain FARDC units pillaged, looted and raped with
equal ferocity. In the two-year-long struggle, hundreds of thousands of
Congolese fled and lost their belongings, thousands were killed, and
untold numbers of girls and women were raped. Finally, as part of ‘Umoja
Wetu’, Rwandan military forces arrested Nkunda in January 2009.
Nkunda’s CNDP forces were then integrated into the FARDC under the
leadership of General Bosco Ntaganda – another warlord who has been
charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court.
Since
that last major war, armed confrontations have consisted of fighting
bands of severely diminished FDLR, Mayi-Mayi and newly formed groups.
Thankfully, these military operations have mostly been reduced to local
and short-term fights, with casualty numbers distinctly lower than at
any other time during the past 15 years.
Due diligence politics of President Kabila
While
the UN Security Council embraced due diligence principals for certain
minerals originating in eastern DRC with resolutions 1952 (2010) and
2021 (2011), the US Congress prepared its ‘Conflict Minerals Bill’. This
measure is designed to force companies with SEC reporting obligations
to disclose to the public if they import and use coltan
(columbine-tantalite), cassiterite, wolframite and gold from eastern
DRC. The bill was incorporated into the Dodd Frank Bill under section
1502 and signed into law by President Obama on 21 July 2010. But its
final implementation rules were only approved by the SEC in August 2012
after a lengthy battle between activists and affected industry groups
and lobbyists.
However,
even without its application the ‘Obama Law’ had an impact within a few
months of his signing it. President Kabila took advantage of the global
attention and on 20 September 2010 signed Decree 705 suspending mineral
exports, although only from South and North Kivu and Maniema. On the
same day, he also signed Decree 706, listing the following requirements
for Congolese institutions to fulfil before he would lift the export
suspension suspension – although none of these requirements appear to
have been fulfilled when he lifted the suspension six months later
without any explanation:
SAESSCAM and the Ministry of Mines must:
1. Deploy their agents along the entire chain beginning with the point of origin to the point of refining;
2. Identify artisanal miners and their cooperatives, and verify that they operate legally;
3. Propose, together with the mining cadaster, new artisanal mining zones;
4. Assist artisanal miners to reorganise into mining cooperatives;
5. Complete the establishment of Centre de Negoce; and,
6. Establish, together with international partners, a map of artisanal mining sites.
The Mining Cadaster and the Directorate of Mines must:
1. Deploy officers in the three provinces;
2. Suspend all registry examinations of current applications in the three provinces;
3. Close application process for any new registration in the three provinces;
4.
Examine, in collaboration with the mining services, whether – and
how effectively – the development and construction of mining projects
is proceeding and report to the Minister of Mines no later than 10
October 2010; and,
5. Initiate forfeiture of all holders of mining titles who are in default, regardless of their situation.
The CEEC must:
1. Reinforce efforts at all levels in the fight against fraud and smuggling of mining products.
The three provincial governments must:
1. Ensure that no minerals will move during the suspension period;
2. Ensure that mining services are ready to implement and manage all measures of the decree;
3. Ensure the effective deployment of the technical services of the Minister of Mines;
4.
Identify all artisanal miners, traders, exporters, processing and
refining facilities, as well as entities with mining permits;
5. Identify all artisanal and other mining sites;
6.
Require accountability and verify the evidence for payment of
taxes that were due by 1 January 2010 at the place of operation of the
traders and exporters, and review all information about the origin of
the funds that are used to buy minerals;
7. Verify whether funds were appropriately repatriated after minerals were exported since 1 January 2010;
8. Co-ordinate the government authorities in the fight against fraud in the mining industry;
9. Encourage permit holders to stay on schedule with their development and construction;
10. Apply sanctions in accordance with the law against anybody who contravenes the dispositions of the decree;
11. Organise a fund for the realisation of basic infrastructure; and,
12.
Provide, within 30 days from the decree entering into force, an
evaluation of supervision measures with a view towards the eventual
lifting of the suspension.
The
SARW research found no evidence that any of the requirements listed in
Decree 706 have been fulfilled. While SARW did not systematically
research the precise details of the suspension order, it did collect
anecdotal evidence. For example, Chinese buyers continued to export
cassiterite, coltan and wolframite throughout the suspension – and did
so at great profit. According to buyers in Goma and Bukavu, who abided
by the suspension decree, buyers from TTT Mining and Huaying Trading
exploited the growing desperation of artisanal cassiterite miners, who
were afraid of losing their livelihoods and were willing to sell their
product at significant discounts (of up to 80 percent compared to world
market valuations).
SARW
has found no evidence of a stoppage in gold production and export.
Since almost all gold still leaves the DRC illegally, it was predictable
that gold exporters would ignore President Kabila’s suspension,
although artisanal gold miners came under significant price pressures
(losing on average 20-25 percent compared to their normal selling
price).
President
Kabila’s decree appears to suffer from the same weakness as the ‘Obama
Law’. Both can be characterised as being overly ambitious and too far
removed from the realities on the ground. Both laws have delivered
little improvement for artisanal and small-scale mining communities. The
US Conflict Minerals law suffers from the additional problem that the
SEC only operationalized its application in August 2012. Until the law
is properly implemented and enforced, any possible impact is based on
voluntary compliance by individual companies.
Hopes
for the eventual success of the law are not high. Chinese buyers and
manufacturers have already made it abundantly clear by their actions
that they will not follow any due diligence. The front is already
crumbling. SARW is aware of a number of other major buyers of
cassiterite, coltan, wolframite, and gold who will not wait much longer
before they start buying and exporting as well. Their reasoning is
compelling: if the US Conflict Minerals Law only creates competitive
advantages for those who can afford not to comply, the market is
distorted and the law is not sustainable.
There
are other parallels between President Kabila’s ill-fated suspension and
the US Conflict Minerals Law. Over the past 15 years, the cycles of
violence have repeatedly demonstrated that the control of mining sites
is never static. One month a site is occupied or exploited by a militia,
the next it is ‘liberated’ by renegade FARDC forces that allow
government administrators to do their work. In another month, no armed
groups are present at all, but government agents start to exploit the
artisanal miners. The possible exception to this pattern is Walikale in
North Kivu. Since the beginning of the coltan boom in the late 1990s it
has always been occupied by one or another illegally armed group.
Successfully implementing the Conflict Minerals Law or fulfilling the
requirements set forth in the suspension decree requires accurate,
sustained and up-to-date monitoring of the situation in all mining
regions at all times. No one has any illusions that the DRC government
is currently living – or indeed can live – up to this responsibility.
Gold mining in Maniema Province
Of
all the eastern Provinces of the DRC, Maniema is the most isolated and
least populated. Its rich and highly diversified natural resource
deposits attracted some investments during and immediately after the
colonial period, including limited industrialised alluvial gold
exploitation by Belgika Or and Symetain. Road connections from the
surrounding provinces to Maniema are poor with ground transportation
from Maniema to the most important regional trading gateways (including
Kisangani to the north and Bukavu to the East) coming to a virtual halt
during the rainy season. The railway network has been completely
destroyed. Only a few local aviation companies provide links to the
outside world, but the transport is provided with old aeroplanes that
are inadequately maintained and do not meet accepted safety standards.
Weak
institutional structures make a mockery of the entire mining industry.
There are not only statistical inconsistencies between reports from
state agencies, but their data reflect such unrealistically low overall
gold output (ranging from 7 to 29 kilograms per year) that the effort to
compile data might as well be abandoned (see table 4). Provincial and
national authorities do not reliably fulfil their supervisory role – for
example, ensuring that gold traders and exporters are licensed and
follow all legal requirements. The weakness of state institutions is
demonstrated by the fact that of the 537 agents of the Provincial Mining
Division who are supposed to be active, only 137 have received
contracts so far. The rest are left in limbo regarding their authority
and their income.
Inconsistent statistical data about annual provincial gold production and exports
Year/ Production - Provincial Mining Division/ Production - SAESSCAM/ Export - CEEC
2007 29 097.7 gram n/a 7 495.5 gram
2008 15 712.9 gram 3 975.9 gram 8 267.9 gram
2009 16 983.5 gram n/a 15 035 gram
2010 25 103.3 gram n/a n/a
2011 22 180.2 gram n/a n/a
However, industrial exploration and exploitation will soon increase in Maniema Province. The Australian company, Erongo Energy Limited,
has acquired a 70 percent share of nine permits originally owned by
Afrimines Resources. The company is run by a former Tiger Resources
Executive and Klaus Eckhof, formerly of Motogold. Testing and drilling
started in 2011 on some of the properties. The Erongo projects are to
the west of Banro’s Namoya mine, which is situated in the border region
near Salamabila. When the mine commences industrial operation in 2013 it
will be Maniema’s most important industrial mineral exploitation
venture.
Construction
for the Namoya project is underway and throughout this year several
hundred locals will be employed in the construction phase, while an
additional contingent of permanent employees will be added once the
Namoya plant is operational next year. Around four villages are directly
affected by Banro’s build-up and will have to be moved. Representatives
of the company are negotiating with artisanal miners to determine who
should be considered a genuine resident and as such, eligible for Banro
Foundation’s compensation scheme. Predictably, the number of affected
residents differed significantly when the negotiation began, with Banro
recognising 106 residents while the locals identified 856 residents. The
likely compromise will provide a significant number of new houses,
financial compensation, and a yet-to-be-determined number of job
opportunities for suitable candidates at the Namoya plant.
Localised
confrontations between the FARDC and UN peacekeepers on one side and
remnants of the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups in North and South Kivu on the
other side produce spill over security issues affecting Maniema’s gold
production. Since the SARW research commenced, FDLR units, Mayi-Mayi
Simba and other groups sometimes withdrew from Shabunda in South Kivu or
from Walikale in North Kivu in the direction of Salamabila or Lubutu
respectively. Small, semi-permanent Mayi-Mayi and FDLR units, as well as
FARDC troops already deployed in Maniema, frequently harass artisanal
gold miners along the Maniema-South Kivu border.
For
Paul Wembolenga, the provincial director of FEC, the only issue is
whether the artisanal miners choose to pay armed aggressors voluntarily
or not. François Muhemedi, the chief of the Provincial Mining Division,
believes that there are a few soldiers in the gold-mining areas along
the border, but that none of them bother the miners. “Members of the
Police and FARDC may at times, during their official missions, demand
from the artisanal mining communities a per diem for their rations.” But
in Wembolenga’s experience, armed groups and military units come to
gold-mining areas for three reasons only: “Kidnapping, rape and
looting.” However Wembolenga does admit that sometimes FARDC troops do
intervene for their protection. Nevertheless, Monsieur Ibrahim, the
chief of SAESSCAM, said: “In some sites, the security is not
sufficient.” As a result, many communities fear the military and are
deeply distrustful. Hélène Andjelani who leads Réseau Wa Mama Simameni, a
self-help group for women, summarised her experience: “There is no
security for us.”
On
the list of most worrisome issues for artisanal and small-scale miners,
physical security is topped only by the daily transgressions committed
by government officials. “I have personally witnessed several incidents
when government officials have extorted the miners,” explained
Wembolenga. Agents of the provincial mining division, SAESSCAM, CEEC,
DGM, ANR and the mining police are usually found on or near the mining
sites. The individuals interviewed are in agreement that these
government agencies offer scant benefits. “The biggest challenge is the
many taxes that government agents impose on us,” said Sefu Zakunani,
secretary to the artisanal miners association of Bikenge. “We are quite
certain that these agents are not channelling the money they get from us
into the treasury of the province or the state.” SAESSCAM agents enjoy
very little respect from the artisanal miners of Bikenge. “We want
nothing to do with them; they give us nothing but take taxes for which
there is no legal foundation.”
Wembolenga
makes similar accusations: “The mining police come here with the only
mission to get the miners’ money.” His members made Jean Népomgono
Kaborongo, the president of FEC Kampene, aware that the representatives
of SAESSCAM provide no assistance or training to the miners. He believes
that the same agents are working closely together with the Provincial
Mining Division to dictate who is permitted to access a mine and work
there and who is not.
Defao
Waupenda, the chief of the artisanal miners association of Bikenge,
believes that many problems are fundamentally connected with widespread
ignorance of the laws in force. This basic lack of information and
understanding leads to what he describes as “acrobatics in order to
obtain all necessary documents and widespread discouragement and
multiplicity of taxations.”
The
improper behaviour of national and provincial government employees
extends to the exploitation of children. Alphonse Kibwe, a 12-year-old
miner who works on gold-mining sites around Kailo, northeast of Kindu
revealed: “I have to pay US$20 to US$50 for a document that the
government agents say gives me the right to mine.” On the mining sites
where he works, other children, including orphans or abandoned or
demobilised child soldiers work in the mines. “They help with washing
the gold, they carry the sand bags, and girls work in road-side stores
or as prostitutes.” None of these activities worry government officials.
“They only come here to extract money from me,” said Kibwe. Rather than
protecting miners and seeing to it that safer work conditions prevail
in the mines, government agents, the traditional leadership of the local
villages, soldiers and security forces compete with each other for
control over the mines and the gold. In the midst of this chaos, the
12-year-old boy has adjusted to the rule of the strong: “We are on good
terms with them as long as we keep paying.”
Bongelo
Balimwatcha, a 53-year-old miner working on the same sites as Kibwe
related very similar experiences: “Where we have armed government
officials, we are being harassed and exploited. The worst are the mining
police officers who fine us for a never-ending list of infractions.”
The irony is that insecurity for the miners increases dramatically once
the military arrives. Balimwatcha explained: “Extortions and violence
increase when they are here.” Representatives of the government are not
permanently stationed in Kailo. “But they do visit us on a regular basis
whenever they are broke,” said Balimwatcha.
Stéphane
Lutika, a former artisanal miner who now earns his living as a small
gold trader described how the region around Kailo used to be
destabilised by Mayi-Mayi groups: “The military has gained control over
our area and should now create conditions that promote secure mining.
But we pay for the peace. The soldiers show up every day to get manioc,
rice, banana and oil.” In addition, soldiers are often also competitors
for the rich deposits in the mines. “They come in and start to dig in
our richest mines – whether we want them here or not.” A young
restaurant operator, Amba Yengola, described the bureaucratic hurdles to
obtain permits necessary to work as a miner: “We have to do a lot of
acrobatics to get our permits, and yet, we are still bothered by the
government and military who come to our mining sites.” Twelve-year-old
Kasimu Mujana described the relationship with the government: “Tense and
particularly with soldiers who we do not trust.” Kasimu explained that
miners must satisfy many demands for money and goods, but the military
still does not look after their security. “Many children work in the
mines and young women are used for prostitution. There is no protection
for us.”
Gold mining in North Kivu Province
While gold
deposits in North Kivu receive far less international attention than the
province’s tin, cassiterite, coltan or wolframite mining, artisanal
gold production is nevertheless a substantial contributor to the local
economy. Located between the Kilo Moto gold belt in Orientale and the
Twangiza-Namoya gold belt in South Kivu-Maniema, there are approximately
12 regions with artisanal and small-scale gold-mining in North Kivu –
Walikale, Masisi, Lutunguru, Manzia-Luholy-Lubereri, Mohanga,
Lundjulu-Loiki-Ubiro, Lubero, Makwasu, Lutela (includes Manguredjipa),
Biabune-Loya and Bilolo-Mobissio-Abakuasimbo. Up to now, very limited
exploration has been conducted at these locations apart from the
prospecting and semi-industrial exploitation that was conducted by a
Belgian colonial company at Manguredjipa.
North Kivu’s
artisanal gold-mining communities, which are small and dispersed
compared to those in Ituri, have been under heavy pressure during the
past 15 years of violence. Successive waves of militias and bandits
repeatedly displaced many miners, forcing them into a nomadic lifestyle
and pushing them largely outside the reach of traditional academic
studies.
The relative
isolation of most of these communities, the poor state of the roads, and
their complete dependence on regional traders, who buy their gold and
sell them foodstuffs and consumer goods, comes at a heavy price for
artisanal and small-scale miners (see table 1).
To fully assess
the socio-economic conditions of artisanal and small-scale gold miners
in eastern Congo it is necessary to analyse the individual buying power
they have in their communities. For this purpose, SARW collected retail
prices from the Congo’s principal trading hubs and the isolated
gold-mining sites. The discrepancies in the retail price of tools,
foodstuffs and consumer goods range from 0 to over 100 percent, with no
apparent justification other than the dictate of local vendors or their
suppliers in Kisangani, Butembo, Goma and Bukavu. The dominant sense is
that traders are able to extract a heavy bonus from the gold miners.
Manguredjipa
Manguredjipa is
located in Lubero Territory and its only road connection is to Butembo,
about 100km east. Manguredjipa is the centre of sprawling gold-mining
communities. Several thousand people living in Manguredjipa, while
anywhere from 30,000-45,000 are widely distributed in the 10,000 square
km of surrounding forests and mountains. There is no available
information about the quantity of gold that is currently extracted from
this region.
One
international mining company, Loncor Resources, has acquired 55
prospecting permits and in 2009 commenced an exploration programme in
and around the historic extraction sites of Manguredjipa. According to
Loncor, over 300,000 ounces of alluvial gold and platinum were extracted
from the area under the Belgian colonial company, Miniere des Grands
Lacs (MGL), between the 1920s and the 1960s.
The current
gold rush has turned the traditional order of Manguredjipa upside down.
According to the Chef De Secteur, Batsosi Nyamwisi, “historically
Manguredjipa was the breadbasket of Butembo and of the Grand Nord thanks
to large rice and palm plantations. During the war, mining for coltan
and later for gold pushed farming almost completely out of this region.”
The residents of Manguredjipa now import foodstuffs to ensure the
survival of the rapidly growing population. A general hospital, primary
and secondary schools (some of them Catholic schools), as well as a
number of churches serve the population relatively well. Since
gold-mining became the dominant activity of many thousands of people in
this area, SAESSCAM, the Provincial Mining Division, the mining police,
ANR and FARDC have arrived too.
SARW focused
its monitoring on three quarries: Bakele, Byamungu and Bichakuchaku –
all of them located within 15km of the centre of Manguredjipa. In
addition to interviews with artisanal diggers, carriers, crushers,
washers and panners, the SARW researchers also talked with gold traders,
local suppliers of foodstuffs, representatives of the Provincial Mining
Division, the mining police, military intelligence, the head of the
local medical services, Catholic priests, and other religious leaders.
Chef de Secteur Batsosi Nywamwisi (a recent arrival in Manguredjipa)
also assisted with information. There was no representative of SAESSCAM
available in Manguredjipa during the time that the SARW researchers
worked there.
Until very
recently, the tens of thousands of miners working in and around
Manguredjipa operated without protection from the FARDC or other state
security. Mayi-Mayi groups would periodically come to Manguredjipa and
“disturb us” – as one artisanal digger put it – but all artisanal miners
reported that the threat of militia attacks has diminished
significantly. Only the Chef de Secteur warned that he had reports of
Mayi-Mayi groups controlling some outlying mining sites, which are
several days march to the west of Manguredjipa. The town is now
protected by a recently-deployed FARDC regiment. “When they arrived they
had no supplies whatsoever, nor money to buy food or shelter,”
explained Nywamwisi. “I had to go around town and beg for food for 300
soldiers and officers.” Throughout the SARW research period in
Manguredjipa, there were no signs of confrontations with armed groups.
However, on the return to Butembo, a short fire fight between a FARDC
patrol and a small group of combatants blocked the road for several
hours. The identity or affiliation of the combatants could not be
clarified, as they retreated without taking any casualties.
The absence of
any sustained militia threats does not mean that there is no violence in
the gold-mining areas. Selemany, an artisanal miner who is working on
an old abandoned Belgian mining site without having obtained legal
permits, stated: “There are only bandits who are organised by the FARDC
soldiers. They extort payments from us.” A miner who did not want to be
named for fear of retribution confirmed: “Our biggest problems stem from
gangs of young villagers who come here to chase us around the mines
until we pay. They are not really organised but they like to pretend
that they are militias.” One of the biggest risks, he explained, is
robbery on the roads to and from the mines.
Artisanal
small-scale gold miners explain how the fees imposed by the agents of
the Provincial Mining Division and the taxes raised by national
government authorities are a serious threat to their livelihoods. While
most of the miners could afford the legitimate fees and taxes, the
additional illegal extortions and the daily incidents of ‘la petite
corruption add up to an amount that exceeds the means of most artisanal
miners. On average, the fee paid for the annual artisanal mining permit
ranges from US$15 – US$25, which is often lower than the official
government mandated price. However, almost all miners pay various
surcharges for the permit. Once they pay, they become targets for
further random extortions and other fictitious taxes by the agents of
the Provincial Mining Division. The flood of charges, fees, duties,
taxes and other levies are too much for many artisanal and small-scale
miners, and they give up any attempt to operate within the legal space.
“I don’t earn enough money to pay for these papers,” said Selemany
explaining his decision to conduct illegal artisanal mining activities.
Extra-legal
financial impositions exacerbate the already deeply anchored belief that
the government is not a force for good in gold mining. Not even
SAESSCAM, the agency that is supposed to support and guide artisanal and
small-scale miners, is appreciated. “The authorities only come here to
get our money,” said one artisanal miner. “Most of the time, SAESSCAM
does not even have an agent in Manguredjipa.” When questioned about
whether they are aware of SAESSCAM’s mandate to assist with safer
extraction methodologies or with the replacement of mercury in the
processing of gold ore with safer practices, a group of miners, who
wished to stay unnamed, answered: “No.” It is clear that the lack of
support and assistance from government agents is a serious hindrance to a
safe mining industry.
The impotence
of state authority is glaringly obvious even before one arrives in
Manguredjipa. The first half of the road between Manguredjipa and
Butembo was recently improved and is in fairly good condition, even
during the rainy season. However, over the past three years, the last
40km of road have deteriorated to the point that not even 4x4 vehicles
can operate. The only practical modes of transport are light
motorcycles, bicycles, and the muscle strength of thousands of people
carrying goods over many kilometres. Traders from Manguredjipa transport
gold hidden in palm oil containers, sacks of vegetables, or other goods
that they want to sell in Butembo. On their return journey, they carry
rice, palm oil and manioc, beer, soft drinks, shovels and picks,
batteries and electronic gadgets, clothes and household items.
Occasionally a few 10-15 ton trucks attempt to traverse this stretch,
but they get stuck and their drivers are forced to hire locals to dig
through metres of mud in order to move their vehicles forward, inch by
inch. On average, a truck takes 1-2 weeks to cover the last 40km to
Manguredkipa.
Crossing the
mud requires backbreaking effort, but it is the first step in
transporting raw gold from Manguredjipa and exchanging it food and basic
necessities. However, the exchange is between massively under-priced
gold and massively overpriced food and goods. SARW has calculated that
the gold miners in Manguredjipa and other gold-mining centres of North
Kivu pay on average 45 percent more for food, tools and consumer goods
than they would in Goma.
Despite their
important economic contributions to the region, gold miners receive
virtually nothing in exchange – including no attention or services from
the government. Gold extraction is accompanied by serious violations of
human rights, especially against women and children. “There are no
measures taken against the frequent cases of sexual violence against
girls, women and children in general. There is no police or judicial
intervention, no place where victims can go and find protection,” stated
a high-ranking official of the provincial government. An artisanal
miner and father added: “How can we report our problems about illegal
and exorbitant taxation, about the lack of protection and legal remedies
when our women and daughters are being harassed, and in most cases the
perpetrators are government officials?”
Walikale
Until a few
years ago, Walikale was inaccessible by road either from Goma, Bukavu or
Kisangani. Since 2005, thanks to the efforts of international donors,
passable roads have been built connecting Bukavu and Goma with Walikale.
The road from Kisangani is only passable by passenger vehicles as far
as Lubutu. Before the roads were constructed, the only way to access
Walikale – in an isolated, mountainous area 270km west of Goma – was a
short asphalt airstrip built by RCD-Goma over 10 years ago on which STOL
aircraft can land. Although the edge of the strip is littered with the
wrecks and debris of crashed planes, it remains the only landing site
for the entire region.
Roads are the
principal entry point for all consumer products for the tens of
thousands of inhabitants of the region. In exchange for these supplies,
raw minerals with a value of hundreds of millions of dollars are
exported to the regional trading centres. Most of these minerals are
delivered in sacks after arduous 50km walks through swampy forest from
the tin-oxide (cassiterite) and wolframite deposits of Bisie, and from
other artisanal mining sites.
The massive
wealth generated by the informal mining industry and the ubiquity of
rebels and corrupt FARDC soldiers, who illegally exploit the mining
communities, has made Walikale the most publicised example of a
conflict-mineral zone – with good justification. Following bloody
contests between RCD-Goma, FDLR and Mayi-Mayi up to 2004, Walikale, the
cassiterite supply lines, and Bisie ended up under the control of the
renegade and unintegrated 85th FARDC brigade.
“On average we
have to flee from armed attacks every six months. This insecurity has
never changed since we started gold-mining here,” explained Nelson
Muzema, an artisanal gold miner interviewed at the Wanyarukula mining
site near Osso centre. “We have become nomads but with limited spaces to
move to.” The southern part of the Walikale region is under the control
of the government, but the north of the territory is controlled by the
FDLR. Until very recently, Bisie, Omate and Mutchele were under the
control of the Nduma Defense Force – better known as Mayi-Mayi Sheka,
formed by Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka. Until a few years ago Sheka was the
manager of the Groupe Minier Bangandula (GMB), a group established by
leading business families from Goma who vied for control over the mining
concessions of Bisie. However, CAMI had granted exploration permits for
these deposits to Mining and Processing Congo (MPC), a company
controlled by South African investors. In March 2011, MPC sold 70
percent of its assets to the Canadian company Alphamin Resources Corp,
which has now installed its own management. According to guarantees
given directly by President Kabila to MPC in 2009, all FARDC units would
leave Bisie by mid-June 2009. This guarantee only emboldened Sheka and
others to move in again on the rich mining regions.
For gold miners
and traders, the security provided by legitimate FARDC troops has its
price. “We are required to pay at least 1000 FC for each gram of gold we
produce,” explained Nelson Muzema, which is the cost of keeping the
soldiers in Wanyarukula friendly. “If we produce greater quantities,
they take one twentieth of our income.”
In the Walikale
region – widely known for its rich cassiterite mines – gold is an
attractive hedge during times when cassiterite and wolframite fetch less
lucrative prices on the world markets. The SARW research focused on the
gold-mining sites of Zua Idée, Omate, Muchele, Matungu and Kintsimba.
In all of these sites, SARW found that artisanal gold miners are subject
to considerable violence, extortion and economic hardship.
The lack of
credible government authority is aggravated by the unreliable or
predatory behaviour of its agents. “On our site there are no officials
of the Provincial Mining Division,” stated Faustin Arthur Bingombe, a
miner who is also director of a small company in Wanyarukula. “They come
by for inspections,” clarified his colleague Limu Papy, the chief of
the Etoile Company at Zua Idée. “Every time these government agents are
visiting us, we have to arrange for a proper reception. We have to host
them with a meal and provide transportation for them. All of this costs a
lot of money.”
For Tshiwara
Bajunda, who works in Zua Idée, the role of the SAESSCAM agents is a
mystery: “We are not aware what their role is, and we have never
received any assistance or contributions from them.” Zebo Makenda Ize
who works with the LK small-scale mining operation in Zua Idée
confirmed: “SAESSCAM has never given us any kind of training.” Balagizi
Butu stated bluntly: “The government representatives are extorting us
with each sale of gold.”
One of the
problems that plague the local gold trading communities is the
increasing circulation of fake gold and the inability of government
agents to intervene against this emerging criminal element. “There are
significant quantities circulating,” explained Mboko Kapunyola Raphaël,
head of Isolé des Mines in Walikale. “It is usually offered for around
30,000 FC when real gold goes for up to 60,000 FC per gram.”
Fraudulent gold
scales are another widespread criminal ploy that cuts into the income
of miners and traders. Lwaboshi Chiraga, a small gold trader based in
Walikale centre explained: “We have great difficulties to make ends
meet. Somehow in Bukavu, where we sell our gold, they seem to have more
exact gold scales.” Once the traders from Walikale arrive there, they
always end up with less gold than what they had weighed in Walikale. “We
lose every time we go to Bukavu,” said Chiraga. At the same time they
have to watch out that their business is conducted when the government
agents are not around. “It costs us too much money when they are present
and demand their share.”
Gold mining in Orientale Province
Nowhere
is artisanal and small-scale gold-mining anchored more deeply into the
history, economy and suffering of the Congolese people than it is in the
Ituri District, the western section of Ortientale Province. Over the
past 15 years, beginning with the First Congo War, Ituri’s gold-mining
regions spiralled into uncontrolled ethnic violence. During the Second
Congo War, when Ugandan and Rwandan troops occupied and thoroughly
pillaged most sites, the remaining infrastructure of the major
parastatal company OKIMO was dismantled, and whatever pieces of value
that were left were hauled off across the border to Uganda. For three
years, a succession of warlords battled each other for temporary control
of the gold mines around Mongbwalu and Watsa. Beginning in 2004, the UN
and the Transitional Government of the Congo made a determined effort
to bring peace to Ituri. Eventually, the leaders of the most violent
militias were sent off for prosecution at the ICC in The Hague, others
were incarcerated in Kinshasa and international mining companies were
invited back to restore the dilapidated operations. At that point, OKIMO
existed only as a terribly undermanaged entity, with its staff in Bunia
thinking and operating as if they were independent of the company’s
headquarters in Kinshasa
During
the post-war period, exploration agreements between OKIMO and
international joint venture partners, such as Anglo Gold Ashanti and
Motogold, were signed under less than transparent conditions. A third
international partner, Mwana Africa, obtained exploration rights.
However, the terms of these contracts soon became subject to contentious
renegotiations because the DRC government discovered a number of unfair
terms. By 2007, the original permit holders had to surrender their
rights and make room for new international partnerships:
- The
only major gold operation left unscathed was Mwana Gold, owner of the
Zani-Kodo project situated west of Aru, whose contract was signed in
June 2005. Mwana controlled 80 percent and OKIMO retained 20 percent of
the project. The sites on which the company conducted its exploration
were mined industrially until 1964. Currently, there is no timetable for
commencement of industrial mining and processing.
- The
Mongbwalu project downsized to half its original territory and is now
called Ashanti Goldfield Kilo (AGK) with 13.78 percent still controlled
by OKIMO. The project is commonly referred to as AGK. The joint venture
partners project the treatment of 500,000 tons of gold ore per year over
five years at their first subterranean exploitation site at
Adidi-Kanga. The date of inauguration of that mine has not yet been set.
- The
Kibali project replaced Motogold and is now operated as a 90/10 joint
venture between Randgold, Anglo Gold Ashanti and OKIMO. The project is
advancing rapidly towards operationalising one open pit and one
underground mining site, as well as one processing plant. Limited
production is expected to commence by 2014 with 600,000 ounces of gold
ore at 4.1g/t gold per annum for the first 12 years. Camps for
construction workers, who will be recruited from nearby communities, and
the resettlement of 15 communities are progressing according to the
social contribution plans approved by all partners.
- Kilo
Goldmines Ltd is a Canadian gold exploration company that has secured
an exploration permit from OKIMO for a 7000 square km area to the west
of the Kibali project. No data is yet available about exploration or
exploitation.
- In
July 2010, OKIMO signed an agreement with the Swedish junior
gold-mining company, Mineral Invest International AB, for a 1442 square
km area, which is known as the Wanga deposits. They are situated south
of the road connecting Faradje and Dungu. So far, the company has
conducted preliminary exploratory steps only. It intends to develop the
property, possibly in a joint venture with a large gold-mining company.
The company, which is listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange, is involved
in the mineral trade, but it is uncertain whether they will engage in
gold trade or export in the DRC.
- Negotiations
for a number of additional exploration permits to junior mining
companies were ongoing during late 2011 and into 2012.
International
gold-mining companies have also shown increasing interest in gold
deposits located outside the OKIMO properties. Loncor Resources has
acquired several exploration rights in the province, one of which is
located at Ngayu, 270km northeast of Kisangani. Around Yindi, important
gold deposits were historically exploited by Belgian enterprises.
Thanks
to the strong interest of industrial mining companies, the region
should experience significant growth in the coming years. For artisanal
and small-scale miners, however, this is a time of heightened concerns.
For some, eventual displacement and loss of access to traditional
artisanal mining might be inevitable. Others might be affected in more
positive ways. Social impact mitigation schemes require that all
companies wishing to engage in industrial mining in the DRC provide
employment, resettlement in furnished housing, schools and improved
medical care for local residents and artisanal miners. But for the time
being, a sense of insecurity (and sometimes anger at the foreign
companies) dominates the discourse.
In
large part, the insecurities result from very poor communication
strategies by the joint venture partners. While the companies appear to
live up to all legally mandated disclosure statements, operating plans,
socio-economic assessments, papers and studies that discuss eventual
displacements and resettlements of villages, or employment
opportunities, none of these important documents are published in the
local languages spoken by the affected populations. The lack of correct
information extends to the most elementary level. For most locals, the
correct names and roles of OKIMO and its joint venture AGK are shrouded
in mystery. There is ongoing confusion about the name of the company.
The fact that SOKIMO (the legally correct name for the company) is no
longer a parastatal but is a public company has not yet registered with
the informal mining community of Ituri District.
For
artisanal and small-scale miners, it matters a great deal whether they
operate on property controlled by SOKIMO or dig for gold on land under
the jurisdiction of the Provincial Mining Division. Emmanuel Maki, the
technical director of the small-scale mining operation at Kipe Yayo,
which is within the SOKIMO-AGK land area said: “The company has signed
an exploitation contract with me. In exchange they demand 30 percent of
the sand we dig out and charge US$1000 per 500 square metres we use per
year.” The remaining output of the mine is for the contractor, his
sub-contractors, their labourers, material and tools. On the other hand,
an ‘Encadreur’,
who operates as the primary contractor pays 30 percent to SOKIMO but
keeps 30 percent and distributes the remaining 40 percent among his
local sub-contractors or mine manager, also known as ‘De Trou’. He in turn decides how much to pay his labourers.
The
labourers are hired to dig, carry and wash the sand. For these workers,
the income they earn under the SOKIMO system can vary significantly. On
one site SARW researchers found women carriers at Iga-Barriere who earn
as little as 200 FC per day, whereas at another site nearby the diggers
take home 8000 FC per day (converted into weekly pay this is
approximately US$50). Despite these local variations the conditions that
artisanal and small-scale miners find outside the SOKIMO-controlled
area are much more favourable. The lawful annual fee for the artisanal
mining permit is US$25. In principle no other charges should apply – a
huge advantage over their colleagues labouring inside the SOKIMO
perimeter. They are very much aware of these differences, as Basa
Mateso, manager of the Nizi IV mine and chief of Baluma Village
confirmed: “… the barrage of bribes, taxes and other demands by
government agents add up so that we cannot afford them.” Unfortunately,
Mateso is caught inside the SOKIMO territory.
Mongbwalu
What
is commonly referred to as the Mongbwalu gold-mining site encompasses a
large area where informal or formal mining has been in existence for
over 100 years. It is estimated that about 80 percent (or 36,000–42,000)
of the people living in Mongbwalu depend on artisanal and small-scale
gold mining. There are hundreds of other mining communities within the
permit area of the Mongbwalu project, each with a significant population
of artisanal and small-scale miners.
Operating
as artisanal or small-scale miners on the Mongbwalu site imposes
different conditions compared to other parts of the DRC. As a
parastatal, OKIMO has the privilege of licensing artisanal and
small-scale mining operators wishing to be active on its properties. In
order to better assess the relationship between OKIMO and its private
sector partners and between Anglo Goldfields Kilo and the artisanal
mining community, the SARW research focused both on outlying areas and
mining sites in the immediate vicinity of the future Mongbwalu
industrial zone.
Lebi
Faruku, a manager of a mine in Pluto highlighted the ambiguity in which
the artisanal and small-scale miners must operate: “AGK has suspended
the issuing of mining licenses. However, the company pretends to be
blind when thousands of artisanal miners continue to exploit gold.
Traditional chiefs are selling them these rights even in contravention
of AGK’s property rights.”
“We
don’t experience many difficulties,” stated Eric Ukumu, an artisanal
miner who works at the Pluto site, “except that we are on OKIMO’s
property and it is impossible to obtain a mining permit from them.”
Ukumu and other artisanal miners in Pluto are seriously bothered by the
amount of exaggerated tax-schemes that state agents impose on them,
notwithstanding the fact that none of them have any legal mining
permits. Government services such as the Ministry of Economy, Mines, or
the Environment are only acting as tax collectors. “It is
disproportionate, particularly compared to the old times when we would
give OKIMO 1 gram of raw gold every 2 weeks,” said Faruku. He then went
even further: “We are victims of veritable organised extortion by the
civil servants.” Why, he asked, do the miners have to pay taxes to the
officials from the Ministry of Environment when they do absolutely
nothing to protect the environment?
For
Matthieu Ovoa, the co-ordinator of CEMAO, there are even more
principled issues at stake: “We are all unemployed Congolese who have
been abandoned by the state. We must find a way to survive and
exploiting our natural resources is what we can do.” That is why his
cooperative has been fighting over the last five years for the
protection of the interests of artisanal miners and to modernise their
work. This primarily means finding financial resources that will be used
to introduce safer mining techniques. Ovoa explained: “We have to work
without legal permits, without support by the state or any other
organisations.” However, his members are all exorbitantly taxed by a
growing number of governmental organisations. “It’s always about money
they want from us.”
All
artisanal miners agree that the physical threats from militias are
clearly in the past. “The military is in charge and does effectively
protect the population,” said Ovoa.
Gold
traders who either act as independent buyers of artisanal gold or more
often are agents of larger gold traders situated in Bunia, Butembo or
Aru, are also tolerated by AGK – and extorted by government employees
for whatever they are worth. Traders and merchants are well aware that
they are targets of state agents and that they should maintain a quiet
existence. One trader, who wished to stay anonymous, stated: “To
government officials we are chakula yetu – our Swahili expression for ‘from where you eat’.”
Although
they trade gold produced by artisanal miners who lack proper permits,
the traders are still required by the Ministry of Mines to buy permits
at US$190 per year. Other agencies also raise money from the traders
without giving any reasons for the tax. “What ANR is doing, is anyone’s
guess,” said the trader, “as is true for others, such as DGI. Very
often, they don’t give us any receipt for our payments. That’s our
country.”
Hubert
Ngabu, another trader who works in the Mongbwalu area, blamed AGK:
“They are putting artisanal miners under pressure and make only those
zones available that have already been exploited.” This situation stands
in stark contrast to what many miners and gold traders fondly recall as
the belle époque before the war, when Kilo-Moto employed local residents, paid good salaries and constructed roads, hospitals and schools.
Iga-Barrière
Iga-Barrière
is situated midway between Bunia and Mongbwalu, at a crossroad that
also leads to Fataki, Mahagi and Aru. This privileged geographic
position has turned the formerly small mining site into an important
trading hub for consumer goods, foodstuffs and gold. The chief of the
Groupement estimates that 18,000 artisanal and small-scale gold miners
are currently working in Iga-Barrière. They exploit tailings along the
banks and in the Nizi River. Significant mining is also going on in the
surrounding hillsides, which are exploited by small-scale mining
operations, often involving several dozens of employees.
A
mini gold rush was recently triggered in Mbudu, a village to the
northeast of Iga-Barriere, when a local resident was digging a septic
tank and hit upon a very rich gold vein. In a short period of time, the
entire village of farmers began digging in their backyards and fields
and even ripped their houses apart. Not much is left of the original
Mbudu except pits that indicate a major occurrence of artisanal
gold-mining.
Such
mad rushes on their land may be explained by the extraordinary
difficulties and confusions concerning property rights and access to
gold deposits. “Who owns the land? OKIMO, SOKIMO or AGK?” asked
Généreuse Lotsove, who works with a small-scale mining operation in
Mbundu, “No representative told us anything about the future of this
space.”
Many
suspect that the confusions and the pressures that SOKIMO exerts on the
local communities with the help of ANR agents is designed to drive
people off their land, which is considered a historic right by many
Congolese. “On one site managers of SOKIMO frequently buy our gold
because trading with artisanal gold is still their most important source
of income,” explained Ngona Lossa, a catechist in one of the local
villages. At the same time, many SOKIMO managers appear to take
advantage of the miners to the point that they can barely survive. “They
take the little that is left to the artisanal miners when in fact all
we want is to use the land that belongs to Baluma, our ancestor.”
Small-scale
miner Richard Ngbemu explained: “In order to work a mine, one pays 30
kitcheles of raw gold that is currently about US$1290.” After that there
are quantities of sand with high gold content that are given to the
police, soldiers, ANR, and other government and non-government
employees. Tsala Dhekana, the mayor of Iga-Barriere and a contractor on
mining sites, described the full picture of economic deprivations: “The
price we have to pay for the rights to mine the land from SOKIMO is
beyond our means and still we are required to pay and obtain the same
rights from the traditional leader. Now, once we have the permit, the
government services knock on our door to get what they consider their
share. The demands by the local ANR intelligence agents are particularly
odious. No local miner sees any benefits from their presence. There are
a lot of misgivings about these so-called taxes, but we pay them in the
hope that we will not be squeezed further.”
For
female miners, the economic pressures are particularly difficult. In
many cases their husbands were killed during the wars and militia
violence, they were displaced or they were otherwise separated from
their men and families. Without any capital, there are very few
opportunities for survival left for them. The relationship with the
government agencies and the joint venture partners is crucial to their
survival. “SOKIMO has always bothered us because they have never
tolerated our presence unless we paid them,” explained Pascaline
Ndjangusi, a female miner and stone collector working on the Sombe-Dimo
mine, “But AGK is much worse – they have prohibited everything we do.”
The exploitation of single women can take many other forms too.
Généreuse Lotsove recalled how a policeman recently fined her for
allegedly not respecting the traffic rules while she walked away from a
gold buyer. “He knew that I had cash because I just sold a little bit of
gold.”
All
miners report real improvements regarding the elimination of physical
threats and attacks by militias or renegade FARDC forces. “We have no
militias left in the region,” stated Issamba Jado, a farmer and
part-time artisanal miner from Mbudu. “We have total peace; nobody has
to fear for his life anymore. The security situation has improved to the
point where our most serious problems are now with AGK.” Some miners
have even pointed out that they rely on FARDC to protect their mines and
gold when they transfer it to the buyer. A catechist, Dieudonné Bapu,
confirmed that whatever precarious situations created by the joint
venture partners might exist, the military has no part in it. “We are at
peace with the soldiers who are here, they just do their work.”
Virginie Love, who runs a little shop in Iga Centre pointed out that
recourse for victims of violent crimes is now available: “The police
will take violent crimes seriously and there is now also a special court
for legal issues related to children.”
Mabanga
In
contrast to Iga-Barriere, Mabanga is far from the main roads that
connect Bunia with Mongbwalu or with Mahagi-Aru. The road to Mabanga is
in a deplorable state and even with a good 4-wheel-drive vehicle during
the dry season it takes over one hour to navigate from the main road to
Mabanga. During the rainy season Mabanga is often inaccessible.
Notwithstanding these problems, the gold rush has attracted over 2000
miners and their families, who have built makeshift houses near the
three principal mining sites.
Mabanga
is part of the territory granted to AGK, but the joint venture partners
have not initiated exploration drilling in the immediate vicinity. That
does not mean that AGK – or maybe OKIMO – has not established a revenue
sharing system with the local gold miners. “According to OKIMO’s rules
we are supposed to pay 30 percent of our gold sand, but on average we
end up paying 40 percent of our revenues because that’s how much they
take from our excavated sand,” explained Gratien Ndahora, a local miner.
“It is an abusive system because on top of these payments, agents from
ANR, representatives of the Ministry for the Environment and even the
FEC are demanding a share of our gold.”
The
relationship with the military, on the other hand, brings practical and
positive benefits to the miners. In Mabanga, gold is mined in open-pit
mines. Substantial amounts of sand, all with a high content of gold, are
dug up and stored until the crew can start to wash out and divide the
gold. “Storing so much valuable sand is risky,” explained Philippe
Lokana, a sub-contractor in charge of a mine in Dimo. “It can be stolen,
or even our workers may start to wash it out prematurely.” To prevent
theft, most miners rely on the military to guard the gold sand deposits
day and night, seven days a week. The fee for the soldiers is
customarily around 10 percent of the production, which is considered a
good investment by most miners. “Their presence on our site has
absolutely no negative impact on our work or the security of our
families,” assured Lokana, “because they leave once their work is done.”
Mining
sites in the two territories of Bondo and Banalia are very isolated and
only connected by poor roads to the southeast where the next trading
centre is in Kisangani, 600 km away. Baye and Seminor are the principal
gold-mining sites in Bondo, while Panga and Mangi are the centres in
Banalia. Some industrialised gold exploitation began in this area during
the colonial period, but the Belgian installation quickly fell into
disrepair after independence. The current, informal artisanal mining
started in the early 1980s as part of the Zairianisation of the mining
industry.
Over
ten thousand artisanal miners have been drawn to these remote regions.
In the minds of the gold miners, the record prices quoted on world gold
markets make it practical to travel these distances and endure the
hardships. Government services and oversight functions have not kept
pace with the massive influx of artisanal miners. Although SAESSCAM has
deployed 150 agents to all areas of the province, not all of them are
formally under contract and most of them see monthly salary payments
only a few times per year. On the rare occasions when salaries are paid,
even senior agents receive a mere US$30 per month.
The
deplorable state of government oversight extends to CEEC, an agency
that generally tends to be proactive. According to the head of the
Kisangani bureau of CEEC, none of the gold exporting firms that operate
in Kisangani have requested legal licenses to do business. The entire
output from the artisanal miners is therefore leaving the country
illegally and without having been properly taxed.
The
unpaid agents responsible for the oversight and law enforcement of the
province have turned into hungry predators, who regularly descend upon
the artisanal mining camps with fictitious orders and payment demands.
“The glaring contradictions in their so-called taxation systems and the
multiplicity of government services do not keep the officials from
proceeding with whatever they want on any given day,” said a miner from
Buta by the name of Bruno Masebu Ngboyo. “SAESSCAM agents are not
bothering to help and instruct artisanal miners. They are just here to
ask us for money – often without giving us any receipt.”
According
to the miners, even the government agent’s thievery is not organised
properly. “They charge us an exorbitant US$25 for an artisanal mining
permit,” stated Ismaël Marmalaba, a miner from Baye, “but frequently
they are out of forms.” Artisanal miners are supposed to pay anyway.
Miners who wish to obtain evidence for their payment receive no help.
For Marmalaba the conclusion is inevitable: “There is nothing legal
here.” Another miner, Jean Ngbangbo agreed: “We are abandoned by the
state and no laws protect us.” The lawlessness extends deep into the
working lives of each miner, as Ngbangbo and Marmalaba explained: “As
soon as we start to find gold in a newly dug mine, a local administrator
may show up on behalf of the landowners to chase us off.”
The
miners also have to consider that the Disciplinary Brigade is sent
against them. These are poorly trained police officers who tend to
create a lot of problems. FARDC soldiers and normal police can cause
even more serious security problems. Bruno Masebu Ngboyo told SARW: “The
soldiers are not permanently deployed to our mining sites. But every
time they show up, they start to loot and pillage our camps and if we
object, their answer is arbitrary arrests. This is always a time of
terror for our families.”
One miner stated laconically: “This is the law of the jungle.”
Gold mining in South Kivu Province
The
second richest gold deposit in the DRC, the Twangiza Namoya gold belt
that cuts across South Kivu from east to west, is also one of the spaces
where the nexus of conflict and gold has a particularly long history.
Armed groups operated from the Itombe Range during 25 years of perpetual
rebellion against Mobuto. It is also the original refuge of the
Banyamulenge, who were one of the catalysts for the Congolese wars. This
is the first region that is on the verge of moving from many years of
informal gold-mining into industrial production. In October 2011, the
Canadian-managed Banro Corporation started to produce gold at its
Twangiza mining site. Other sites around Lugushwa and Kamituga are now
under development and will commence production in the coming years.
Industrial gold production is expected to bring additional revenues to
the people of South Kivu.
There
are many secondary gold-mining sites in addition to rich deposits of
cassiterite, coltan, wolframite, silver, copper, cobalt and other
minerals. Most of these deposits (including the gold now being mined by
Banro) used to be part of the vast Belgian-Zairian conglomerate SOMINKI.
During Mobutu’s Zairianisation of the mining sector, the industrial
installations were abandoned and exploitation of the region’s assets
reverted back to artisanal and small-scale operations.
Historically,
South Kivu has spawned a diversity of armed groups. Together with North
Kivu, the province is dotted with surviving units of FDLR and
Mayi-Mayi. In recent years, Hutus who banded together in FDLR units have
come under attack in successive military operations, starting with
‘Umoja Wetu’ in 2009, a joint Congo-Rwanda military offensive, and
‘Kimia II’ that was assisted by MONUC. While the FDLR are now fractured
and decimated, they are still a destabilising factor as the last major
confrontation in Shabunda province (November-December 2011)
demonstrated. And roaming FDLR bands still threaten gold-mining
communities, as SARW learned in interviews with artisanal gold miners in
Kalehe.
Mwenga/ Walungu
The
historically prominent gold-mining centres of Kamituga and Lugushwa and
many other sites in the Walungu and Mwenga Territories tap into the
Twangiza-Namoya gold belt. In the past, these sites were mined
industrially by SOMINKI. The Banro operations in Twangiza and at Namoya
to the west in Maniema Province are expected to yield 240,000 oz of gold
per year. The expected revenue will fund expansion costs at the Banro
sites in Kamituga and Lugushwa. The required investments will infuse
hundreds of millions of dollars into the regional economy in the form of
direct taxes, dividends, as well as indirectly through the commission
of various works, acquisitions and salaries.
While
the mid-term prospects for the region are positive, the short-term
prospects are dominated by widespread fear of the consequences that the
transition from informal to formal gold production will have of local
communities. Misinformation and rumours abound that Banro will displace
entire villages and deprive the Congolese of their traditional right to
benefit from their land’s gold riches. Any white visitor to the region
is normally mistaken as an emissary of Banro, and will be viewed with a
great deal of suspicion. The assumption is that Banro will gradually
displace the entire artisanal and small-scale population within its
extensive concessions. “All of Kamituga is part of the Banro concession
territory,” explained Mukupi Bulambo, a miner on the Isomisa gold mining
site. “There is no mechanism to guide us to free mining sites, or
information available about alternative artisanal mining zones. Instead
of helping us, the government just blocks the issuance of artisanal
mining permits.” Another local miner, Mulmabi Karubandika, is very aware
of how exposed they are to Banro’s decisions. “Everything can change
from one moment to another. We do not know our rights. We do not know
the precise boundaries of the Banro concession land.” Bulambo and many
of his colleagues fear that any day Banro will arrive and shut them all
down. “From time to time a Banro representative comes to reassure us
that they are not ready to work in our area,” said Bulambo. While that
is helpful, the miners still fear the inevitable day when Banro will
change its plan. “It will be a great tragedy because we will not be
prepared for that day,” added Bulmabo.
To
some extent these fears are offset by Banro Foundation’s efforts,
including the building of roads, the Mulambi Mission medical facility
north of Twangiza, the Kibiswa primary school near Namoya (on the South
Kivu side of the border with Maniema) and the Makalanga Women’s Resource
Centre in Lugushwa. The company also provides water-supply remediation,
supplies latrines to hospitals, builds sports facilities, rebuilds
churches, and sponsors an array of local and regional activities –
social contributions that are required of any mining company by national
laws. But Banro has missed important opportunities to make these
contributions better known in the wider region by publishing reports
about its plans and efforts not only in French but also in Swahili.
According to its most recent release, Banro currently has 634 skilled
employees of whom 558 are Congolese. Another 2,600 Congolese are
directly or indirectly employed in the construction phases of the
various projects that the company is undertaking in South Kivu and
Maniema.
With
or without Banro, the backbone of the local economy is mining. “At
least 80 percent of the population of the Kamituga area depends on
income from mining,” estimated Messe Wangalusu, manager of a small-scale
gold-mining operation at the Kabatongo site. The remaining 20 percent
of the population indirectly depend on mining since they are the traders
who supply the communities.
With
the new regulation issued by the Ministry of Mines that forces all
artisanal miners to organise themselves into cooperatives, the economic
dynamics have changed for the worse. “Rather than represent and protect
our interests, we now find that our cooperatives are just another cost
factor that has to be borne by the miners,” explained Messe Wangalusu.
“These escalating financial pressures will swallow us up.” The rising
cost of living is taking a heavy toll on the wallets of miners. “To put
food on the table for my family of five, I pay at least US$10 per day.
Everything we buy here has to be brought in from Bukavu – for which we
pay. And because the roads are in a very bad state, we are forced to pay
an extra price on top of the already higher costs for all the goods and
foodstuffs.”
Everyone
interviewed throughout the entire artisanal mining structure, including
the small gold traders and the local associations representing miners
and traders, agrees that ongoing harassment and extortions by government
officials is the most challenging and threatening problem. Lehopa
Butumani, who is a miner in the G7 mine and has been working since the
age of 14 without a proper artisanal mining permit, summarised the
problems of working as a gold miner: “Administrative harassments by the
military, the traditional leaders and the police; lack of assistance and
tools, and starvation.”
According
to all interviewed miners, government functionaries sometimes collect
the legitimate fees for the artisanal mining permit. However, it is much
more likely that the same administrators – together with soldiers and
officers, traditional leaders and policemen – will extort numerous
additional payments. Regardless of whether the fees, taxes or levies
raised against them are legitimate, the miners and traders are left with
little or nothing in net earnings. Despite their contribution as one of
the most significant regional wealth providers, the artisanal and
small-scale miners receive no services from the government in return.
“SAESSCAM agents only show up to collect our money,” said one miner.
Lehopa Butumani illustrated the point: “If one of us requires hospital
care, we have to carry the patient 50km from Lugushwa to Kitutu over a
horrendous road that turns into a metre-deep mud river during the rainy
season. With a motorbike the trip costs US$20-US$30.”
Itongwa,
who is the manager of a mining cooperative, explained: “The mining
police come here only if somebody hasn’t paid the taxes. In that case
they shut down the mine.” Until the penalised miners pay a US$50 fine
they are not allowed to resume mining. Thierry Babingwa, president of
the mining cooperatives of Mwenga Territory, complained: “The Mining
Division has found a new twist by charging for the application form and
for the actual artisanal mining permit.” In his opinion, SAESSCAM has
completely confused its mission. “Instead of providing training and
education to artisanal miners, they see themselves exclusively as a tax
collection authority.”
Claude
Maliza, an artisanal miner from Birhala, explained how combatants
frequently visit the mines. “It used to be just FDLR rebels but they
have been pushed out. On the rare occasions when they still come by,
they are disguised in civilian clothes. Units of the FARDC are now in
control, and they show up frequently to collect ‘little presents’.
Whenever FARDC units appear, we have a little panic sweeping the mine,”
said Itongwa. “We represent such attractive looting opportunities that
if their superiors order them to be transferred, they will fight those
orders and simply stay.” Butumani explained: “The soldiers are clearly
interested in nothing else but gold. We never see them during the time
we develop a mine or during the rainy season when most of our mining
sites are flooded and we are unable to work.”
“When
the mines are ready for production, FARDC units will immediately be
present. They either enforce a fictitious reason to close the mine so
that they can take over the operation themselves, or they force us to
give them a certain amount of stone. Frequently, they will crush the
stones and wash out the gold themselves. We have, for example, First
Lieutenant Guilan of the 14th Brigade who works in the Tobola mines
outside Kamituga. He not only runs his own mine, he also acts as
financier for other mining sites and is trading gold on his own
account,” explained Thierry Babingwa.
Another
president of a regional mining cooperative said: “Every Saturday, the
FARDC who are based in Butuza extract from all miners in the surrounding
areas the gold ore that they produce during two hours of work.” Even if
the police and military try to hide their true intentions, the legal
adviser to the artisanal miners who are members of the G7-Cooperative
knows that the miners are subject to extortion: “They come into the mine
to look for trouble and to shut down the entire mine. Unless we pay
hefty fines, they will not allow us to go back to work.”
In
addition to raw gold or untreated gold ores, many mining communities
are regularly asked to contribute food rations of manioc, beans or sweet
potatoes to FARDC soldiers.
A
secondary area where the gold industry is subject to extortion is the
road to the nearby trading centres of Uvira and Bukavu. “There are
always armed men out looking for somebody to rob,” explained Songa
Iluba, the chief of the local gold traders association. “They are
usually in civilian clothes to make us think that they belong to the
FDLR.” Even if they are FDLR, it does not matter. Iluba further
explained: “The thievery usually takes place in plain sight of an FARDC
checkpoint. Our national military forces never intervene.”
In
addition to the extortions and grotesque over-taxations, the gold
miners of Walungu and Mwenga are also often forced to pay highly
exaggerated retail prices. “We spend only 20 percent of our time
farming,” stated one indigenous miner. No one pursues farming anymore –
the traditional source of income in this part of South Kivu. Degradation
due to over-cultivation of the once fertile soil and an increase in
pests, such as cassava mosaic, brown streak and many other parasites,
have had deleterious effects on the economy of South Kivu. Now, the
majority of the food consumed in the mining areas is imported and bought
at a steep premium by the miners.
Kalehe
Kalehe
is nestled at the point on the road from Bukavu where it forks
northwest to Walikale and northeast to Goma. Despite its strategic
location, Kalehe has been traditionally cut off from formalised mining.
The region is rich in cassiterite, coltan, wolframite, tantalum, niobium
and gold, and since 2008 has attracted foreign investments. The largest
holder of exploration permits is the Canadian company, Shamika
Resources, which – under its local subsidiary Shamika Congo Kalehe –
controls wide-ranging permits in Kalehe and on neighbouring Idjwi
island. Shamika has released no information about its financing, or when
and where it intends to commence an exploration programme, and any
production seems to be far off in the future.
Kalehe’s
relative isolation is one of the main reasons why the industrialisation
of the region has been so slow, particularly as its isolation and the
nearby Kahuzi-Biega National Park make the area an ideal resupply base
for FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups. Several times in recent years, the UN
Group of Experts has reported on how sections of Kalehe were dominated
or controlled by FDLR, PARECO, and FARDC units entirely composed of
former CNDP combatants. In 2009, the Group also reported how FARDC
Colonel Zimurinda controlled many mines in Kalehe, and how his officers
were once intercepted transporting 1500 kilograms of wolframite to a
trading house in Goma. There is no known follow-up by the government in
this case.
Debra
Basomi Charangabo, an artisanal miner explained: “Our site is not far
from the forest where FDLR are sometimes camped. From time to time, they
come by to loot, pillage and inflict other abuses on us”. Despite the
ongoing presence of militias and criminal groups, many artisanal miners
stated that they were not being disturbed. On the other hand, they
complained of being forced to make regular payments to FARDC soldiers
and provide weekly ‘military rations’ as well as suffering occasional
looting sprees by militias. Somehow, artisanal miners in Kalehe have
come to accept these abuses and extortions as an unavoidable part of
life. Banga, an artisanal miner who is part of the Cominya cooperative,
said: “The soldiers regularly impose ‘community service’ on all miners.”
However, Patrick Ameli, a member of the artisanal mining cooperative
Nyawaronga, pointed out: “Actually, the soldiers do not disturb us much
and for the 500 FC we pay weekly they are the only ones who can
intervene in conflict situations, or where we can obtain some justice.”
In
Kahale too, the so-called fees, taxes and levies that are imposed by a
swarm of government officials take on absurd dimensions. According to
several members of the Cominya cooperative, the weekly fee for the FARDC
is 500 FC per miner, US$22 for one artisanal miner card, US$4 for an
identification card, another US$10 per month and per mine for each miner
plus US$10 for the SAESSCAM identification document. “Finally, we are
also paying US$5 per week to the president of our cooperative.” Bahati
Bosco, one of the local miners is under no illusion about the real
purpose of these taxes: “They only come here to get our money.”
Of
all the artisanal miners interviewed in Kalehe not a single one could
identify a positive service or useful contribution by government agents.
“We don’t have too many difficulties obtaining our permits and
artisanal miner permits,” stated Ameli “except that we often have to
search long and hard to find gold in order to pay for it.”
The
prevalent view among the mining communities is that the living and
working conditions are ‘deplorable’. Fina Mucweru and Chalonza
Natkucheba, two women who operate small trading posts, explained: “We
have no health centre, no school, and the roads are so bad that our
goods can only be transported to and from Bukavu by motorbike.” Lack of
services and rule of law in their community has resulted in complex land
disputes and a direct threat to their survival. The land for which the
chief of the camp obtained a mining permit actually belongs to a local
farmer. Lwaga Macine, one of the miners, stated: “The landowner wants to
raise crops in the surrounding fields and is not allowing our women to
farm for our own needs. This jeopardises our survival.”
Ameli
pointed out that there are no police stationed near their site with
currently over 200 miners at work. Felix Wazekwa Zihalirwa, the chief of
the camp, explained that the lack of security even extends to
transportation. Neither motorbikes nor bicycles can be used, forcing
miners and traders to walk six hours to sell their gold in town or to
bring food and supplies to the mining sites. Zihalirwa said: “That
exposes us and our traders to high risks of being robbed.”
Fizi
The
hinterlands of Fizi, extending along Lake Tanganyika to Baraka and to
the northwest towards Mwenga, and then along the adjacent Itombe
mountain range and the Minembwe plateau, are rich in gold deposits. The
plateau is the homeland of the Banyamulenge people, an ethnic group
deeply embroiled in the Congo wars. As a leading member of the People’s
Revolutionary Party, former President Laurent-Désiré Kabila lived and
operated from Fizi for many years. As the leader of the Alliance des
Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, he staged the
successful overthrow of Mobuto from this region.
Until
very recently, rebel activities have prevented industrial mining.
However, over the past five years this has been reversed and companies
are showing strong interest in acquiring mining permits.
TransAfrikaResources had secured permits for the largest tracts of land
for mining exploration, brought in drilling equipment and advanced
rapidly towards production. However, the UN Group of Experts recently
reported that the founder and operations manager of TransAfrikaResources
might have a relationship with the FRF, a Banyamulenge-dominated rebel
group. The manager, Thomas Nziratimana, was formerly a Vice-Governor of
South Kivu and a RCD functionary. According to the UN, the FRF receives
logistical and general support from Banyamulenge communities in return
for protection. It was also discovered that the FRF raised taxes from
local markets and gold traders. These UN allegations were serious enough
to cause TransAfrikaResources to abandon its work in South Kivu.
Another
concession encompasses Makenda mine, a traditional artisanal and
small-scale mining site. According to CAMI records, Kashama Muteba holds
an exploration permit together with 38 additional licenses throughout
the DRC. They were all granted on 22 January 2007. Kashama Muteba
appears to be Ferdinand Kashama Muteba, the President of the UDPS
chapter in Ontario, Canada. SARW researchers did not detect any sign of
activity on this property, leaving the entire gold-rich region once
again to artisanal gold miners.
Leda
Mining, a company that appears to be a subsidiary of Anvil Mining, owns
large concessions to the South of Fizi. Leda sold 75 percent of its
rights to a property located southwest of Fizi in Misisi to a junior
gold exploration company called Casa Mining, which has also acquired
gold exploration rights in Maniema and Katanga. The company has
commenced a drilling programme on its Misisi property, but it will be a
number of years before any industrial gold production is likely in this
location. Nevertheless, rumours have already made some local gold miners
and traders nervous. “If the company begins operations, all traders
will be unemployed as we depend on our business of buying gold,” said
Safari Kazinguvu, the secretary of ANEMISA, the gold traders association
in Misisi. “We are not for the industrialisation of this region.”
Of
concern is the widespread presence of FARDC soldiers who engage in
every aspect of gold-mining. “Whenever a mine shows promising gold
veins, the FARDC soldiers and officers and the ANR and National Police
make us work a certain amount of hours for them,” said Mwanza Assumani, a
miner and member of a cooperative in Kimbi. “The commanders of the
FARDC 10th Military Region have stone-crushers working for them on a
permanent basis – they have no choice.”
Instabilities
caused by the presence of Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba, FDLR, FRF and the forces
of the FARDC 112th Brigade (which integrated former FRF combatants)
have only recently abated. Once again, the ongoing presence of FARDC
soldiers continues to impose heavy penalties on artisanal communities.
Justin Bitombo, who works in the artisanal gold mine in Misisi,
described the relationship with the FARDC stationed in his region: “Most
of the time they are ok with us. But it is dangerous. The situation can
change at any moment as we saw during the military operation Kimia II.
They came frequently into our villages and mining camps to loot, pillage
and to take our women.”
Under
closer questioning, Bitombo admitted that he was subjected to many
different abuses, including daily extortion for money or food. “They ask
us to work for them for two hours, but then they force us to go on for
two days. And in the neighbouring Miba mine soldiers frequently work
there but they force the locals to wash their sand for free.” With small
bands of FDLR and Mayi-Mayi roaming the area, most miners around Misisi
are more than willing to accept the transgressions of FARDC soldiers,
since their presence is a security-enhancing factor.
To
avoid extortion by renegade soldiers – mostly imposed on traders who
buy raw gold from the mining sites and transfer it to Fizi – the
administrator of the territory has ordered all gold ore to be crushed in
Fizi. However, these types of measures just shift the cost around.
Raphael Bofoya Limwawa, a member of Comiki, a cooperative in Misisi,
stated: “Transporting the stones to the stone-crushers in the centre of
Fizi increases transportation costs enormously – that we pay.”
The
exorbitant payments to the military still do not protect the
cooperative against illegal coercions. Comiki’s chief has to pay
SAESSCAM 300,000 FC per month. Artisanal miners who are not part of the
cooperative but would like to work in the same mining site have to pay
50,000 FC per month. “The traditional leaders of the land where we work
demand payments as well, usually in collaboration with ANR agents, the
officials of the Provincial Mining Division and the mining police,” said
Limwawa.
When
President Kabila imposed a six-month suspension on all mining
activities, the officers of the 112th and 113th Regiments did not
enforce it but took advantage of it. “Each stone-crusher was required to
pay each week in order to be permitted to work,” explained Mwanza
Assumani, a miner and member of a local cooperative. The approximately
200 stone-crushers who work at the Miba mining site ended up paying 1
million FC just to secure the military’s permission to continue to work.
After they were allowed back into the mine, they were still forced to
pay 15,000-20,000 FC per day.
Gold deposits in Congo (Kinshasa) (Source: Southern African Development Community, Mineral Resources Survey Programme No 4, 2001)
The Democratic
Republic of Congo remains one of the world's great undeveloped resources
of mineral wealth. Despite limited exploration, it is known to be rich
in copper, cobalt, zinc, gold and diamonds, and it could have been one
of the stronger economies of Africa if it had not had such major
political problems. Up to the early 1960s gold production was 8 000 kg a
year (Ruffini, 1997). Most of the gold production came from deposits
in greenstone belts of northem DRC, close to the borders to Uganda and
Sudan (a legend which still lives on in the Democratic Republic of Congo
places the gold mines of King Solomon in this area) and from the Kivu
Province in eastern DRC.
The country was
known as the Belgian Congo until it became independent in 1960 as the
Republic of the Congo. In 1964 it became the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Its name was changed in 1971 to Zaire by President Mobuto
Sese Seko. A rebellion in 1997 saw the toppling of President Mobutu and
carried Laurent Desire Kabila to power and the country reverted to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
The new
government was initially reasonably well received by the mining
community, and interest from foreign companies would be on the increase
if it were not for the ongoing civil war. The country's new Minister of
Mines believes that official production of 6 000 kg a year could be
achieved and hopes the country will take its place as one of Africa's
major gold producers (Ruffini, 1997).
| Year | Production | Unit of Measure | % Change |
|---|
| 2002 | 7600 | Kilograms | NA |
| 2003 | 4100 | Kilograms | -46.05 % |
| 2004 | 5700 | Kilograms | 39.02 % |
| 2005 | 7200 | Kilograms | 26.32 % |
| 2006 | 10300 | Kilograms | 43.06 % |
| 2007 | 5100 | Kilograms | -50.49 % |
| 2008 | 3300 | Kilograms | -35.29 % |
| 2009 | 2000 | Kilograms | -39.39 % |
Source:USGS
Northern DRC
Gold production in northern DRC began in 1904. Total recorded output from the region amounts
to 350 t.
Stratigraphy and general geology
The entire gold production of northern DRC comes from
schists and greenstone belts located
either within the Bomu
amphibolite and gneiss
Complex, or within the Upper Zaire granitiod
Massif' where the greenstone terranes are referred to as the Ganguan and the Kibalian respectively. The Upper Zaire granitiod
Massif constitutes, together
with associated metasediments and vol
canics, the western part of the Nyanza-K.ibali granite greenstone terrane, which extends
from
northern Tanzania into the Central
African
Republic. The Kibalian greenstone
terrane is more important from an
economic point of view (it hosts the Kilo and Moto Greenstone Belts which are the largest
gold producers in
the Democratic Republic
of Congo) and crops out in numerous zones surrounded by granitoids.(The
Moto greenstone belt, north-eastern Congo, which consists of Archaean
rocks of the Lower Kibalian System host the important gold
mineralization. The Moto greenstone belt is bounded to the north by the
Archaean West Nile Gneiss complex and to the south by the (younger)
Upper Zaire granitic complex.
The
Twangiza-Namoya gold belt, eastern Congo, is located in Proterozoic and
Archean age rocks in the northern half of the Great Lakes
sub-province.)
The gold is hosted either
in quartz veins emplaced within shear zones cutting across greenstones or tonalite, or in impregnations along foliation planes
(Lavreau, 1984). The process
which concentrated the gold
into the veins or
foliation planes was accompanied by profound wallrock
alteration, mainly carbonatisation. The alteration took place during greenschist-facies metamorphism.
Kilo Greenstone Belt
Alluvial gold was discovered in the Kilo area in 1903, and
shortly thereafter high-grade gold quartz veins were
discovered.
Gold has been recovered intermittently from the Kilo mines since the early 1900s, with ore grades of about 15,5 g/t Au having been obtained. Reported cumu lative production to date has been 466-622 kg of gold (Elevatorski, 1995). The rich gold-quartz veins occur in faulted and sheared zones of chloritic
schist and amphi bolite. Generally
the veins are about 2 m thick, subverti
cal and concordant with the foliation
of the country rocks. In some areas the veins have been folded
and refolded, resulting in saddle reefs. Pyrite,
pyrrhotite and magnetite are abundant accessory
minerals. In addition
to quartz-vein mining, some gold has been reco-vered
from eluvial deposits
and also from disseminated gold in wall-rock impregnations
Isuru, Kanga
About half of the lode
production from the Kilo District
has come from the
Isuru and Kanga deposits located about 25 km northwest of Kilo. These deposits produced
a total of some 40 t of gold. Quartz veins and lenses are disposed in an en echelon
pattern along mylonitised zones (Lavreau, 1984). The host rocks at Isuru are ferruginous grits. The country rocks
at Kanga are quartz-diorite and coarse-grained tonalite,
intrusive in greenstones.
Nzebi
Of the two deposits mined,
the· one is situated within chlorite-talc schist, while the other
one occurs within coarse-grained
tonalites.
It has
not
been
established whether the same shear
structure created
the two deposits or not. Vertical faulting is a common feature in the region. The gold grades of these two deposits
is about 10 g/t Au (Lavreau,
1984).
Senzere Mine
The
Senzere Mine is located approximately 5 km south east of the Nzebi deposit. En echelon quartz
veins were mined from shear
zones within strongly foliated
chlorite actinolite-talc schist. The ore grade was about 9,3 g/t Au.
Tsele
At Tsele a quartz
vein, 1 m thick in a mafic host rock, was
mined. The ore graded between 2-25 g/t Au with average gold grade of 10 g/t (Lavreau, 1984).
Yedi
Quartz veins in fine-grained, non-schistose amphibolite were mined at Yedi, 40
km northwest of Kilo. No further information is avalaible.
Camp Ill
At
Camp III a single vein, 0,5-2 m thick,
has yielded 20
g/t Au. Host rocks are andesitic. No further information is avalaible.
Moto Greenstone Belt
Exploitation of auriferous placers began
in 1911. Subsequently production also came
from lodes discovered in this area.
Unlike the Kilo mines, most of the production has come from wall-rock impregnations (Elevatorski,
1995). Host rocks are iron-stained
schist and
amphibolite similar to those at the Kilo mines; however,
there is a paucity of diabase dykes. Gangue minerals include
albite, quartz and carbonates, with subordinate sericite, iron, chlorite and epidote.
Ores
contain pyrite, pyrrhotite and magnetite.
About 15 km east of Moto is the ore body of Agbarabo
which is cylindrical in shape about 20 m in diameter
and has been exploited to a length
of 300 m. It dips to the north-northeast, parallel to the foliation of the country rocks. Enriched shoots are encountered within
the main body, or near it. The host rocks are sericitised and albitised schist. Most of the established 20-t gold reserve has been mined out (Lavreau, 1984).
The Gorumbwa Mine,
about 9 km south of the Agbarabo
Mine, had a high-grade tabular ore body, 120m wide
at the surface (reducing to 55 m at 30m below surface) and about
10 m thick, dipping at 24 to the north-northeast.
The gold grade of the mined ore was 15 g/t Au. Host rocks are carbonate-albite-quartz schist (Elevatorski,1995). Silver and copper sulphides
are abundant. Most of the 40-t gold reserve
has been mined out (Lavreau,
1984).
The
quartz vein mined at this deposit was emplaced into amphIbolites. It had
a strike length of 300 m and a depth extent of 60
m. The average thickness of the vein was about 1 m. Total
recorded production was 491 kg of gold, with an average
grade of about 6 g/t Au (Lavreau,
1984). Exploitation had to be abandoned as a
result of excessive water infiltration.
The Ngayu Greenstone Belt is located
approximately 240 km southwest of the Moto
Greenstone Belt.
It is unknown when gold was first discovered here.
A swarm of parallel quartz veins
gives
rise
to
the Kitenge and Adumbi
inselbergs.
Some twenty veins have been worked in this area, with two of them yielding most of the 5 t
of gold produced by the two mines (Lavreau,
1984). The veins are a few centimetres
thick and
are disposed in an en echelon way, slightly oblique to the elongation of the hills. Gold content
was remarkably constant at around 10 g/t. A report for Adumbi by the Bureau de Recherches
Geologiques et Minieres, indicated potential
for downdip extensions
of the ore body to host up to 1,9 Mt of ore at an average grade of 10 g/t Au (Ruffini, 1997).
At
Yindi, about 1 407 kg of gold have been recovered from a vein field
in which more than 1 400 veins
have been recorded
(Lavreau, 1984), but only twenty of them have been exploited. Their individual
thicknessess
are less than 1 m and their gold content varies between 1 and 344 g/t, with an average
of 3,6 g/t. Only 70 per cent of the gold was recovered because
of the abundance of sulfides and the refractory nature of the ore. The vein field of Yindi is hosted within metavolcanics and ferruginous grits. Veins and veinlets are parallel to the apparent bedding. The lengths of the veins
are
considerable
(one being
1
300
m
in
length)
and
their
thickness
varies between 0 and 200 cm. At
Angukuluku a small but similar
vein field has yield ed 170 kg of gold. The bedding,
marked by ferruginous
grits, is cut at the fold hinges,
indicating that
the veins were emplaced parallel
to the regional foliation
Kivu Province
Both alluvial
and lode gold operations have yielded gold from
this
Province
in
the
eastern
DRC.
One
of
the recently active operations in this area was the Lugushwa placers, located about 80 km southwest
of Kamituga.
Lugushwa
Ownership in 2001: Banro
Resource Corporation 93 per cent, Government
of the Democratic
Republic of
Congo 7 per cent Alluvial mining has accounted for all the gold production
to date from Lugushwa, located
about 45 km south west of Kamituga.. Mineralised zones are contained
within what appears to be a synclinal
structure.
As recently as 1996, gold was extracted
by a primitive alluvial operation,
with reported production at 62.,20 kg a year.Total identified resources are 933 kg (Banro Resource Corporation, 1998). Regional geology comprises mica schist with intercalated greenstone and
quartzite, and intrusive granite with quartz
veins
and
quartz
stockworks in. shear zones
(Ruffini, 1998c). The gold within the
veins and stock works often grades between 30 and 100 g/t. The adjacent schists tend to carry disseminated low grades of between 1
and 4 g/t Au. During a soil-sampling programme conducted
by Banro, a number of near-surface hard-rock deposits were discovered and subsequently trenched, drilled and tested with adits. Two near-surface
deposits include 3 Mt of ore grading
4,5 g/t Au and 2,5 Mt of ore grading
4 g/t Au (Ruffini, 1998c). There is
significant potential to increase the reserves in depth and along strike.
Mobale (Kamituga)
Ownership:in 2001 Banro
Resource Corporation 93 per cent Government
of the Democratic
Republic of
Congo 7 per cent The Mobale Mine was, until the recent civil war leading to the change in government, a producing mine which had recovered over 24 t of gold since 1923. Production initially came
from
underground
workings
accessed
by
a decline shaft and, in the 1950s, two high-grade open pits were
developed. Oxidised ore at a cut-off grade
of 3 g/t Au was mined from the
open pits until the 1960s. The pits were developed to a depth of 40 m.
A review of historical work has indicated a potential yield of 15,5 t of gold from the open pits, at a grade of between 1,5 and 2,5 g/t Au. Prior to the mine being flooded
in 1997, gold production came solely from the underground operation
where min ing during its last four years averaged
30 000 t/y of ore at a grade of 9,9 g/t Au (Ruffini, 1998c). Mining
has taken
place to a depth
of250
m below suface.
Auriferous quartz veins occur in biotite schist. The ore minerals comprise arsenopyrite, pyrite, chalcopyrite and pyrrhotite, with minor amounts
of galena, sphalerite, bis muthinite and aurostibite.
Namoya
Ownership in 2001: Banro
Resource Corporation 93 per cent Government of the Democratic Republic of
Congo 7 per cent
Alluvial gold was first discovered
in 1931 and produc
tion from alluvial
operations continued through
to 1947. Primary gold mineralisation on Mount Mwendamboko
was discovered in the early 1950s and primary gold min ing
commenced from
an open pit in 1951. It is estima ted that about 4 t of gold were recovered
from
quartz veins grading 10 g/t (Ruffini, 1998c)
before civil distur bance, resulting from the Democratic Republic of Congo's
newly achieved
independence from Belgium
in 1960, led to the closure
of the mines. All the deposits
so far discovered
by Banro are developed in quartz-vein stockworks within shear
zones. Host rocks are folded chlorite-sericite schist and quartzite.
Gold occurs in quartz veinlets
and also as inclusions in arsenopyrite
and pyrite
(Elevatorski, 1995). According to Banro Resource Corporation's independent
consultant,
this zone has mineable reserves
totalling 11,2 t Au. Although in the 1950s low-grade
targets were not economical,
the use of heap leach technology
makes them very viable today.
Kabobo
Ownership in 2001: Anvil
Mining NL 100 per cent
The geology
at Kabobo, 15 km southeast
of Luemba, is dominated by Lower-
and Mid-Proterozoic terranes,
comprising mainly metasediments and
intermediate
to basic
intrusives. The presence
of PGMs, which occur in intimate association with both quartz-vein gold mineral isation and disseminated
gold
mineralisation
in
basic host rocks, is also
widely
reported. In 1998 Anvil
Mining undertook a review of the pre-1960s archival data which revealed
that extensive regions had alluvial and primary gold
occurrences
(Resource
Information Unit, 1999).
Kyimbi
Ownership in 2001: Anvil
Mining NL 100 per cent
At Kyimbi, 4 km northwest of Lake Tanganyika, primary gold mineralisation is reported
to
be
associated with Proterozoic metasediments
(talc schists, mica schists,
quartzites
and
limestones)
and
tonalitic
intru sives. Quartz veins of significant width (up to 10m) and strike length
(greater than 1,5 km) are reported to contain gold, silver
and PGMs with gold grades consistent-
ly
above 5 g/t. The intermediate and basic intrusives are
reported to have disseminated styles of gold mineralisa tion, with grades consistently above 3 g/t (Resource
Information Unit, 1999).
In an area of copper deposits, gold was recovered in
the early 1900s at the Ruwe Mine (Elevatorski, 1995), located just north
of Kolwezi. Host rocks
are fractured sandstones with vein-type
mineralisation containing gold, silver, platinum and palladium.
Notwithstanding their very
low grade,
altered rocks enriched through supergene processes akin to elutriation have been mined profitably at Subani, just north of the
Moto area (Lavreau, 1984).
Ownership in 2001: Banro
Resource Corporation 93 per cent Government of the Democratic
Republic of Congo 7 per cent
The Twangiza Prospect, 35 km west of the Burundi border, occurs at the crest and southern end of a north-northwest-striking anticline. Previous
work defined a gold
resource along an 800 m strike, with a width of up to 300 m. The hydrothermal mineralisation consists of gold-bearing pyrite and arsenopyrite in quartz-carbonate veins and hosts disseminated gold, primarily along the
upper contact of diorite sills. Host rocks are intruded
by albites. The ores contain 25 per cent ankerite, calcite, gold-bearing arsenopyrite and pyrite. The estimated
resource is 104,6 Mt, grading 2,12 g/t Au. Initial mineralogical analyses indicated that the Twangiza
sulphide ore is amenable
to conventional crushing, grinding, flotation and cyanidation
processing techniques, while the oxide ore is amenable
to heap leaching. The Twangiza project
is believed to have the potential to produce at least 6 220 kg of gold annually. Alluvial
gold is also present.
Ownership in 2001: Cluff Mining Ltd
Cluff was awarded four exploration licences, covering 18,330 km2,
in
southern DRC in August
1997. A Mining Convention was signed with the government and approved by
Presidential decree on the 28th October 1998.
Exploration
work during 1998 entailed stream-sediment sampling, pitting and trenching by a team of geologists in an area of known gold occurrences. Initial results have
been encouraging with good gold grades, ranging
from 4,7
g/t to 138,2 g/t, occurring
in primary rock over a 14-km strike length. The exploration programme
continued
in 1999 with drilling and additional trenching.
Kipushi
Ownership in 2001: America Mineral Fields Inc 100 per cent
Kipushi was a zinc-copper-lead deposit with a history
of production. The mineralisation occurs within a breccia
zone with associated faulting. In February 1996 America Mineral Fields had exclusive
rights, through a frame
work agreement with Gecamines, to conduct feasibility studies on the deposit
as it was also considered to con tain gold.
Preliminary studies began in January
1997 (Resource Information Unit, 1999). Deposits in the
Democratic Republic of Congo containing other minerals were also being re-assessed for gold.
Conclusion
Greenstone belts, especially
Kilo, Moto and Ngayu, offer a high potential for future gold mining. According to a study carried
out in 1994 by the National Centre
of Geological and Mine Research, the soil in the Kilo-Moto
area is so rich in gold that, with modem extraction methods, it may be possible to recover 6-7 kg/t of gold from escavated rock and soil from around the former mines
of Office d'Or de .Kilo-Moto (Okimo). Thousands of artisanal miners are working in this region. In certain
places the concentrations reach the exceptional figure
of 18 kg/t Au.
The Kivu Province
also offers good potential for future mining.
Moto Gold Mines Ltd (Australian) is exploring the Kilo Moto
goldfield in Ituri Province. The project includes the following
prospects: Pakaka and Pamao, Gorumbwa, Kibali, Durba – Karagba, Megi –
Mengu, Ndala, Kombokolo, Agbarabo - Tete Bakangwe. The resource estimate
is an indicated 55,40 million tonnes at 2,9 g/t Au for a total of 5,076
million oz gold and 88,63 million tonnes at 3,8 g/t Au for 10,794
million oz of inferred resources of gold. Moto
risks having its mining permits cancelled after Okimo, the state-owned
gold mining company, accused the company of failing to meet contracts,
reported Reuters. Moto's Congolese unit had 90 days to honor contracts
with Okimo, or it may have its mining leases revoked or reviewed, the
newswire said on 26 January 2007, citing Okimo CEO Victor Kasongo. In
terms of the contracts, Moto had committed to repair mining
infrastructure and conduct geological surveys in return for a 60% stake
in mineral concessions. A feasibility study, released in December, 2007,
evaluated the gold project's Indicated Mineral Resources of 77.8
million tons at 2.8 g/t Au for 7.0 million oz, but did not take into
account an additional Inferred Mineral Resource base of 98.9 million
tons at 3.8 g/t Au for 12.1 million oz, which it says has a conversion
rate of close to 100% within key deposits.
Moto is planning a US$483-million mine, which includes an US$80-million
hydroelectric power station, US$78-million for initial mining fleets and
an additional US$47-million construction contingency.
It would be a 3.3 million oz opencast gold mine with a life of 8.5
years, and the six-pit mine is expected to produce 400,000 oz of gold a
year. Moto Goldmines reported a 47% increase in Indicated Mineral
Resources at the Moto Gold Project in February,2008. Global Mineral
Resources for the Project, above a 1.0 g/t Au reporting cut-off, are now
estimated to be: Indicated Mineral Resources 95.3 million t @ 3.4 g/t
for 10.3 million oz Au Inferred Mineral Resources 96.5 Mt @ 3.6 g/t for
11.3 million oz Au.
-
- Many of Randgold Resources’ existing mines were borne from the group’s own greenfield exploration projects
– an exception being Kibali, which it and AngloGold acquired as an exploration
project in a C$546m cash-and-share transaction for Moto Goldmines in 2009. The
asset has an existing resource base of over 10 million ounces. Kibali will help raise Randgold’s annual production to more than 1.2 million ounces by 2014
from about 800,000 in 2012.. The mine will produce at least 30,000
ounces in 2013, 550,000 in 2014 and average about 600,000 ounces in its
first eight years.
Gold mineralisation in Kibali is found in volcaniclastics, sedimentary rocks and banded ferruginous cherts.
Kibali Gold Mine
Kibali Gold Mine
Source: www.randgoldresources.com
Kibali gold
mine is situated 560 km north-east of Kisangani in the Orientale
province. The site is located in the north-east of Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) in Central Africa. The gold mine is being developed in an
area of 1,836km2 on the Moto goldfields. When completed, it is expected
to be one of the largest gold mines of Africa. The open pit and
underground integrated mining at Kibali is expected to be commissioned
in the fourth quarter of 2013. The mine will have a life of 18 years.
The project is a joint venture (JV) of Rangold (45%), AngloGold Ashanti
(45%) and Sokimo (10%). It is being developed and operated by Rangold
Resources. The JV expects to invest approximately $1.4bn in the
development of the Kibali project. The mine is expected to produce about
600,000 ounces of gold per annum for the first 12 years. Production is
expected to start by end of 2013. Kibali gold mine is located within the
Moto greenstone belt. The belt contains Archean Kibalian
volcano-sedimentary rocks and ironstone-chert horizons. The
volcano-sedimentary sequence comprises of sedimentary rocks, variety of
pyroclastic rocks, basaltic flow rocks, mafic-intermediate intrusions
and intermediate-felsic intrusive rocks. The gold fields at Kibali are
characterised by northeast and northwest trending faults. The gold
mineralisation is scattered throughout the region. It is mainly found in
volcaniclastics, coarse volcanicastics, sedimentary rocks and banded
ferruginous cherts.
The
mineralisation is believed to have occurred structurally through
quartz-carbonate alteration and pyrite. It is broadly divided into two
zones. One part lies in the Kibali-Durba-Karagba which trends northeast
and the second part lies in the northwest trending Pakaka-Mengu
area. Rangold will be responsible for development and construction of
the underground mine. The underground mine is being developed by
constructing a tunnel using the box cut method, while also creating a
terrace for the processing plant. The integrated mine will comprise of a
twin-circuit sulphide and oxide plant, four hydropower stations and a
standby high-speed thermal power generator as back-up to be used during
the dry season.
Work on the
open pit mine development at Kibali began at the end of the second
quarter of 2012. The development contractor for the decline system has
been selected. The final design of the system has begun and the vertical
shaft will be designed by an engineering company. The Kibali gold
project is being developed in two overlapping phases. Phase 1 of the
project is being developed from first quarter of 2012 to fourth quarter
of 2013. It includes construction of the open pit operations,
metallurgical plant, tailings storage facility, hydropower stations,
back-up power plant, and all other associated infrastructure. The
estimated cost of phase 1 is $920m. Phase
2 will develop the underground mine and is expected to start production
in 2014. The cost estimated for the phase is $650m. Mine
construction Construction work on the Kibali gold project began in
April 2012 and is underway. Approximately 200,000 cubic meters of land
has been shifted for the foundation of metallurgical plant and 800,000m³
for the bulk earthworks. Construction of associated infrastructure and
earthwork of hydropower station and boxcut are in progress. The
underground mine is being developed through twin decline system. The
works completed in 2012 were manufacturing of the mills and hydro
turbines, and construction of the ROM pad, platform for the vertical
shaft and mine assay laboratory.
- Banro Corporation (Canadian, AMEX:BAA; TSX:BAA) is exploring the Twangiza-Namoya gold belt
in the South Kivu and Maniema Provinces of the DRC. The project
includes the following prospects: Twangiza, Lugushwa, Namoya and
Kamituga. The current resource estimate is 2,72 million oz of measured
and indicated resources, plus inferred resources of 8,11 million oz of
gold at 1 g/t Au cut-off. According to sources at the Denver Gold Forum
in September, 2007, the TSX and AMEX-listed company has retained
Canadian investment bank RBC Capital Markets to run a bidding and due
diligence process; apparently with the view of selling the company. The
two most advanced projects are Twangiza and Namoya. Prefeasibility
studies on both would be completed in the first quarter of 2008 and
bankable feasibility studies would be done by the third quarter of
2008. Twangiza
currently has a total resource estimated at 6.24 million oz of gold.
Planning at this stage is for a mine producing 300,000 oz/year over a
life of about 13 years at an average cost of $275/oz over the
life-of-mine. Namoya is a much smaller deposit with a resource of 1.35
million oz at this stage and forecast average costs of $235/oz over the
anticipated life-of-mine.
- Gold Fields (South African, NYSE:GFI; JSE:GFIELDS) is doing early stage exploration on the Kisenge
Project, Katanga Province in the southern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, some 680 kilometres from the main city of Lubumbashi.
- Elemental Minerals Ltd is to acquire a 60 per cent interest in the Musefu
gold project in the southern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo
near the border with Angola. Gold was discovered there in 1920 and
mining began by Belgian interests in 1932. Records kept until 1958 show
that total production was 80,385 oz but no exploration work has been
done at Musefu for more than 50 years. Historic drilling at one prospect
shows intersections including 12,5 m at 7,51 g/t gold and 5 m at 16,09
g/t.
Wa Balengela Kasai-Investments Congo (WBK),
a Congolese mineral exploration and exploitation company, has filed
litigation to validate its Memorandum of Understanding to establish a
joint exploration venture with La Quinta Resources Corporation, (LAQ.V),which has been thrown into doubt by claims by Banro Corporation’s Congolese subsidiary.
La Quinta announced that WBK has commenced an action in a commercial
court in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to clear claims by Banro
Congo, that Banro signed an earlier agreement concerning WBK's claimed
concessions in Maniema and South Kivu Provinces in south eastern DRC.
The court proceedings seek to block Banro Congo from exploring the
concessions as well as compelling the company to pay damages and costs
for interference.
The disputed area has 32 exploration licences held by WBK, totalling
7,010 square kilometres, located adjacent and between Banro’s Lugushwa
and Namoya properties in the south of the Twangiza-Namoya gold belt,
which extend 120 kilometres to the west.
WBK holds extensive mineral leases in the DRC, and has numerous diamond
exploration agreements. It has also been instrumental in introducing
other companies into the DRC for copper and cobalt exploration. In
March, 2007, Banro issued the following statement:
The properties within the WBK licence area have a long history of both
formal and informal mining. They were extensively mined mainly for
alluvial gold by BelgikaOr from the early 1940s to the 1970s after which
formal mining and exploration ceased.
At least six previous mining sites can be easily identified, and artisanal mining continues on much of the target areas today.
La Quinta Resources Corporation (LAQ.V)
has announced that it has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with
AMIKI (Association Miniere du Kivu sprl) to lease, or acquire all of the
Exploration and Exploitation rights of AMIKI on the Kampene Project in
South Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Kampene
project covers 49 square Kilometers and includes an Exploration Licence
and a Small Miner's Licence to mine and sell all mineral products from
the Licence area including Gold, Silver, Coltan, (Columbite and
Tantalite) and Cassiterite. Kampene has a long history of extensive
mineral production dating back to the 1940's and the Belgian era, when
mineral production for Gold, Cassiterite and Coltan formed the economic
basis for the formation of the Town of Kampene,
complete with its power plant, airstrip, schools churches and hospital.
Since the Belgians left, production of gold has continued, first for
the Congolese government during the Mobutu era and subsequently by the
Rwandan Army during the second war of Liberation. AMIKI have held these
claims since 1981 and reclaimed the property after the United Nations
supported 2003 Peace Accord. Following the democratic election of 2006
and subsequent revision of the Congolese Mining Laws AMIKI has now been
able to convert the licences to a modern Permis d'exploitation number
235 including a Small Miners Exploitation licence allowing immediate
production from the site.
The Kampene Project lies adjacent to a 7,000 square kilometre licence
area for gold exploration covering the southern portion of the Twangiza -
Namoya Gold Belt, owned by Wa Balengela Kasai-Investments Congo sprl,
(WBK) which is the subject of a separate Agreement between LAQ and WBK
and is currently in a due diligence process.
- Mwana Africa plc
has a joint venture agreement (80%) with Office des Mines d’Or de
Kilomoto (Okimo) over an exploration property in the north-east of the
DRC. The joint venture was signed in June 2005. The 3,000 square
kilometres project area is a 100 km long belt running from Kilomines,
adjacent to AngloGold Ashanti to the south, the Government’s Kilo Moto holdings to the north and to the east of ground held by Gold Fields.
It is also located around the Zani-Kodo gold mine. Zani project started
before independence and reached total production of 572,000 tonnes at
6,5 g/t, but was abandoned due to unrest in 1964 during the civil war.
Zani’s mineralized zone at the surface is 500m long and up to 30m wide,
it consists of silicification in sheared greenstone with gold contained
in sulphides. At the time of closure Zani’s sulphide reserve was 352,000
tonnes at 8,15 g/t.
- AngloGold Ashanti (South Africa, NYSE:AU; JSE:ANG)
is exploring the Mongbwalu project, a 10 by 15 km block, in the
northeast. An inferred resource of two-million ounces to three-million
oz has been estimated and an airborne geophysical survey to define
additional regional drill targets was planned for 2007, in addition to
70 000 m of drilling.
- Erongo Energy Limited
(ASX code: ERN) is focused on exploring the Maniema Project, which
covers 930km² and is located in east central Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Central Africa. The Maniema Project is prospective for gold and
tin, and is in the same geological setting as the Banro and Kilo-Moto
gold deposits. Seven target areas have been identified from previous
work, none of which have been previously drill tested. At Kabotshome on
Prospect 4804, mineralisation has been identified over more than 1km,
with widths of more than 80m. It remains open to the north, south and at
depth. Results have included 25m at 2.17 g/t Au from 74m, including
7.25m at 4.89 g/t Au, and 18m at 2.03 g/t Au from 68m including 4m at
6.38 g/t Au. The results confirmed the potential for a low-grade
deposit at open pittable depths and a style of mineralisation that is
similar to Banro’s Twangiza and Namoya deposits. Erongo completed a
drilling program at the Mitunda and Mbutu prospects in June 2012 that
potentially identified two flat-lying mineralised structures. The
Company is now planning further diamond drilling at Kabotshome, with
results expected by August 2012. Erongo also plans to explore the Kalulu
Prospect, a tin soil anomaly surrounded by extensive artisanal
workings, in 2012. The Company is currently completing a due diligence
review of the Giro Gold Project, in northeast DRC. Erongo has entered
into an agreement to acquire up to 60% of four tenements, which are west
of Randgold Resources' multi-million ounce Kibali deposits. Evaluation was expected to be complete in July 2012.
Production from
the upstream oil industry, mainly from offshore fields, is an important
contributor to the DRC’s economy. Oil production in 2003 was estimated
at 22,000 barrels per day. Proved reserves have been estimated at 1.538
billion barrels (January 2002). There is one oil refinery in the country
with a capacity of 15,000 barrels per day. At present it is operating
at about 50 percent capacity. There are plans to upgrade the refinery to
50,000 barrels per day, but this is dependent on finding foreign
investment and a complete resolution to the political instability.
Exploration for
oil and gas in the DRC began in the 1960s along the country’s Atlantic
Ocean coastline at the estuary of the Congo river, which is located
between the prolific offshore production region of northern Angola and
its oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. The country became an oil producer in
1976 when its offshore fields came on stream. Its entire crude output is
exported because the crude characteristics are incompatible with the
configuration of the country’s only refinery.
The Ministry of Mines and Energy regulates the industry, while a new State company, La Congolaise des Hydrocarbures (Cohydro) was
formed in 1999 to take responsibility for all activities related to the
oil sector, from exploration and production to refining.
The DRC has
seven producing offshore gasfields, most of which is flared. Some of the
gas is re-injected and a portion is used in gas-lift operations. Proved
reserves have been estimated at 104.8 billion cubic metres (January
2002). Two major three-year projects have been initiated in an attempt
to increase production levels both onshore and offshore.
Various foreign
companies are operating in partnership with the government in the
upstream oil sector. The most significant being a consortium operating
the offshore concessions which includes Chevron, Teikoku Oil of Japan, and Union Oil of California.
The Ministry of Mines and Energy is updating petroleum legislature to
supervise and control the awarding of exploration permits and production
concessions.
- Oil production: 21,090 bbl/day (2004)
- Oil exports: 21,090 bbl/day (2006 est.)
- Oil proved reserves: 1.538 billion bbl (1 January 2002)
- Natural gas proved reserves: 991.1 million cu m (1 January 2005 est.)
- Congo Gulf Oil Company (owned by Chevron of the United States (50%), Teikoku Oil Company Ltd of Japan (32.3%), and Unocal Corporation,
which merged with Chevron in 2005, (17.7%)] produced approximately
17,000 bbl/d of crude petroleum from seven offshore wells in 2000. Congo
Gulf Oil accounted for about 60% of national petroleum production.
- Perenco
operates six onshore fields, with an output of approximately 20,000
barrels per day. Perenco is also the operator of DRC's offshore
concession and terminal - assets it acquired from Chevron in 2004.
- Tullow Oil
signed a production Sharing Agreement (PSA) in July 2006 to gain a
48.5% operated interest in Blocks I and II in the prospective Albertine
Graben. Blocks I and II cover some 6,500 sq km over the onshore and
offshore acreage in Congo (DRC) part of the Albertine Graben which
extends into neighbouring Uganda. The planned work programme comprises a
number of technical studies in preparation for the acquisition of 400
km of 2D seismic data during the first licence period. Tullow has
interests (50-100%) in all three blocks comprising the Ugandan part of
the graben where recent exploration has recently proven the existence of
a working hydrocarbon system. Five oil discoveries in the Albertine
Basin in Uganda have significantly enhanced the prospectivity of the
region. As a result an aggressive exploration and appraisal programme is
planned for Uganda and Congo (DRC).
Source: Tullow Oil
- Heritage Oil Corporation
signed a Production Sharing Agreement in the DRC
in July 2006 for a 39.5% interest in Blocks I and II
in the prospective Albert Basin. Blocks I and II cover
over 6,000 km2 over the onshore and offshore acreage
in the DRC part of the Albert Basin that extends into
neighbouring Uganda.
| Year | Production | Unit of Measure | % Change |
|---|
| 2002 | 300 | Metric tons | NA |
| 2003 | 800 | Metric tons | 166.67 % |
| 2004 | 3200 | Metric tons | 300.00 % |
| 2005 | 4400 | Metric tons | 37.50 % |
| 2006 | 3800 | Metric tons | -13.64 % |
| 2007 | 8900 | Metric tons | 134.21 % |
| 2008 | 11800 | Metric tons | 32.58 % |
| 2009 | 9400 | Metric tons | -20.34 % |
Kivu Resources Limited
is active in the eastern DRC and Rwanda. Historically, the area was an
important tin and tantalum producer. Kivu Resources, through its wholly
owned local companies (Metal Processing Association SARL in Rwanda,
Central African Resources SPRL and Mining and Processing Congo SPRL in
the DRC) will hold a number of assets in the DRC and Rwanda including a
management agreement with SAKIMA, a state owned company, in the DRC to
manage tin and tantalum production from small scale miners; an option to
acquire an 80% shareholding in SAKIMA's mining permits; a joint venture
with the government of Rwanda on the Gatumba mining permits; as well as
a number of prospecting permits in the region. A consortium consisting
of EDIN Mining Limited, a mining investment company domiciled in the
British Virgin Islands, Ireland based Coronation Capital Limited and Metmar Limited will acquire a 50% stake in Kivu Resources. The consortium has an option to increase its shareholding in Kivu Resources to 70%.
| Year | Production | Unit of Measure | % Change |
|---|
| 2003 | 120 | Metric tons, tungsten content | NA |
| 2004 | 20 | Metric tons, tungsten content | -83.33 % |
| 2005 | 180 | Metric tons, tungsten content | 800.00 % |
| 2006 | 500 | Metric tons, tungsten content | 177.78 % |
| 2007 | 570 | Metric tons, tungsten content | 14.00 % |
| 2008 | 340 | Metric tons, tungsten content | -40.35 % |
| 2009 | 170 | Metric tons, tungsten content | -50.00 % |
Source:USGS
History
Historically
the DRC has been a significant producer of uranium. The Shinkolobwe Mine
in the Katanga Province is known for producing ore rich in uranium.
Deposits in the area are understood to have been discovered in 1915 and
extraction began in the 1920's. Commercial production ceased in 1960.
The Shinkolobwe
mine is a vein type deposit, with most of the deposits having grades
between 250 and 8,500 ppm. Uranium extracted from Shinkolobwe was used
to develop the atom bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima during the
Second World War.
- UraMin was reportedly interested in buying the Shinkolobwe uranium mine.
- Brinkley Mining plc
has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of the
Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") which will provide the company's
70% owned subsidiary, Brinkley Africa Ltd, with priority access to the
DRC’s uranium resources. The Congo government subsequently said it would
block a joint venture between Brinkley Mining and the Atomic Energy
Authority (CGEA) after finding terms of a memorandum of understanding
between the parties to be 'questionable'.
- Gécamines (La Générale des Carrières et des Mines), the Congolese state-owned mining company, owns the Kipushi zinc mine.
At the height of production, in the late 1980s, Kipushi produced
143,000 tonnes of zinc and 43,000 tonnes of copper. Mining at Kipushi
was stopped in 1993 when the government of Mobutu Sese Seko ran out of
funds. The mine has 17 million tonnes of ore, with 2,83 million tonnes
of zinc and nearly 400,000 tonnes of copper. Gecamines has invited bids
to restart the mine despite South African miner Exxaro Resources,
formerly Kumba Resources, and Canada’s First Quantum Minerals claim to
rights to the project.
- United Resources won
the tender to develop the deposit and will invest up to $400m in the
project, Gecamines MD Paul Fortin, announced in February,2007. United
Resources, a group of financial companies, won the tender because it
offered Gecamines a 37% stake in the project. South Africa's Exxaro
Resources and First Quantum Minerals have taken the matter to court in
Belgium.
- A
Belgian court ruled on 23 March, 2007, that Congolese mining company
Gecamines suspend its tender for investors to develop the Kiphusi zinc
deposit, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, paving the way for Exxaro
Resources and First Quantum to file lawsuits, that could run into
millions of dollars, against the State-owned firm. Exxaro and First
Quantum could sue Gecamines on the merits of the case and request the
enforcement of the agreements.
- Ivanplats' Kipushi
zinc-copper project marks a second asset in the DRC's Katanga province.
Kipushi lies 30 km southwest of Lubumbashi, and produced roughly 60
million tonnes grading 11.03% Zn and 6.78% Cu from 1924 to 1993.
Ivanplats owns 68% of the project, with the DRC's state-owned La
Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) holding the
remainder. Ivanplats submitted an application to extend its exploitation
permit at Kipushi on June 15. The property hosts surface mining and
processing infrastructure, including: two concentrators, administrative
offices, workshops and housing, as well as a connection to the national
power grid. Underground access is provided through five shafts, with the
No.5 shaft providing primary access to the lower levels. Ivanplats is
in the process of dewatering the mine in a bid to refurbish existing
shaft infrastructure to the 1,150-m level. According to filings the
company estimates US$30 million in remaining expenditures on the
refurbishment over the next two years. Kipushi holds a historic resource
totalling 17 million indicated tonnes grading 2.23% Cu and 16.76% Zn.
But the company's underground exploration will focus on the Big Zinc
high grade zone, which hosts 4.7 million historic tonnes grading 38.6%
Zn and 0.76% Cu.
Mining in the Ituri Province of the Congo
A Contemporary Profile
by David Barouski; May 14, 2007
Most people who
became aware of the 2nd Congo War (1998 to 2003 ) did so because of
the violence unleased in the (then) Ituri District, which was created in
June of 1999 by General James Kazini of the Ugandan People’s Defense
Force (UPDF). After the Lusaka Accords were signed and the UPDF
officially pulled out of the country, the neighboring countries of
Uganda and Rwanda aggravated and exploited ethnic differences to create
numerous militias that went to war over the vast gold tracts in Ituri.
The illegal sale of this gold in neighboring countries served to fund
the war by purchasing arms, military uniforms, and other supplies.
Incomprehensable acts of violence and rape occurred, and child soldiers
were the norm. Today, with the aid of U.N. forces, Ituri has found a
relative peace.
Ituri is unique
compared to the Kivu provinces to the south because throughout the 1st
Congo War (1996 to 19997) to the present day, war over minerals has
always been about gold and timber. The rest of Northeastern Congo went
through several distinct phases where one particular commodity was more
sought after than another. When the 2nd Congo War broke out, diamonds
were the most coveted mineral until mid-2000. In 2000, the coltan
(columbium-tantalite) boom occurred due to increased military-industrial
spending, and the arrival of popular electronics equipment (the cell
phone boom, Sony Playstation, etc.), which drastically increased market
demand for coltan. What started off in 1999 as a $20 (U.S.) per pound
commodity rose to $380 (U.S.) per pound by December of 2000. With 80%
of the world’s coltan reserves, fierce fighting for the mining sites
claimed countless victims.(1) The world market reserves quickly became
so saturated with smuggled coltan that the price plummeted back down by
the end of 2001. The smugglers in the Kivus then focused on the highest
grade ores that were found primarily in Walikale Territory.
After the
signing of the Sun City Final Act that officially ended the 2nd Congo
War in 2003, world demand for tin rose sharply due to new environmental
laws in the European Union (E.U.) and Japan. Cassiterite, a mineral
that is smelted into tin oxide, became the most desirable commodity in
the Congo along with niobium, a chemically-unique form of columbium used
in heat-resistant alloys that are utilized in a variety of
applications. The Lueshe mine in Congo holds the only large reservoir
of niobium in the world. To this day, niobium and cassiterite remain
the most coveted mineral to smuggle in the Kivus for the remaining
dissidents, particularly by Rwandan-backed General Nkundabatware and his
men in North Kivu Province.
Throughout the
wars and for years before that, multinational corporations sought to
exploit the same gold mining areas in Ituri that the militias did. The
mines are primarily concentrated around the towns of Mongbwalu, Watsa,
Durba, Kilo, and Moto in very remote areas. Today, with some likeness
of peace, the fight for control of the concessions will begin anew. The
Deputy Minister of Mines, Victor Kasongo, has begun a review of the
mining contracts for the newly elected Congolese Government and he said
50% of the contracts may be voided.(2) All official negotiations for
mining rights have ended until all the contracts have been reviewed.
This could prove to be troublesome for both the Congolese Government and
the mining companies.
The mining
concession that includes the Watsa/Durba area (OKIMO Concession #38) was
obtained by the Canadian gold-mining firm Barrick Gold from the Office
of Kilo-Moto (OKIMO) on 3rd August, 1996 before the fall of President
Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko. OKIMO, the state-owned gold mining company,
became a joint partner in Barrick’s project. Barrick initially became
interested in the concession after the U.S.-based consulting firm Davy
McKee Corporation completed a feasibility study of the area in 1991.
Between October and December of 1996, while the war was raging in the
area southwest of the concession, Barrick completed several of their own
exploratory drills, but the results were less promising than the
reports OKIMO gave the company. In 1996, Barrick also made a side deal
with General Kpama Baramoto, head of President Mobutu’s Guarde Civile.
General Baramoto allowed Barrick to mine gold around his base in Bunia
in exchange for funds to rebuild Bunia’s airport.(3)
Barrick
restructured their mining contract after the Alliance of Democratic
Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL-CZ) headed by Laurent
Kabila took power in 1997, but they retained the mining rights to
Concession #38. They reportedly began these negotiations before L.
Kabila reached the capital city of Kinshasa.(4 ) Barrick was allowed to
keep the contract President Mobutu Sese Seko signed after Laurent
Kabila took power because L. Kabila’s Finance Minister Mawampanga Mwana
Nanga (who later became Minister of Agriculture) insisted he honor “good
faith” contracts between President Mobutu and certain foreign mining
firms. This was an unusual move because Minister Nanga was known to be a
staunch critic of foreign mining firms. He had already canceled the
mining contracts of Belgium’s Union Minère (now Umicore) and
DeBeers/Anglo-American despite strong protests from Nelson Mandela.
However, Minister Nanga apparently had a soft spot for
American-connected firms, perhaps because he graduated from Pennsylvania
State University and taught at Kentucky University.(5)
Minister Nanga
urged AFDL-CZ’s Mining Minister Kambale Kabila Mututulo to sign off a
one billion dollar (U.S.) deal to Jean-Raymond Boulle’s Hope,
Arkansas-based (at the time) American Mineral Fields Incorporated (AMF)
(now Adastra), one of Barrick’s business partners. The deal was for two
huge mining concessions in Kipushi and Kolwezi, located in the Katanga
Province (then Shaba Province). Mr. Boulle desperately needed access to
the minerals because he was bidding to acquire the contract to build a
new space station to replace Mir, a $60 billion dollar (U.S.) endeavor.
His acquisition of the Mir contract is remarkable when considering AMF
was only incorporated in 1995.(6)
A major
competitor of Anglo-American with several former Anglo-American/DeBeers
directors on its executive team, AMF already had the deal lined up in
April 1997 after Mr. Boulle (a Briton born in Mauritius) visited L.
Kabila in Goma after the AFDL-CZ/RPA captured Lubumbashi (Katanga
Province) and put Katangan Governor Kyungu ku Mwanza under house
arrest.(7) Mr. Boulle reportedly fronted $50 million dollars (U.S.) to
L. Kabila for the deal and he likely used some of it to buy arms and
equipment.(8) However, AMF did eventually partner with Anglo-American.
American
Diamond Buyers, another company owned by Mr. Boulle and Joseph Martin
(and a competitor of DeBeers), reportedly paid L. Kabila $25,000 (U.S.)
to buy a diamond mining license from the AFDL-CZ.(9) When the company
opened for business in Kisangani before the 1st Congo War was even over
(but after the ADFL-CZ controlled the town), Zairians literally broke
the door down to sell their diamonds. Several people could even be
seen around town wearing tee-shirts given out for free by the
company.(10)
Mr. Boulle (a
former Anglo-American executive who also acted as an advisor to Guinea’s
Mining Minister) also allowed L. Kabila and Minister Nanga to use his
personal corporate Lear jet for transportation around the country. In
return, besides the mining contracts, L. Kabila allowed Mr. Boulle to
set up a trading post in Mbuji-Mayi immediately after the AFDL-CZ
captured the city during the same month Lubumbashi fell. He also
greatly reduced the price of AMF’s annual mining license fees.(11) Mr.
Boulle and two other connections to AMF at the time, Chairman Michael
McMurrough and business associate Jackson Stephens, were reported to be
friends of Bill Clinton since his days as Arkansas’ governor.(12)
One week before
the AFDL-CZ took Kinshasa, AMF chartered a group of investors to meet
L. Kabila. Mr. Boulle hoped to attract investors for his new mining
projects. Representatives from CIBC Wood Gundy, Bunting Warburg (a
branch of London's SBC Warburg), First Bank of Boston, Citibank,
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, and Goldman Sachs attended along with several
reporters, Robert Briscotti (investment banker), Robin Sanders (Director
of African Affairs for the NSC), and Cynthia McKinney (former U.S.
Congresswoman for the State of Georgia).(13) The meeting went over
well. Washington D.C. based New Millenium Investment Limited signed a
joint venture deal with the AFDL-CZ to run Goma’s Development Bank.
Bethesda, Maryland-based Comsat signed on to sell satellite phones in
Goma.(14)
Almost
immediately after AMF got its mining contract with the AFDL-CZ, DeBeers
sent the head of its Kinshasa branch (Nicholas Davenport) and an
Anglo-American director to meet with L. Kabila and Minister Mawampanga
in Goma to plead for a contract. Under the Mobutu regime, DeBeers held a
4% stake in MIBA while its Central Selling Organization had rights to
the entire Zairian state production. DeBeers also had five comptoirs in
Zaire that bought from artisian miners.(15)
DeBeers was
also deeply entrenched in Zaire through Anglo-American Corporation
(which is nearly 50% owned by DeBeers), one of its business partners.
The Canadian company Banro Corporation merged with Belgium-based Mines
D'or Du Zaire (MDDZ) in September 1996 shortly before President Mobutu
left Zaire in exile. A ~13% shareholder in Banro was U.K.-based Cluff
Mining. The majority shareholder in Cluff Mining was
Anglo-American.(16) Through the MDDZ merger, Banro was able to obtain a
93% interest in SAKIMA.(17 )Today, Banro is actively mining gold in
Twangiza, Kamituga, Lugushwa, and Namoya in South Kivu.
Another company
who wanted in on the action was First Quantum Minerals. Their Bwana
Mkubwa branch fronted money to Laurent Kabila when he was with the
AFDL-CZ and had not yet reached Kinshasa. They received mining
authorizations in return.(18)
First Quantum
recently tried to buy out Adastra (formerly AMF) and still holds
lucrative concessions in the Congo. On their Board of Directors sits
Chairman Phillip Pascall (Rio Tinto), Rupert Pennant-Rea (Chairman of
Henderson Group plc; Director of British American Tobacco plc, Sherrit
International Corporation, Gold Fields Limited, and Rio Narcea; former
editor for The Economist and the former Deputy Governor of the Bank of
England), and Andrew Adams (AngloGold).
Barrick created
a joint-venture with Anglo-American in March 1998 to explore OKIMO
Concession #38 in preparation for active mining. In 1998,
Anglo-American created its AngloGold Limited subsidiary and in May 1998,
the firm purchased nearly half of Barrick’s stakes in the Congo.(19)
Exploration occurred from February to August 1998 but their staff was
forced to flee in August due to the outbreak of the 2nd Congo War.
AngloGold Limited assumed operational control of Concession # 38 on 5
August, 1998, but they were never able to actively mine the concession
because of the war. OKIMO repossessed the land after they fled.(20)
After OKIMO reclaimed the concession, Barrick made a side deal with RCD
Mining Minister Alex Thambwe in 1999 for the rights to mine the land,
but Barrick was unable to mine on the land because of the ongoing war on
the mining concessions in Ituri.(21)
After the 2nd
Congo War began, the UPDF and the Rally for Congolese
Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML) occupied Watsa until they
withdrew as a provision of the Lusaka Accords in 1999. Militias in
Ituri multiplied drastically in 2000 to seize control of the power void
left behind when the UPDF withdrew. Barrick Gold sub-contracted its
concession to Uganda’s Caleb International, owned by General Salim
Saleh, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s half-brother.(22) It appears
the intent was to hold and protect the concession for Barrick until the
fighting stopped. Meanwhile, the Hema Union for Congolese Patriots
(UPC), RCD-ML, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Movement for the Liberation of Congo
(MLC), the Lendu Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI), People’s
Armed Forces of Congo (FAPC), and various other factions fought over
Watsa and Durba until most of them either disarmed or were driven out by
MONUC/FARDC offensives last year. The MLC moved into the area until
mid-2006, when MONUC gained full control over Watsa.(23)
Barrick’s
business practices have not gone completely unnoticed. In December
2002, Barrick Gold was sued in an anti-trust case for literally
manipulating the price of gold on the world market. Banking giant J.P.
Morgan (prior to their merger with Chase Manhattan) was an investor in a
company called Argo Partnership, who became a significant shareholder
in TrizecHahn. Barrick bought TrizecHahn , making J.P. Morgan a
shareholder in Barrick Gold by virtue of the buyout. J.P. Morgan
reportedly loaned Barrick gold reserves from a central bank to
short-sell on the market, increasing the supply and driving the price
down. The money from the gold sales was invested in money market
instruments at J.P. Morgan for a higher return than the gold borrowing
rate, thus creating a profit. The short sales were considered off-sheet
assets, so the purchase of gold off the market was not reflected as a
loss in their balance sheet.(24)
Barrick would
then mine the gold needed to replace the borrowed stores at the central
bank, but a clause in the J.P. Morgan gold lending deal gave Barrick an
infinite number of years to pay back the central bank. This meant
Barrick could buy up the gold supplies to drive the price up, or they
could dump their borrowed stores and drop the price generating a profit
for both Barrick and J.P. Morgan. Recall that during 1998, as Barrick
was evicted from the Congo, the price of gold was falling considerably.
It has been rising steadily since 2001. (Ibid)
Currently,
Barrick has terminated all non-project hedge contracts. They have
allotted $23 million dollars (U.S.) for exploratory efforts in Africa
for the 2007 fiscal year. Another $26 million dollars (U.S.) is
delegated to explore the Sedibelo PGM deposit on the Bushveld Complex in
South Africa. They completed a feasibility study on the Buzwagi gold
project in Tanzania, where Barrick is also opening a joint venture
project with Xstrata Nickel in Kabanga. Barrick is also eager to
develop their Reko Diq joint venture in the Baluchistan Province of
Pakistan.(25) They are also selling all their shares in NovaGold.
The Baluchistan
Province is the largest province in Pakistan. It borders the Helmand
Province of Afganistan, an opium crop district and Taliban (meaning
“students” in Arabic) stronghold. The Baluchistan Province has been
used as a rear base for training and staging their armed forces. The
Taliban are a Nationalist Sunni faction comprised of Pashtuns, who form a
very sizable population in Baluchistan Province. The area is awash in
locally ruled fiefdoms by tribal chiefs and mullahs (Islamic clergymen).
In Pakistan, they are usually from the Wahhabi or Salafi sect.
The individuals behind Barrick Gold are so well-connected they are worth noting in detail:
Howard Beck:
Corporate Director of Barrick Gold. Formerly involved with BAE, and
Citibank Canada. BAE bought out United Defense Industries (a company
formerly owned by The Carlyle Group) in 2005. Just recently, BAE was
the subject of a corruption probe in Great Britain, but Prime Minister
Tony Blair and Attorney General Lord Peter Goldsmith ordered the
investigation suspended. Some British officials believe the firm
lobbied Lord Goldsmith to drop the investigation.(26) BAE is a 20%
owner of Airbus.(27)
Gustavos
Cisneros: Board Member and International Advisory Board Member of
Barrick Gold. He is the Chief Executive Officer of Cisneros Group,
which includes television and radio networks, broadcasting and
telecommunications operations, programming and production companies for
television and radio, supermarkets, beverage production, fast food
outlets, video franchises, and music production. He essentially owns
the Latin-American media market.
Mr. Cisneros is
Venuzeuelan and a stauch opponent of Venezuela’s current Populist
President Hugo Chavez. Mr Cisneros is a founding (and current) member
of the International Advisory Board of the Council on Foreign Relations
and a former Director of the International Advisory Committee of Chase
Manhattan Bank. He is director of the Chairman's Council of the
Americas Society and a member of the International Advisory Council of
the United States Information Agency, the Board of Overseers of the
International Center for Economic Growth, the International Advisory
Board of Power Corporation of Canada, the International Advisory Board
of Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, the International Advisory Board of
AEA Investors Incorporated, and is a board member of Panamerican
Beverages Incorporated (a Coca-Cola bottling company).
In addition, he
is a Trustee of Rockefeller University in New York and sits on the
Board of Georgetown University. He also sits on the International
Advisory Board of Columbia University, the Advisory Committee for the
David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard
University, and the Rockefeller University Fund. Mr. Cisneros acts as
the Commissioner of the Global Information Infrastructure Commission and
is a member of the Council for Latin American Studies at John Hopkins
University. In addition, Mr. Cisneros is a Governor of the World
Economic Forum.(28)
Donald Carty: A
Corporate Director of Barrick Gold, Dell, Sears and Roebuck. He is
also the Chairman of Virgin America, Porter Airlines, and is the former
Chief Executive Officer of American Airlines.
Marshall Cohen:
Lawyer for Cassel’s Brock & Blackwell, and former Canadian Deputy
Minister of several areas including Finance, Industry, Trade &
Commerce, Energy, and Mines & Resources. He is a Corporate Director
of Barrick Gold, American-International Group, TD Ameritrade, Premcor
Incorporated, Metaldyne Corporation, Toronto-Dominion Bank, and Lafarge
Corporation. He is a member of the International Advisory Committee for
The Blackstone Group. Formerly, he was the International Councillor
for CSIS, and a former member of the Executive Committee of The
British-North American Committee and The Trilateral Commission. He was
also the Chairman of the International Trade Advisory Committee for the
Government of Canada.
John Crow:
Corporate Director of Barrick Gold. He is the former Governor of the
Bank of Canada (1987 to 1994); Chairperson of the Central Bank Governors
of the Group of Ten countries, and one-time head of the North American
Division of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Brian Mulroney:
Corporate Director and Chairman of the International Advisory Board of
Barrick Gold and most notably, the former Prime Minister of Canada (1984
to 1993). He is a Director of Archer Daniels Midland Company, the
Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, and the Cendant Corporation. He
is Chairman of Trizec Properties Incorporated, America Online-Latin
America Incorporated, and Quebecor Incorporated. He sits on the
International Advisory Board of the China International Trust and
Investment Corporation, JPMorgan Chase, Independent News and Media,
Power Corporation, Bombardier Incorporated, Aerospace Group - North
America, and General Enterprise Management Services Limited. In
addition, he is an honorary trustee of the George H.W. Bush Presidential
Library and Senior Partner in the Ogilvy Renault law firm.
Anthony Munk: Peter Munk’s son. He is a Director of Barrick Gold and Onex.
Peter Munk:
Founder, Director; member of the International Advisory Board; and
former Chief Executive Officer of Barrick Gold and the Trizec
Corporation. Mr. Munk also founded Clairtone Sound Corporation. In
addition, he is a member of the World Gold Council and the 1001 Club.
Mr. Munk is a close friend of infamous Saudi Arabian arms dealer Adnan
Khoshoggi, who was involved in financing and setting up arms deals to
Iran during the Iran-Contra scandal.(29) Mr. Khoshoggi helped Mr. Munk
launch Barrick Gold in 1983, but later sold his shares to Mr. Munk just
before details of his involvement in Iran-Contra broke in 1985.
Lord Charles
Powell of Baywater: Lord Powell is a cross-bench member of Britain’s
Upper House of Parliament and the House of Lords, where he sits on the
Economic Affairs Committee. He served as the Private Secretary and
Advisor on Foreign Affairs and Defense to former Prime Ministers
Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Lord Powell is currently an Advisor
to the Chairmen of BAE and Eastern Star Publications. He is a principal
at New Bridge Strategies, a business advisory firm currently working in
Iraq. He holds many directorships, including: British Mediterranean
Airways, Caterpillar Incorporated, Financière Agache, Moet-Hennessy
Louis Vuitton, Sagitta Asset Management (Chairman), Mandarin Oriental
Hotel Group, Jardine Matheson & Company Group, Textron Corporation,
Yell Group, Limited Schindler Holdings, Switzerland, and Northern Trust
Global Services.
He also serves
on the Advisory Board of Barrick Gold, Diligence (a PMC), Hicks Muse.
Delta HPC (a former business partner of Lockheed Martin), GEMS Private
Equity Fund, Rolls-Royce European Strategy Board, Textron International,
Wingate Capital, Magna Corporation, the European Advisory Group GMBH,
Thales U.K., and Alfa Capital. Lord Powell is Chairman of the Said
Business School Foundation’s (Oxford University) Board of Trustees. He
is also active with several non-corporate groups including trustee
postitions at the Aspen Institute (USA), British Museum, and the Karim
Rida Said Foundation. He is a Director of the Atlantic Partnership, the
Singapore Millennium Foundation, and the U.K.-China Forum. He is also
President of the China-Britain Business Council and a member of the
Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
William Cohen:
Member of Barrick Gold and Intel Corporation’s International Advisory
Boards. Intel was a major consumer of tantalum in the early 2000s
during the computer industry boom. He is currently the Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of the Cohen Group, an international business
consulting firm. He is currently a Director at Viacom and AIG. Mr.
Cohen is also CNN’s World Affairs Contributor. He was the U.S.
Secretary of Defense (1997 to 2001) during the beginning of the 2nd
Congo War and NATO’s bombing of Kosovo.
Prior to
working for the DOD, he was a U.S. Senator for the state of Maine (1979
to 1997) and served on the Select Committee on Intelligence (1983 to
1991, 1995 to 1997), the Governmental Affairs Committee ), Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs in George H.W. Bush’s
administration) and the Armed Services Committee (1979 to 1997). In
addition, he served on the Iran-Contra investigative committee in 1987.
Before he was elected Senator, he was a House Representative for
Maine’s 2nd District ). While in Congress, he served on the House
Judiciary Committee that investigated the Watergate scandal. He served
on the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations ) on its
Middle East Study Group and currently works for several think-tanks and
committees including the CSIS (Counselor and Trustee) , the School for
Advanced International Studies, the William S. Cohen Center for
International Policy and Commerce at the University of Maine in Orono
(Chairman), and the Brookings Institution. He established and led U.S.
delegations to the American-Arab Dialogue in Cairo and is the Chairman
Emeritus of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. Mr. Cohen is also a
former trustee of the Africa Foundation. In May 1992, he got Rwandan
opposition parties to meet with RPF officials in Brussels.(30)
Paul G.
Desmarais Senior: Member of the International Advisory Board of Barrick
Gold and Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. He is Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Power Corporation, and honorary President of the
Canada-China Business Council. He is a former Director of TotalElfFina;
former member of the Trilateral Commission; current member of the Privy
Council, and a Companion of the Order of Canada. He is on the Advisory
Board of the Carlyle Group and CSIS. Mr. Desmarais is a personal
friend of the Bush family (Former U.S. President George Herbert Walker
Bush is the former Chairman of Barrick Gold’s International Advisory
Board [1995 to 1999] and was a personal golfing partner of President
Mobutu (31) and Brian Mulroney.(32)
Vernon Jordan
Junior: He was Chairman of Bill Clinton’s presidential transition team
and one of his top political advisors as well. He is currently a Senior
Counselor practicing general, corporate, legislative and international
law with the firm Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld. In addition,
he is a member of the Bilderberger Group, the Iraq Study Group, the
Council on Foreign Relations, and the Trilateral Commission. He sits
on the Board of Directors for American Express, Dow Jones & Company,
Lazard Freres and Company, J.C. Penney Company, Xerox Corporation,
Ashbury Automotive Group, and the LBJ Foundation. He is also a member
of the International Advisory Boards of Barrick Gold and
Daimler-Chrysler. Mr. Jordan serves on the Board of Governors for the
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies; a Senior Managing
Director with Lazard Freres & Company; and a Trustee of Howard
University. He is a former Director for Revlon, Sara Lee, Corning, and
Nabisco.
He has been
involved with several African-American civil rights, equality, and
empowerment groups. He served as President and Chief Executive Officer
of the National Urban League, Incorporated; Executive Director of the
United Negro College Fund; Director of the Voter Education Project of
the Southern Regional Council; attorney-consultant at the U.S. Office of
Economic Opportunity; Assistant to the Executive Director of the
Southern Regional Council; and Georgia Field Director of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He also received
numerous presidential appointments including a spot on the Secretary of
State's Advisory Committee on South Africa.
Karl Otto Pöhl:
Member of the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold, the Carlyle
Group, former Chairman of the German Bundesbank (Central Bank) from
1980 to 1991, and former German Governor of the IMF. He served in
Germany’s Economics and Finance Ministries. He is currently a partner
in Sal. Oppenheim Junior & Cie investment bank; member of the
Bilderberger Group; Director of GAMCO Investors Incorporated and Gabelli
Funds LLC; and Senior Advisor to the Ahli United Bank.
Nathaniel
Rothschild: International Advisory Board member of Barrick Gold and
Co-chairman of Atticus Capital. He is a Director of RIT Capital
Partners PLC, Trigranit (Chairman), The Rothschild Foundation, JNR
Limited (Chairman), and a member of the Belfer Center's International
Council at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. In addition,
Mr. Rothschild is on the International Advisory Council of the
Brookings Institute. Mr. Rothschild is the only son of Jacob Rothschild
and belongs to the well-known Rothschild family of bankers.
Andrew Young:
Member of the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold, Argus
Newspapers, and Delta Airlines. He was a close personal friend of Dr.
Martin Luther King Junior, a prominent African-American civil rights
activist in the U.S. Mr. Young is a former Ambassador to the U.N. (1977
to 1979) under President Jimmy Carter and a Georgian Congressman from
1973 to 1977. He served two terms as Mayor of Atlanta, Georgia where he
was Co-Chair of the Atlanta Committee for the Centennial Olympic Games
in 1996. He was appointed by Bill Clinton to chair the Southern Africa
Enterprise Development Fund. Mr. Young is the former Chairman of
Working Families for Wal-Mart and the Southern Africa Development Fund.
He was also a Director of the Drum Major Institute and a consultant for
Nike. In addition, Mr. Young is the former President of the National
Council of Churches (2000 to 2001) and a former member of the National
Security Study Group.
He is the
current Co-Chair and Co-Founder of GoodWorks International (GoodWorks is
a member of the CCA; Associate of the African-American Institute;
affiliate of the Council of Foreign Relations, and Senior Advisor of the
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Client
corporations of GoodWorks include Barrick Gold, ChevronTexaco, Monsanto,
Nike, and Coca-Cola.) and a founder of the CCA. He teaches public
affairs as a professor of policy studies at Georgia State University's
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Mr. Young is a Director of
Argus, Host Marriott Corporation, Archer Daniels Midland, Cox
Communications, Atlanta Market Center, the Atlanta Falcons, and Thomas
Nelson Publishing. He is currently a member of the Bretton Woods
Committee, the Council of Foreign Relations, and is an active Freemason.
Mr. Young is also currently promoting international investment in
Rwanda and is working on creating a convention of international
investors in Kigali that will be the largest African business summit to
date. It is currently scheduled for 2010.
In addition to George Herbert Walker Bush, Barrick Gold has several other former directors with major credentials:
Howard Baker
Junior: Tennessee’s Republican Senator from 1967 to 1985, including two
terms each as Senate Majority and Senate Minority Leader. He then
served as President Ronald Regan’s Chief of Staff in 1987 to 1988 .
After parting ways with President Reagan, he joined Donelson, Bearman
& Caldwell (1989 to 2001), a lobbying firm for hire that represented
Barrick Gold. In 2001, he was called to serve as the U.S. Ambassador
to Japan. In 2005, he stepped down from his post and reunited with
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz as a full partner.
He also joined the Advisory Board of Citigroup. Mr. Baker also runs the
University of Tennessee-Knoxville Center for Public Policy named in his
honor.
Edward Ney:
This former director of Barrick was George Herbert Walker Bush’s
Ambassador to Canada (1989 to 1992); a reward for running Bush’s
presidential ad campaign in 1988. Mr. Ney took charge of Young and
Rubicam (acquired by WPP Group in 2000), a public relations
agency-for-hire in 1970 and he built it into the largest firm of its
kind. Mr. Ney was named Chairman of the Advisory Board at
Burson-Marsteller, a subsidiary of Young and Rubicam.
Burston-Marsteller is also a public relations firm-for-hire who was
hired to cover up Shell’s nefarious business policies in Nigeria. They
were also hired by General Jorge Videla’s violent regime in Argentina,
and the Government of Indonesia during the time they were enacting their
murderous policies during their occupation of East Timor.
Burson-Marsteller also worked for Monsanto during their Bovine Growth
Hormone scandal; lobbied for the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and tobacco companies; covered for Union Carbide after the
Bhopal disaster, and worked to improve Exxon’s image after the Valdez
spill in Alaska.(33)
John Trevor
Eyton: Mr. Eyton was a Canadian Senator first appointed in 1990 by
(then) Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. He is a Director of Brazoil, Coca
Cola, IQ Ludorum, Nayarit Gold, Owen Media Partners, General Motors
Canada, IMAX, Partners for Youth, Nestle Canada, Noranda Incorporated,
the International Chamber of Commerce (Paris), Excor-Zerust Canada, and
Brookfield Asset Management. Mr. Eyton is Chairman of the Canadian
Sports Hall of Fame, Excor-Zerust Canada, Ivernia, Multi-Games
Incorporated, Richview Resources, and Silver Bear Resources. He is
Governor of the Canadian Olympic Foundation, Junior Achievement Canada,
and the Canadian Sports Hall of Fame. Previously, he served as a Senior
Partner at the law firm of Tory Tory Deslauriers & Binnington and
as Chairman of EdperBrascan (now Brookfield Asset Management). He is
also a member of the Trilateral Commission.
Richard Helms:
Director of the CIA from 1966 to 1973 under President Richard Nixon and
Deputy Director of the CIA under John McCone. Prior to this, he worked
in the Office of Strategic Services, the parent department of the CIA.
During President Nixon’s term, he was the Ambassador to Iran. He was
involved with Augusto Pinochet’s coup of Chilean President Salvador
Allende in 1973. He also served on the board of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International, which was embroiled in laundering money from
international arms dealers and terrorists. He was a Director of the
Carlyle Group, a consultant for Bechtel, and a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations.
Sources in Aru
on the Congo-Uganda border stated “white executives” from Barrick Gold
fly in and inspect Watsa every few months, but the company refuses to
resume operations until fighting stops in the area. With MONUC in full
control of Watsa, the fighting has ceased. MONUC’s logistics branch has
established regular flights there. Barrick can now try and repossess
their mining license for the concession. The infrastructure in Watsa,
Doko, and Durba has been restored. Durba has a working grinder and
Nzoro has an active hydro-electric power source. The Kenyan
construction firm Civicon began work on a 108 kilometer road leading
from the Vura border post to Watsa and should be finished in nine months
time barring the return of armed warfare in the area. The
Australian/Canadian mining firm Moto Goldmines Limited provided some of
the equipment for the job as per a contractual agreement with the
Congolese Government.(34)
Barrick Gold is
a former business partner of the previously mentioned firm American
Mineral Fields Incorporated (now named Adastra Minerals), who still owns
their extensive concessions in Katanga Province. Barrick was also
partnered with the infamous and now defunct mining firm Bre-X Minerals
Limited.(35)
One of
Barrick’s current business partners is South Africa-based Gold Fields.
Gold Fields purchased Barrick’s stake in South Deep, a mine located west
of Johannesburg they acquired when Placer Dome was purchased. As part
of the deal, Barrick was given over $300 million dollars (U.S.) worth of
shares in Gold Fields.(36) Notables associated with Gold Fields
include Chief Executive Officer Ian Cockerill (former Executive Officer
for Business Development and African International Operations for
AngloGold Ashanti Limited), Director John Hopwood (former Director and
head of the Mergers and Acquisitions Division of Ernst & Young’s
Corporate Finance; former Executive Director of Gold Fields of South
Africa Limited), Director Patrick Ryan (former Executive Vice President
of Mining Operations, Development and Exploration at Phelps Dodge),
Tokyo Sexwale (Chairman of Mvelaphanda Resources Limited), Rupert
Pennant-Rea (Chairman of Henderson Group plc; Director of British
American Tobacco plc, Sherrit International Corporation, First Quantum
Minerals, and Rio Narcea; former editor for The Economist and the former
Deputy Governor of the Bank of England)
Barrick also
works with Australia-based Emperor Gold, who is a minority stakeholder
in Barrick’s Porgera mine project in Papau New Guinea. Emperor’s
Non-Executive Director Robert J. McDonald was a Managing Director of NM
Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited and also held numerous
positions with Rio Tinto, who also mines in Papau New Guinea.
Non-Executive Chairman Geoffrey Campbell used to manage Merrill Lynch’s
Investment Managers’ Gold and General Fund, one of the largest
investment funds of its kind in the world.
Emperor is a
subsidiary of DRDGold Limited, based in South Africa. Mr. Campell acts
as its Non-Executive Chairman as well. Director James Turk founded
GoldMoney Network Limited, a digital gold transaction system. He also
worked with Chase Manhattan Bank before managing the Commodity
Department of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Alternate Director
Kobus Dissel hails from AngloGold.
Another partner
of Barrick Gold was Ashanti Goldfields Limited, a company later
purchased by Anglo-American Corporation and renamed AngloGold-Ashanti
Limited. AngloGold-Ashanti is actively mining on Concession #40 in and
around Mongbwalu, where local Anglo officials stand accused of illegally
paying off the FNI in 2004 to mine the area in safety. They also
reportedly allowed the FNI and its President Floribert Njabu to use
company vehicles, jets (chartered by Kilwa Air, who also chartered for
MotoGoldmines Limited), lawyers, and housing. Jean-Pierre Bemba was
reportedly the man who suggested AngloGold work with the FNI in order to
start mining in 2004. William Swing was supportive of
AngloGold-Ashanti’s exploration plans in FNI territory. At the time,
MONUC did not have a presence in Mongbwalu, only Bunia.
AngloGold-Ashanti employees (at the time) who had direct contact with
the FNI were Ashley Lassen (Head of AngloGold-Ashanti’s Uganda branch),
Howard Fall (Project Manager in Mongbwalu), Jean-Claude Kanku
(consultant), Desire Sangara (AngloGold-Ashanti’s Manager in the
Kinshasa office), and Mark Hanham (Engineer).(37)
AngloGold’s
Chief Executive Officer Bobby Godsell (former Chairman of the World Gold
Council) dismissed the allegations and announced they were going to
continue work in Mongbwalu, but he promised to pull out of the Congo if
his workers were forced to pay militias off to ensure their safety.(38)
In the meantime Anglo-American is looking to sell AngloGold-Ashanti.
Newmont Mining has shown interest in a merger with AngloGold, which
would seriously dilute Anglo-American’s ownership, but not eliminate it.
Despite the plans to sell off AngloGold, Anglo-American still plans
for formally open two offices in the Congo: one in Kinshasa and one in
Lubumbashi. Anglo-American, which posted a whopping 46% profit in 2006,
is looking to buy back three billion dollars (U.S.) worth of shares and
invest in copper projects in the Congo.(39)
(Then)
AngloGold-Ashanti’s President and Non-Executive Director Sir Samuel
Kwesi Jonah, reportedly backed the RCD financially after L. Kabila
revoked a mining contract from him while he was the Chief Executive
Officer of Ashanti Goldfields Limited. Ashanti originally bought the
concession from Mindev for only five million dollars (U.S.). After the
RCD/ANC controlled the area, the RCD’s Minister of Mining Alex Thambwe
returned the contract to Ashanti Goldfields.(40) Sir Jonah resigned
from AngloGold-Ashanti’s Board of Directors in February 2007.
Sir Jonah is a
Board Member of Lonmin, the Commonwealth African Investment Fund
(Comafin), Transnet Limited, Anglo-American Platinum Corporation
Limited, the Ashesi University Foundation, Equinox Minerals (Chairman),
the uranium-producing nuclear power company UraMin Incorporated
(Chairman), Anglo-American Corporation, Ghana Airways, Moto Goldmines
Limited, Scharrig Mining (Chairman), Sierra Rutile Limited (Chairman),
Sierra Resources Holding, Range Resources Limited (which holds the
rights to all the minerals in the Somali semi-autonomous state of
Puntland), Titanium Resources Group, Copper Resources Corporation (with
George Arthur Forrest and George Andrew Forrest), Standard Bank Group of
South Africa, Bayport Holding Limited, Transnet Limited, Equator
Exploration Limited in Nigeria and São Tomé & PrÃncipé (with
Baronness Lynda Chalker), and he is a former director of Mittal Steel
(currently in the proverbial hot seat for a contract they signed with
the government of Liberia)
He is a member
of the Advisory Council of the U.N. Secretary General's Global Compact,
South African President Thabo Mbeki's International Investment Advisory
Council, the African Regional Advisory Board of the London Business
School, First Atlantic Merchant Bank, Defiance Mining, Ghanian President
John Kufuor's Ghana Investors' Advisory Council, President Obasanjo
Nigerian Investors’ Advisory Council, and serves as a Presidential
Advisor to President Mohamud Muse Hersi of the Somali state of Puntland.
He also holds an honorary British knighthood, the Star of Ghana and
several other international awards and titles. He recently announced
plans to open his own firm called Jonah Mining.
Currently, the
Canadian company African Mineral Fields Incorporated (AMFI), recently
purchased by Nevada-based Magnus Resources Incorporated, owns rights to a
section of Concession #38. African Mineral Fields also owns gold
mining concessions in Uganda at Mwerusandu, and Mitoma, Mubende, and
Lugazi. Bruce Milne, AMFI’s Uganda Exploration and Country Manager,
originally discovered the concessions Barrick Gold currently owns in
Tanzania. John Dixon, a consulting geologist for AMFI, once worked as a
consultant for Placer Dome from 2000 to 2006. Placer Dome was bought
out by Barrick in late 2005.
Moto Goldmines
Limited (headed by Sir Samuel Jonah) entered into a joint venture on
Concessions # 38 and #39 (which includes the mines in Durba, Karagwa,
and Chauffeur) through its subsidiary Borgakim Mining SPRL (a subsidiary
of Border Energy Limited, which is itself a subsidiary of Moto
Goldmines Australia Limited, whose parent company is Moto Goldmines
Limited). Originally, a joint venture was created between the privately
owned Orgaman SPRL and OKIMO on 10 May, 2003. Moto Goldmines then
bought into the existing agreement between the two and became a 60%
owner of the property.(41)
Moto Goldmines
Limited was created when Moto Goldmines Australia Limited (formerly
Equis Limited) and King Products Incorporated (formerly Wizard Lake
Petroleum Corporation) merged in 2005. Moto Goldmines has set up a
complicated series of 13 subsidiaries in order to control as much of
Concession # 38 as possible. Border Energy Limited is a wholly owned
holding company of Moto Goldmines Limited. Moto Goldmines Limited
created several subsidiaries as joint ventures with Border Energy, many
of which are active in Ituri District and have entered into joint
ventures of their own with OKIMO. They include Rambi Mining SPRL, Blue
Rose SPRL (owned by Blue Rose Investments Limited in Strathavon, South
Africa), Kibali Gold SPRL, Amani Gold SPRL, Gorumbwa Mining SPRL,
Tangold SPRL (owned by Greendale Universal Holdings Limited in Roadtown
on Tortala Island, British Virgin Islands) , and the aformentioned
Borgakim SPRL. Orgaman SPRL was previously established in the Congo to
import frozen fruit and is owned by Belgian William Damseaux. Reginald
Gillard is the company’s President and Jean-Claude Damseaux is the Vice
President.
The deal to
include Moto Goldfields Limited in the contract has come under heavy
scrutiny by the Congolese Government. Mr. Victor Kasongo Shomary,
OKIMO’s (then) Managing Director, never approved the contract, but three
of OKIMO’s four directors did. The contract was questionable because
it had a clause that allowed OKIMO’s Directors to short-sell additional
plots of land to Borgakim SPRL. Additionally, the percentage of
ownership allocated to OKIMO was only 30% and any additional joint
ventures with another Moto Goldmines Limited subsidiaries would likely
reduce the percentage further. The contract also required Borgakim SPRL
to pay for prospecting the concessions, but they have opted to rely on
old studies (funded entirely by OKIMO) for data as a way to save
themselves money, which is a breach of the legal agreement. The
Ministry of Finance has suspended all negotiations between OKIMO,
Borgakim SPRL, and Moto Goldfields Limited. In addition, the contracts
of Moto Goldfields Limited’s smaller subsidiaries are under review
because of late payments on the lease agreements. OKIMO gave
MotoGoldfields Limited an ultimatum: they have 75 days to invest in a
metallurgical plant, a power station, and then begin mining in Durba, or
else the contract is null and void. Sir Jonah reassured his
shareholder, stating OKIMO’s threats have “no legal value and (are) of
no effect.” He also accused other mining companies of souring Moto
Goldmines’ relationship with President Kabila.(42)
On top of all
this, OKIMO’s management is also under investigation for stealing gold
from Concession #38. Mr. Kasongo, OKIMO’s Financial Director, and its
Sales Manager all stand accused of diverting mined gold for personal
profit. Mr. Kasongo was later exonerated of the charges and appointed
President Joseph Kabila’s Deputy Minister of Mining. The outside
pressure on Mr. Kasongo is evident as he is now proposing to privatize
OKIMO via the London and Toronto stock exchanges.(43) Moto Goldmines is
counting on Mr. Kasongo’s departure from OKIMO to allow the remaining
directors to persuade the incoming director to cooperate with them and
approve the contract.
A number of
smaller companies with leases on Concession #38 and/or #39 have not
honored their contracts because they have been inactive on the mining
sites. One is the private firm Aston and Sheffield Commodities-Goldagem
SPRL. Aston and Sheffield is Goldagem’s parent company. Goldagem
itself is based in Dubai and run by Taoufik Mathlouthi, Chairman of
Mecca Cola. Two additional small firms that have not paid for their
mining leases are Rambi Mining SPRL and Amani Gold SPRL.
A large company
that has failed to honor its mining contract in Ituri is Mwana Africa
PLC, owned by Mwana Africa Holdings Limited based in Johannesburg, South
Africa. It was founded by three former Anglo-American directors in
2003. The firm began a joint venture project with OKIMO in June of
2005. Mwana Africa is also the vast majority shareholder of a joint
venture with Anglo-American located south of Kolwezi, Fungerume, and
Likasi in Katanga Province to mine copper and cobalt. With copper
prices at records highs, Mwana is agressively seeking to expand its
project, while Anglo-American has made deliberate efforts to expand
their copper mining assets. They are negotiating with Gécamines to
purchase another concession in Katanga Province to expand their project.
Mwana Africa
Holdings Limited was bought out by the Dublin-based (Ireland is known to
be very leinient on corporate taxes) company African Gold PLC. African
Gold PLC purchased Tangold SPRL in June 2004. Tangold SPRL itself
owned a single portion of OKIMO Concession #38 at the time of the
purchase and that contract is on the verge of being canceled. Mwana
Africa Holdings also owns part of Australia-based Gravity Diamonds
Limited, a joint venture with BHP Billiton, Asia Marketing Limited
(registered in Israel), Intergroup Consultants Limited, and a number of
private diamond firms primarily registered in Antwerp, Belgium, home of
the Diamond High Council (HRD). Incidentally, Antwerp was also the main
port of entry for coltan coming to Europe from the Congo during the
coltan boom of the early 2000s. Gravity Diamonds is active in the
Congo’s former Kasai Province, Angola, and Australia. Lastly, Mwana
also owns Sibika S.A., which had a 20% stake in MIBA (the Congolese
state-owned diamond mining entity) at the time of the purchase.44
Mwana Africa
Holdings also bought Bindura Nickel Corporation from AngloGold-Ashanti
in 2004. Bindura was chiefly active in Zimbabwe as it was a joint
venture between AngloGold-Ashanti and the government of Zimbabwe run by
President Robert Mugabe. In early May 2004, Bindura’s Chief Executive
Officer Leonard Chimimba was shot and killed outside his home in Harare
after returning from a meeting with bank executives. He also reportedly
visited the Governor of Zimbabwe’s Reserve Bank (Gideon Gono) the day
before. The murder occurred after over half a million dollars (U.S.)
worth of nickel disappeared from two Bindura trucks driving to South
Africa in March. The incident is believed to be the work of business
insiders working with criminal syndicates in South Africa.(45)
Mwana Africa
recently sought to expand its operations by bidding for the Canadian
diamond exploration company SouthernEra Diamonds (through JPMorgan and
OZ Management), who holds joint ventures with BHP Billiton and Nyumba Ya
Akiba SPRL, as well as their own exploration projects in the
Kasai-Occidental and Kasai-Oriental Provinces of the Congo. In
addition, they own 20% of MIBA.(46)
As can be
expected, the company employs several well-connected individuals.
Director Dr. Chris Jennings was an assistant vice president of
Falconbridge Limited, a company integrated into Xstrata in August 2006.
He was also the Deputy Director of Botswana’s Geological Survey. Chief
Financial Officer Mr. Chris Reynolds spent several years with
accounting giant (then) Price Waterhouse. President Alasdair MacPhee
spent 17 years with DeBeers and Mr. Michael Kritzinger, a company
lawyers, provided council for Anglo-American, DeBeers, and
Gencor/Billiton.
Notables
directing African Gold PLC are Hank Slack (Director of Anglo-American
[1981 to 1999], Chief Executive of Minorco [1991 to 1999], current
Director of Terra Industries and Engelhard Corporation, former Director
of Solomon Brothers and SAB Miller), John Teeling (Chairman of Minco,
Petrel resources, Pan Andean Resources, and African Diamonds), Oliver
Baring (Executive Chairman of the First Africa Group; former
Anglo-American Director; current Chairman of Cluff Mining PLC;
non-executive Director of Merrill Lynch World Mining Trust and the
Tiedmann Trust Company, and advisor for the The Senient Resources Fund).
Another major
player is African Gold’s Chief Executive Officer Kalaa Mpinga. Mr.
Mpinga is the son of a former Prime Minister and nephew of Mr.
Pierre-Victor Mpoyo (One of L. Kabila’s advisors; the former Congolese
Minister of Economy; former Minister of State; owner of the Central
Mining Group, and business partner of Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach, the
Director of Gécamines in 1998). Kalaa received his Agricultural
Development and Economics degrees at the University of California-Davis
and McGill University (Canada) respectively. After graduating, he went
to work for the Bechtel Corporation in San Francisco. In 1991, he left
to join LTA Limited, which was owned by Anglo-American Corporation. In
1997, he was promoted to Executive Director of Anglo-American’s mining
division and worked in the Congo’s Ministry of Economy under his uncle.
To this day, Mr. Mpinga continues to hold strong ties with
Anglo-Amcerican.(47) From 1998 to 2000, Mr. Mpinga was a Patron and
Board Member of the African Business Roundtable and he was also an
Executive Director of New Business Africa. In 2001, he was one a
founding member of Mwana Africa Holdings.
He currently is
a Director of Group Five Limited (a huge construction firm), and
GijimaAST, a technology corporation based in South Africa. In addition,
he is Chairman of Bindura Nickel Corporation. Many of Mr. Mpinga’s
recent projects are funded by Lansdowne Partners Ltd. and Marshall Wace
LLP.(48) On a personal note, Mr. Mpinga is an open admirer of the late
DeBeers/Anglo-American patriarch Harry Oppenheimer, calling him, “A
great African, a man with a vision for the continent and indeed a
pioneer of African renaissance.”(49)
David
Barouski is an African Affairs researcher with a focus on Central
Africa. He was the co-recipient of a Project Censored award in 2006 and
is a regular contibutor to Znet. His work has appeared in Z Magazine,
Waheen Online, the Somaliland Times, and Congo Panorama. He is the
author of the book, “Laurent Nkundabatware, his Rwandan Allies, and the
ex-ANC Mutiny: Chronic Barriers to Lasting Peace in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo,” which he traveled to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Rwanda to research.
1 “Congo’s Coltan Rush,” BBC News. 1 August 2001.
3 Reno, William. “Sovereignity and Personal Rule in Zaire.” African Studies Quarterly. Volume 1, Issue 3. May 1997.
4 “New Leaders Take Africa Into Their Own Hands,” Sam Kiley. The Times. 20 May, 1997.
5 Madsen,
Wayne. “Genocide and Operations in Africa: .” Lampeter, Ceredigion,
Wales, United Kingdom: Edwin Mellen Press, Limited. 1999. pg. 283,
300-301.
6 Ibid. pg.
281; Baracyetse, Pierre, Loudiebo, Alexandre. “The Geopolitical Stakes
of the International Mining Companies in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (Ex-Zaire).” English Translation. 2000.
7 Madsen,
Wayne. “Genocide and Operations in Africa: .” Lampeter, Ceredigion,
Wales, United Kingdom: Edwin Mellen Press, Limited. 1999. pg. 280-283.
8 Baracyetse,
Pierre, Loudiebo, Alexandre. “The Geopolitical Stakes of the
International Mining Companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(Ex-Zaire).” English Translation. 2000.
9 “Friends in High Places,” Richard C. Morais. Forbes. 10 August, 1998.
10 “U.S. Firms Stake Claims in Zaire’s War,” Cindy Shiner. CNN. 17 April, 1997.
11 Madsen,
Wayne. “Genocide and Operations in Africa: .” Lampeter, Ceredigion,
Wales, United Kingdom: Edwin Mellen Press, Limited. 1999. pg. 67,
280-283.
12 Ibid. pg. 70.
13 Ibid. pg.
283; “Firm From Clinton's Home Town Has Deal With Zaire Rebel Chief,”
Christopher Ruddy. NewsMax. 16 May, 1997; “Congo-Zaire,” Conor de
Lion. Global Finance. June 1997.
14 “U.S. Firms Stake Claims in Zaire’s War,” Cindy Shiner. CNN. 17 April, 1997.
15 “DeBeers Bows to Zaire Rebels,” Stefaans Brümmer, Chris McGreal. Mail & Guardian. 18 April, 1997.
16 United States Department of the Interior. “The Mineral Industry of Zaire.” George J. Coakley. 1997.
17 United States Department of the Interior. “The Mineral Industry of Congo (Kinshasa).” George J. Coakley. 1998.
18 “Canadian Companies in the Congo and OECD Guidelines.” Corporate Knights. Issue CK 16. 5 June, 2006.
19 “Gold Producer Buys Barrick Properties,” Las Vegas Review-Journal. 17 May, 1998.
21 United
States House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Operations
and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations.
“Suffering and Despair: Humanitarian Crisis in the Congo.” One Hundred
Seventh Congress, Session 1. Serial No. 107–16. 17 May, 2001.
22 “Shifting
Sands: Oil Exploration in the Rift Valley and the Congo Conflict.”
Dominic Johnson. Pole Institute. 13 March, 2003. pg. 9-10.
23 Private Interview. 2006.
24 “Don Doyle
Explains ‘Blanchard vs. Barrick and J.P. Morgan’.” Jay Taylor. Jay
Taylor’s Gold and Technology Stocks. Volume 22, Number 15. 3 January,
2004.
26 UK Defence Firm Lobbied Minister to Drop Corruption Probe: Report,” Agence France Pressé. 16 December, 2006.
29 Madsen,
Wayne. “Genocide and Operations in Africa: .” Lampeter, Ceredigion,
Wales, United Kingdom: Edwin Mellen Press, Limited. 1999. pg. 74.
31 Palast,
Greg. “The Best Democracy Money Can Buy.” New York, New York: Plume
(Penguin Group). 1st American Edition. 2003. pg. 93.
35 “The Western Heart of Darkness: Mineral-Rich Congo Ravaged by Genocide and Plunder,” Asad Ismi. CCPA Monitor. October 2001.
37 “The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo.” Human Rights Watch. 26 April, 2005; Private Interview. 2006.
39 “Anglo American Profits Grow 46%,” BBC News. 21 February, 2007;
“Anglo $3bn Share Buyback in 2007,” Allan Seccombe. Mining MX. 21
February, 2007. http://www.miningmx.com/mining_fin/.htm; “Stability Tempts Mining Companies Back to Congo,” Rebecca Bream. Financial Times. 21 February, 2007.
40 Madsen, Wayne. “Genocide and Operations in Africa: .” Lampeter,
Ceredigion, Wales, United Kingdom: Edwin Mellen Press, Limited. 1999.
pg. 305.
42 “Business Borgakim-OKIMO: Exact Contours of a Contract That Wants to
‘Kill’ Kilo-Moto for Good!,” DigitalCongo3.0. English Translation. 18
January, 2007. http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/40343;
“OKIMO, A Very Annoyed Trade-Union Delegation!,” La Prospérité.
English Translation. 19 January, 2007; “Mining Conflict
OKIMO-Borgakim: Anxious Interference From Minister Balamage!,”
DigitalCongo 3.0. English Translation. 30 December, 2006. http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/39948; “OKIMO Says Clock is Ticking on Moto,” David McKay. MiningMX. 16 February, 2007. http://www.miningmx.com/juniors/.htm;
“Update on the Moto Gold Project.” Moto Goldmines Limited. Press
Release. 26 February, 2007; “Moto’s Jonah in Congo Parley,” David
McKay. Mining MX. 29 March, 2007. http://www.miningmx.com/gold_silver/.htm.
43 “Congo Accuses Canadian Mining Firm of ‘Cheating’,” The East African. 12 March, 2007.
44 “Year in Review 2006: Democratic Republic of the Congo July to
December.” Great Lakes Center for Strategic Studies. 2006. pg. 24.
45 “Mining Boss Shot Dead,” Daily Mirror. 12 May, 2004.
47 “Mpinga Still in Cahoots With Anglo,” African Mining Intelligence. N°149. 7 February, 2007.
48 “Fertile Ground: Hedge Funds Travel to Africa,” Alistair MacDonald. The Wall Street Journal. 6 October, 2006.
49 “Tribute to Harry Oppenheimer: Pioneer of African Renaissance,” Kalaa Mpinga. Daily Dispatch. 29 August, 2000.
Table Bay Hotel drama (Katanga mineral riches in play in Cape Town)
(Source: Mineweb)
Caesar's wife, in the form of Cynthia Carroll, nearly rubs shoulders
with Niko Shefer, a carnivorous rum runner fresh from a Big Shark Hunt.
Author: Barry Sergeant
Posted: Wednesday , 06 Feb 2008
JOHANNESBURG -
You get seal-swallowing Great White Sharks offshore the environs of Cape
Town, but this week the city opened its wind-punched arms to an annual
international carnival of decadence and bad taste known as the mining
Indaba. At one point, Cynthia Carroll, the CEO of Anglo American (AAL
LN, £28.30 a share), once the world's leading mining company, nearly
brushed shoulders with Niko Shefer, a rum runner who had just returned
from a Big Shark Hunt.
This so nearly happened in the foyer of the Table Bay Hotel, Cape Town's
version of Dubai's decadent seven-star Burj Al Arab Hotel. Shefer was
followed by a flapping entourage of motley characters, most of them
Congolese, but also including a pony-tailed paleface who looked as if he
might have just hit town with some interesting business from Mexico.
The whispers around the hotel were that Shefer had hired 10 rooms in the
Table Bay Hotel for the four day duration of the Indaba, along with
five big fat depraved limousines. Shefer's spokesman, at last count, one
Chris Vick, was not taking calls to confirm or deny the details of
Shefer's post-shark attack on the Table Bay Hotel.
Vick is known across the planet for his impassioned appeals that the world rinses its memory of Shefer's criminal conviction
on corruption charges, way back in 1989. Well, everyone's naturally
forgotten that, but it's difficult to erase the memory of Shefer being
declared a personal non grata in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), just six months ago, after his name was connected to a tangled
would-be uranium deal. Nobody, but nobody, should let Shefer near that stuff.
Carroll, who is above suspicion and whiter than Caesar's wife, gave a speech
that said nothing negative about anything in the world, scarcely
recognising last month's meltdown at Eskom, one of the greatest
institutional failures in African history. In another lily-white speech,
this one dripping with schmooze, Victor Kasongo, DRC Vice Minister of
Mines, outlined a "new" plan to "fast track" solutions to his country's
review of mining contracts. The media happily doled out the story, the
biggest one at this year's Indaba, to their audiences.
Victor Kasongo is nothing more than a runner for the Holy Trio: DRC
president Joseph Kabila, along with his closest adviser, Augustine
Katumba Mwanke, and a notoriously litigious paleface who can be handily
referred to as The Real Shark Hunt. Kasongo's job down in Cape Town was
to sound like a vegetarian Great White Shark, but always looking like a
Great White Shark craving fresh meat. On Wednesday morning he bored
hundreds of people to tears and sleep over a breakfast that should have
been depraved and decadent and highly meaningful.
In the Real Shark Hunt, mining companies backed by billions of dollars
of Western capital are being kicked around like packs of rats and other
assorted small vermin.
A few weeks back, Toronto-listed Katanga Mining (KAT CN, C$13.02) -
currently merging with London-listed Nikanor - (NKR LN, £3.99) was
forced by DRC parastatal Gécamines (La Générale des Carrières et des
Mines) to surrender
two of its valuable properties into a Chinese deal. Katanga Mining has
admitted to the deal, but has politely declined to explain what it
received as a quid pro quo.
And so it goes. There is no end of decadent and bizarre deals going down
in Katanga Province , which houses the majority of the DRC's copper,
cobalt, zinc and uranium riches. In a July 18 2006 report to the UN's
Security Council, the Group of Experts on the DRC raised serious
questions over concession rights held by individuals of unknown or
questionable standing. Noting that the DRC's Mining Cadastre listed
2,144 mining and quarrying concessions, the Group of Experts argued that
"an undetermined number appear to be held by concessionaires affiliated
with investors whose personal and professional integrity is doubtful".
This lack of transparency, the Group of Experts argued, provided "hiding
places for sanctioned individuals, financiers of embargo violators and
for other individuals who simply do not meet the standards of the Code
Minier". As an example of a "due diligence failure", the report referred
to Camec (CFM LN , £0.45), and noted that Conrad Muller "Billy"
Rautenbach, a major shareholder in Camec, was wanted by the authorities
of South Africa for fraud and theft. Rautenbach has ostensibly sold Boss
Mining (concessions 467 and 469) and also concessions 1590-1605 to
Camec. Rautenbach was last year declared a persona non grata in the DRC.
Like Shefer, he is desperately trying to have the ban lifted. Like
Shefer, he is wont to try and do extraordinary things, but he is
excluded from shark hunts in landlocked Zimbabwe.
These days, Camec has joined forces with an entity known as Prairie to
list the "Mukondo JV", representing what may well be the world's richest
cobalt deposit, on a big stock exchange. Among the cash raised from the
would-be listing, a minimum of $400m will go to Prairie, and $170m to
Camec. This week, a coalition of NGOs published audit reports - signed by Ernst & Young - of four of the entities going into the Mukondo JV, Boss Mining, Kababankola Mining Company, Mukondo Mining, and La Société Minière de Kabolela et de Kipese sprl,
insisting that prosecutors and stock exchange regulators in Europe and
North America carefully examine the audits "to consider whether there is
sufficient evidence to trigger prosecutions".
Back on due diligence failures, the UN Group of Experts report also
referred to Ruashi Mining (concessions 627, 578, and 72), noting that
Shefer, "ex-convict and currently indicted by the authorities of South
Africa, is the controlling shareholder of Ruashi Mining". Under cover of
layers of entities, including Sentinelle Global Investments, Shefer
"sold" Ruashi to Metorex (MTX SJ, R19.66), and later realized benefits
to the tune of around $400m, according to individuals familiar with the
situation. After events that unfolded this week, Metorex could show its
class by explaining one or two things in and around Compagnie Miniere du Sud Katanga.
There is also the would-be
swindle of Kalukundi, a glorious copper-cobalt asset that belongs to
Africo (ARL CN, C$1.69). As for The Real Shark Hunt, the free
speculation amid the depravity and decadence of this year's Indaba
carnival was that the people who know the most about that story are
likely to be Glencore's Ivan Glasenberg and Lloyd Pengilly of JP Morgan
Cazenove.
Then there is Moïse Katumbi Chapwe, governor of Katanga Province, but his is one of many stories for another day.
| Selected DRC/Zambia copper miners | |
|
Stock
|
From
|
Value
|
|
price
|
high*
|
US$bn
|
| First Quantum |
C$75.43
|
-33.9%
|
5.12
|
| Equinox |
C$4.65
|
-33.6%
|
2.62
|
| Katanga Mining |
C$13.02
|
-53.6%
|
2.57
|
| Nikanor |
£3.99
|
-36.6%
|
1.10
|
| Camec |
£0.45
|
-44.2%
|
0.99
|
| Metorex |
R19.66
|
-35.3%
|
0.93
|
| Anvil |
C$12.70
|
-37.5%
|
0.90
|
| Teal |
C$4.75
|
-22.1%
|
0.26
|
| Copper Resources |
£1.87
|
-0.5%
|
0.22
|
| ZCI |
R11.35
|
-60.8%
|
0.19
|
| Mwana Africa |
£0.36
|
-56.9%
|
0.18
|
| African Copper |
£0.53
|
-47.5%
|
0.14
|
| Zambezi Resources |
£0.15
|
-50.0%
|
0.05
|
| Africo |
C$1.69
|
-64.4%
|
0.05
|
| African Eagle |
£0.10
|
-40.6%
|
0.03
|
| Simberi |
C$0.06
|
-45.5%
|
0.01
|
|
|
-41.4%
|
|
| Diversified |
|
|
|
| BHP Billiton |
£15.97
|
-15.9%
|
179.46
|
| Freeport-McMoRan |
$85.91
|
-28.5%
|
32.81
|
| Vedanta |
£19.31
|
-20.2%
|
10.90
|
| Lundin |
C$7.93
|
-49.9%
|
3.10
|
* 12-month high
|
|
|
Israel and the Ongoing Holocaust in Congo (Part 1)
by Keith Harmon Snow / February 9th, 2008
Maurice
Templesman is one of the top funders of Barrack Obama and Hillary
Clinton and the Democratic Party. Templesman was the unofficial
ambassador to the Congo (Zaire) for years, but a new Israeli-American
tycoon has replaced him. In the world of bling bling and bling bang,
some things change, some stay the same. The CIA, the MOSSAD, the big
mining companies, the offshore accounts and weapons deals—all hidden by
the Western media. The holocaust in Central Africa has claimed some six
to ten million people in Congo since 1996, with 1500 people dying
daily.1 But while the Africans are the victims of perpetual Holocaust,
the persecutors hide behind history, complaining that they are the
persecuted, or pretending they are the saviors. Who is responsible?
For
Israeli-American Dan Gertler, business in blood drenched Congo is not
merely business, it is a quest for the Holy Grail. Young Dan Gertler
goes nowhere—does nothing—without the spiritual guidance of
Brooklyn-born Rabbi Chaim Yaakov Leibovitch, a personal friend of
Condoleeza Rice.2 Gertler and Leibovitch are two of the principals
behind a diamond mining company, Emaxon Finance Corporation, involved in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Gertler and gang won the
majority rights to the diamonds from the state mining company, Société
Minière de Bakwange, MIBA, found near the government-controlled town of
Mbuji-Mayi, the rough diamond capital of the world.
Emaxon Finance
Corp. has apparently out-maneuvered diamond competitors, especially the
big rivals Energem and De Beers. Energem is one of the many shady mining
companies connected to Anthony Teixeira, a Portuguese born businessman
now residing in South Africa whose daughter married Congolese warlord
Jean-Pierre Bemba. The warlord’s deadly battle in Congo in March 2007
was a bid between rival agents—Jean-Pierre Bemba and Joseph Kabila—to be
the black gatekeeper for the mining cartels run by dynastic families
like Templesman, Oppenheimer, Mendell, Forrest, Blattner, Hertzov,
Gertler and Steinmetz, and for companies like NIKANOR, whose stock
prices rose early in July 2006 in expectation of a July 30th “win” for
Joseph Kabila.3 Africa Confidential called President Kabila’s 2003 visit
to the Bush White House a “coup” for the Israeli diamond magnates Dan
Gertler and Beny Steinmetz.
Canadian-based
Energem, formerly DiamondWorks, is owned by British mercenary Tony
Buckingham and its director/shareholders include Mario and Tony
Teixeira, J.P. Morgan, and Gertler’s partner Israeli-American Beny
Steinmetz (50%).4 Through subsidiary Branch Energy, the
Energem-DiamondWorks gang has perpetuated war in 11 African countries.5
In December 2007, Energem re-launched itself on the London Stock Market
with the newly laundered image of a renewable energy company. Regarding
diamonds, it said only it “had decided to give up exploration rights in
the Central African Republic.”6 The Energem spokesman explained that
Tony Teixeira “had a clean bill of health” etc., etc. Of course, Energem
“quit” the C.A.R. because Jean-Pierre Bemba marched his troops into
C.A.R., where they raped and pillaged widely.7 Energem is still
operating in Congo, but Dan Gertler is the new, unofficial ambassador to
the Congo for the George W. Bush gang.
Gertler and
partners like Beny and Danny Steinmetz, Nir Livnat, Chaim Leibovitz and
Yaakov Neeman run a hornet’s nest of companies involved in African
hotspots, including: Dan Gertler International (DGI), Steinmetz Global
Resources, International Diamond Industries, NIKANOR and Global
Enterprises Corporate.
“Dan Gertler is
‘the new kid on the block,’” writes Yossi Melman in Israel’s Haaretz
news. “Bold, sophisticated, brutal, he is an adventurer with a short
fuse.” Haaratz confirmed that Dan Gertler owns a complex network of
interconnected companies, often registered in offshore tax havens and
involved in India, Russia, Belgium and the United States, and that Dan
Gertler is looking to God for guidance.8
THOU SHALT NOT STEAL
“In the diamond
industry,” Melman wrote, “Gertler is considered something of an odd
bird. He maintains few ties with the other merchants and is not very
sociable… Alongside his business affairs, most of his energy is
channeled into matters of faith. He is a donor to religious institutions
and from time to time makes a pilgrimage to the rabbi he most admires,
Rabbi David Abuhatzeira, from Nahariya, in order to consult with him and
receive his blessing. Gertler is surrounded mostly by religious people
and laces his speech liberally with praise to God.”8
In 2003,
Condoleeza Rice, then Assistant to President Bush for National Security
Affairs, introduced Dan Gertler and Chaim Leibovitch to U.S. official
Jendayi Frazer, a Harvard Kennedy School affiliate and former National
Security Council agent focused on Africa. On December 6, 2006, Frazer,
then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was one of seven
special Bush delegates sent to the inauguration of Congo’s newly
installed President Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa.9
When Dan
Gertler and Chaim Leibovitch and their friends visit the luxury Gertler
villa in Lumumbashi, the capital of Katanga, Congo’s large southern
province, their kosher meals arrive by private plane from Kinshasa. The
special executive jet that flies their kosher meals a few hundred miles
over the roadless Congo costs some $US 23,000 per trip.10
The average
income for Congolese citizens each year—if they survive it—is about $95.
Shootings at mining facilities and diamond mines are common, land is
stolen from Congolese people, strikes are crushed by security forces
that companies are partnered with, and black overseers of state terror
routinely arrest and torture any vocal opposition—and sometimes
disappear them—in support of white bosses. The Société Minière de
Bakwange—MIBA— and the diamond fields of Mbuji-Mayi in Congo have a long
history of bloodshed backed by Western powers, including Israel, from
the beginning.11 Amnesty International points out that not a single
state agent has ever been prosecuted for the extrajudicial executions of
suspected “illegal” miners in Mbuji-Mayi.12
After a century
of exploitation and slavery, we find MIBA consistently withholding
payment of salaries to starving Congolese laborers and middle managers
for months at a time. April and May 2007 saw strikes and protests
leading to the Kabila government’s arbitrary arrest, detention and
torture of trade union organizers like Leon Ngoy Bululu; police have
also shot protestors.13 So-called ‘illegal’ diamond
workers—disenfranchised local Congolese people forced into “criminal”
activities to survive—were summarily executed on MIBA concessions in
Mbuji-Mayi. MIBA security guards have also been sniping unemployed
diamond miners.14
Meanwhile, Dan
Gertler’s kosher meals depart Kinshasa, the capital of the big Congo,
through the arrangements of Rabbi Chlomo Bentolila, high priest of the
Chabad of Central Africa. Rabbi Chlomo Bentolila has been a Kinshasa
Rabbi since 1991, and he was a spiritual force who survived the
terrorism of the old dinosaur, Mobutu Sese Seko, the way most elites
did: by working with him. Rabbi Bentolila is a member of the Chabad
Lubavitch Global Emissary Network, headquartered in Brooklyn, New York,
and his wife Miriam is the sister of Rabbi Mena’hem Hadad, a high priest
in Brussels.15
“Kosher does
not mean that a Rabbi blesses the food,” Rabbi Betolila corrected me,
“but rather that the food was supervised by a Rabbinical Thora [sic]
authority who sees that the ingredients were in accordance with the laws
of Kashrut expressed in the Bible (Leviticus and Deuteronomy).”16
Dan Gertler
often flies people into Congo, on his private jet, for sacred Jewish
rituals. For the Bar Mitsvah of Rabbi Chlomo Bentolila’s son Binyamin
Avrahim in June 2005, guests included eminent Rabbis, Hassidic singer
Yoni Shlomo and special orchestra Yossef Brami, all arriving in “special
flights” from Israel, New York and Brussels. The reception was held at
the luxurious and exclusive Memling Hotel. Joseph Kabila sent a sizeable
delegation but did not attend: his closest advisers provided a blessing
on his behalf.17
The Gertler,
Steinmetz and Templesman interests are advanced in part through the
support of the Committee of the Jewish Community of Kinshasa—le Comité
de la Communauté Israélite—that is tightly coordinated with the power
structure in Kinshasa to exert influence and assure control of
Israeli-Belgian-Anglo-American interests over the geopolitical arena.
From June
26-30, 2007, the Communaute Israelite de Kinshasa received a visit from
the Israeli Ambassador Yaakov Revah, director of the Africa Department
of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Revah also flew to
Lumumbashi for meetings with Dan Gertler and his agents, including
Moishe (Moses) Katumbi, the Governor of Katanga, and they most likely
enjoyed a lovely, $23,000 kosher meal sent from the Chabad in
Kinshasa.18 The Communaute Israelite de Kinshasa maintains very intimate
political relations with President Joseph Kabila’s PPRD party, the
People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy. On March 1, 2006, in a
formal ceremony, the President of the Communaute Israelite de Kinshasa,
Ashlan Piha, was awarded the Congo’s Medal of Civil Merit.
THOU SHALT NOT COVET
Before his
assassination on January 16, 2001, Laurent Desire Kabila—the President
of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—made a deal with the Gertler
gang that would play out in favor of the current President Joseph Kabila
and, it seems, be a central factor in relation to both Congo’s ongoing
war and the bloody warlord’s battle in Kinshasa in March 2007.19
Back in 2000,
former Congolese president Laurent Kabila offered a monopoly on
Congolese diamonds, and 88% of the proceeds, to Gertler’s International
Diamond Industries (IDI) in exchange for Israeli military assistance to
his new government.20 Top Congolese military officials apparently flew
to Israel in 2000 to negotiate the deal. Gertler pledged military
assistance to President Laurent Kabila through top Israeli officials.21
The original
Gertler-Kabila deal fell through after Laurent Kabila was assassinated
for not cooperating with the Great White Fathers of industry (January
2001), but Gertler and Leibovitch and their disciples formed another
company, Dan Gertler International, and advanced their Congo plan.22 By
2002 Gertler’s company was the leading exporter of Congolese gems,
controlling a diamond mining franchise worth about $US 1 billion
annually.23
In 2003, the
mighty Congolese diamond parastatal Societe Miniere De Bakwanga
(MIBA)—which has been forever controlled by the Great White Fathers in
Belgium, Israel and America—signed an exclusive contract with Gertler’s
startup company, Emaxon Finance International. The deal involved
Israeli’s Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export Organization
(SIBAT), and high-level Israeli defense and intelligence officials.
Gertler and his buddies reportedly bribed Congolese officials and
Angolan generals who, on and off, have commanded Angolan Army troops
protecting Kinshasa, Congo’s capital.21,24
Security for
mining operations in Congo is provided by exclusive security companies
like Overseas Security Services (OSS) one of the many DRC interests of
Belgian billionaire tycoon Philippe de Moerloose. A member of the
Kinshasa elite, de Moerloose supplies jets and other presidential toys
to DRC President Kabila. In 2006, President Joseph Kabila’s campaign
helicopter was at the centre of a legal battle involving Philippe de
Moerloose.25 De Moerloose’s companies operated in Mobutu’s Zaire from at
least 1991, backing state terrorism and Western corporate plunder that
was rendered invisible by the Western media. De Moerloose is also an
adviser to European Union (EU) Commissioner—and diamantaire—Louis
Michel.
Dan Gertler and
Philippe de Moerloose were, reportedly, the only two white men who
attended the wedding of Joseph Kabila and the two clearly share
interests in “security” provided by OSS at MIBA and elsewhere in Congo.
The April 2003 secret agreement signed between the Gertler/Steinmetz
company Emaxon Finance and the Kabila government involved MIBA and two
de Moerloose companies, OSS-Congo and Demimpex, and other firms.
Overseas
Security Services (OSS) operations are apparently grounded in the
experience of top expatriate security operatives formerly involved with
the biggest security firm in Mobutu’s Zaire.26 According to OSS public
relations materials, “these persons have a not unimportant experience in
the safety of this country.”26 Providing mine security, body-guard and
protection services, OSS operates in Burundi, Ivory Coast, Rwanda,
Dubai, South Africa, Republic of Congo (Brazzavile) and Belgium, placing
them in cahoots with all sides warring and plundering eastern Congo
today.27
Emaxon Finance
International is a real gem, one of these octopuses of mining tangled up
with interlocking companies and subsidiaries based in specious
geographical offshore “tax havens” that work to shield from prosecution
people who are responsible for money laundering, weapons and drugs
operations, assassinations and other terrorism.
NIKANOR is
registered as an Isle of Man (UK) company, an offshore tax haven that
helps to conceal criminal activities and maximize profits. NIKANOR
directors include Dan Kurtzer, former U.S. ambassador to Israel
(2001-2005) and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research under Madeleine Albright. NIKANOR partners
include Mende and Moshe Gertner [sic], Israeli property tycoons with
vast holdings in London who control 22 percent of NIKANOR. Another
partner is Israeli-born Nir Livnat, managing director of
Johannesburg-based Ascot Diamonds, a member of the Steinmetz Group of
Diamond Companies, and a principal involved in numerous U.S.-based
businesses from Miami to New York.28
THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS
Back in 2001,
when the Gertler enterprises surfaced in dirty diamond deals, public
relations was handled by Lior Chorev, the “Special Strategic and
Communications Consultant” to International Diamond Industries (IDI),
and Chorev continued in this role to support Dan Gertler businesses.29
Today, Lior Chorev is partnered with the brothers Yuval and Eyal Arad as
director-owners of the Israeli marketing and public relations firm,
ARAD Communications.30
“We do work for
Mr. Gertler on some of his business issues,” said Lior Chorev.31 ARAD’s
many clients include Dan Gertler companies, Los Angeles-based Coral
Diamonds and an Israeli aeronautics weaponry manufacturer producing
Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles (UAVs)—robotic weapons and intelligence
platforms like those being used against the people of Congo today.32 As a
political strategist, Lior Chorev has worked for Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon and current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.33 He has also
participated in Israel-NATO defense planning conferences.34
Dan Gertler is
close to Israeli politicians, especially Avigdor Lieberman, head of the
right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party, and he is very close to diamantaire
Beny Steinmetz, a good friend of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Gertler’s
inseperable friend, Chaim Leibovitz, is also very close to Lieberman,
and was “a regular fixture” in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s
offices.35
Beny Steinmetz
is considered to be one of the richest billionaires in Israel. The
Steinmetz Group, controlled with his brother Daniel, is one of the
biggest clients of the de Beers diamond syndicate. Steinmetz is also
involved in an Israeli real estate group that purchased the assets of
the British Haslemere real estate company for $1.46 billion. Steinmetz’s
real estate partners include the billionaire Israeli investors David
and Simon Reuben, and the Saudi Arabian Olayan Group, an investment
company that is deeply connected with Bechtel Corporation.36 The
Steinmetz web site map of operations hides their involvement in war-torn
Congo.37
Seems Dan
Gertler’s land grabs and exclusion in Congo have a lot in common with
the current crimes against humanity being committed by Israel through
its illegal partition in the Middle East. On January 3, 2008, the
Jerusalem Post reported that Lior Chorev was an integral part of past
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s advisers, and he was recently quoted to
say that even though Sharon did not get to finalize Israel’s final
borders (he suffered a debilitating stroke in 2006), the route of the
security fence—which he decided—would ultimately serve as the basis for
the border and as Sharon’s lasting legacy.38
“He felt he
needed to set the border because he didn’t trust the younger
generations,” Chorev was quoted to say. “He knew the fence route by
heart and the reason for every stretch of land being on one side or the
other.”38
In 2003, the
U.N. Panel of Experts on war in Congo revealed that Emaxon Finance
International is controlled by Israeli diamond traders Chaim Leibovitz
and Dan Gertler.39 Emaxon lists as its address an office in Montreal,
Canada, but Emaxon’s majority shareholder is listed as FTS Worldwide, a
nebulous global corporation whose business address is that of a firm of
lawyers, Mossack Fonseca & Company, in Panama City. FTS Worldwide is
registered with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission to lawyer Andre
Zolty of Geneva Switzerland. A copy of the MIBA-Emaxon contract was
signed on 13 April 2003 by Israeli-Americans Yaakov Neeman and Chaim
Leibovitz.40
Yaakov Neeman
is a founding partner of Herzog, Fox and Neeman, Tel Aviv, one of
Israel’s top law firms, and he has held Israeli government cabinet and
ministerial positions.41 Neeman is on the Advisory Board of Markstone
Capital Group, a very influential group of investment bankers, with Eli
Hurvitz. On the board of Israel’s Teva Pharmaceutical Industries with
Eli Hurvitz is Northrup-Grumman director Philip Frost.42 Both Philip
Frost and Maurice Templesman are top-level councilors for the American
Stock Exchange. Eli Hurvitz sat on the International Advisory Counsel of
Harvard University’s Belfer Center, 2002-2005, during the period when
the Belfer Center and their intelligence operative Robert Rotberg
formalized the “Kimberley Process” to officially whitewash blood
diamonds.43 Yakov Neeman is also a governor of the World Zionist
Organization and Jewish Agency for Israel.
One of the main
objectives of the Kimberley Process, and the Harvard Belfer Center’s
role, was to protect the South African Oppenheimer and De Beers diamond
cartels and their leading buyers and agents like Maurice Templesman and
Beny Steinmetz.44 Added to those diamond industry firms whitewashed by
the Kimberley Process are all the Zionist diamond dealers and cartels
that have risen like a phoenix out of the ashes of the Holocaust.
The
Israeli-American enterprises of the Gertler/Steinmetz gang have
proliferated and today are major shareholders or owners of diamond
concessions in Congo’s Kasai province and copperbelt concessions in
Katanga. The copperbelt is the big money in Congo. Copper prices
recently hit an all time high due to monopoly control by corporations
and new applications in transportation, aerospace and weaponry. Cobalt
is used in dye and paint processes for manufacturing. More importantly,
it is elemental to superalloys used for tank armor, spacecraft,
turbines, ship hulls, ship hulls, blast furnaces, refineries, petroleum
drilling rigs, nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. Like coltan, or
columbium-tantalite, cobalt is also used in cell phone batteries. The
Katanga copperbelt is also rich in germanium, a rare metal used in
optical fibers, infrared lenses and telecommunication satellites.45
The entire
military-industrial-prisons complex revolves around minerals like
cobalt, niobium and heterogenite (cobalt oxide), yet the truth about
what happens to African people in lands taken over by these mining
companies is hidden by the corporate media. More and more land is being
stolen, more and more atrocities committed, with less and less
transparency, and less and less accountability, and fewer and fewer
voices for the voiceless. And, as usual, there are always a lot of empty
promises.
THOUGH SHALT HAVE NO OTHER GODS
Over the past
fifty years, elite Israeli nationals have perpetrated conflict and
injustice in Africa, fueled by and for minerals. Operatives associated
with the Israeli military or intelligence services—the Mossad—maintain
strategic criminal syndicates in competition and in partnership with
other syndicates involving men like Philippe De Moerloose, Louis Michel,
Viscount Etienne Davignon, John Bredenkamp and Tony Buckingham.
Israeli trained
shock troops became Mobutu’s bodyguards, with Mossad advisers.
According to a report by the American Jewish Committee: after 1980
“Mossad agents, military emissaries, and a small group of private
businessmen… replaced diplomats as Israel’s main interlocutors with
African leaders and political (mainly opposition) groups.” The report
cites rising involvement of private defense and security interests,
especially in Angola, DRC and Central Africa Republic, since 1992.46
Israeli
operatives and “businessmen” appear everywhere there is egregious
suffering and dispossession. Dan Gertler’s forays into the bloody world
of diamonds involve Israeli arms dealers Yair Klein, who is reportedly
wanted by the U.S. for training Medellin drug-cartel militias in
Colombia, and Dov Katz.47 Klein was convicted by Israel (1991) for his
involvement with groups that targeted and assassinated Colombian
politicians, journalists, and police. Jailed in Sierra Leone in 1999,
Klein was a field representative for Gertler in war-torn Sierra Leone
and Liberia. Gertler also mingles with the Russian Military Brotherhood,
a group of “retired Russian generals whom Gertler describes as good
friends.”48,49
Retired Israeli
Defense Forces Colonel Yair Klein reportedly organized arms for
diamonds networks in Sierra Leone and Liberia after President Charles
Taylor was deposed. In 1999, Klein was arrested in Sierra Leone on
charges of smuggling arms to the rebel Revolutionary United Front.50 The
U.N. also documented collaborations between Sierra Leone’ rebels and
Lazare Kaplan agent Damian Gagnon; Lazare Kaplan International is one of
the organized crime syndicates of Jewish American Maurice Templesman.51
The Steinmetz
Group of companies are also involved in the bloody diamond fields of
Sierra Leone, along with Energem (formerly DiamondWorks), the company
described above that is connected to the white mercenaries depicted in
Hollywood’s Blood Diamond propaganda film.52 In December 2007, local
people in Sierra Leone struggling to gain the smallest livelihood from
their own resources were shot by police during peaceful protests against
the Steinmetz-controlled Koidu Holdings site. It’s the same old local
people’s story happening everywhere. These were people from communities
driven off their own land by mining companies that promised the world,
cajoled the trusting people, and gave nothing after. The Steinmetz gang
called in the local paramilitary, a curfew was imposed and people were
shot; the police, as usual, falsely claimed that protesters were
armed.53
Like most
mining mafias in Africa, the Israeli octopus—organized crime syndicates,
offshore subsidiaries, interlocking directorships and affiliated
mercenaries—has gripped the very heart of Congo like an octopus grips
and stuns its prey. Mining regulates the pulse of Congo, and foreign
mining companies with their black sell-out agents are sucking the blood
out of the people and the wealth out of the land.
THOU SHALT NOT KILL
Beyond the
intriguing Jewish rivalry for diamonds in the heart of darkness, this
tale takes a chilling turn with the involvement of certain German firms
and New York City lawyers. NIKANOR, another Gertler/Steinmetz company of
dubious origins operating in DRC, has a subcontract with the notorious
ThyssenKrupp conglomerate, a company comprised of two former Nazi
weapons manufacturers linked to the New York law firm of Sullivan and
Cromwell, to Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., Lehman Brothers, Chase
Manhattan Bank, J.P. Morgan, DuPont and IBM, in the great Nazi-American
money plot.54
These companies
were all behind the Jewish Holocaust. The infamous German Krupp firm is
the industrial corporation that collaborated with former CIA director
Allen Dulles and former U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
Clients of the Dulles brothers’ law firm Sullivan and Cromwell included
Adolph Hitler.54 Ted Terry, one of the senior counselors of the law firm
Sullivan and Cromwell today, is also a director of a philanthropy
called the Harold K. Hochschild (HKH) Foundation, named for the mining
magnate behind AMAX, a company operating in the copperbelt in Zambia,
but whose parent company, Phelps Dodge, operates in Katanga, Congo.
Harold K. Hochschild was close to the CIA, and he appears to have backed
the Katanga succession in the 1960’s just as Dan Gertler in recent
years backed the reorganization of power in Congo by force. Sullivan and
Cromwell was also the law firm for AMAX. 55,56
Brown Brothers
Harriman & Company (BBH) was the primary Wall Street connection for
German companies and the U.S. financial interests of Fritz Thyssen, an
early financial backer of the Nazi party. BBH bought and shipped
millions of dollars of gold, steel, fuel, coal, and U.S. treasury bonds
to Germany. These were used to build Hitler’s war machine, and the ties
proliferated even after the Nazi concentration camps began churning out
skeletons. The horrors of the concentration camps at Auschwitz, Birkenau
and Buckenwald became public knowledge long before they became public
outrage. It is the same story for Congo.
A PRAYER FOR THE DEAD
There are no
records or statistics of the numbers of people brutalized or killed in
the diamond or cobalt mining areas, like Kolwezi, Mbuji Mayi, Tshikapa,
Banalia, or Kananga in DRC, or Ndola in Zambia, and many of the victims
of security abuses will never be known.
When Gertler
and Steinmetz and their buddies came to Congo it was soon clear that
they had to challenge Zimbabwean tycoons John Bredenkamp and Billy
Rautenbach—two cronies of dictator Robert Mugabe involved in pillaging
Congo and Zimbabwe for decades. The United Nations Panel of Experts on
DRC named both men for plundering copper and cobalt from Katanga, and
both deal globally in weapons. Bredenkamp is one of the fifty richest
men in England and he reportedly owns a mansion several doors down from
Margaret Thatcher’s residence in London.
On November 7,
2007 it was reported that Dan Gertler was instrumental in putting
together a deal in which Katanga Mining Ltd. would buy rival NIKANOR for
$2.1 billion and merge their adjacent mine projects in Congo to form
the world’s largest cobalt company. Also announced was a joint venture
between the Central African Mining & Exploration Company (CAMEC) and
another Gertler-controlled firm called Prairie International Limited.
The
CAMEC/Prairie joint venture will exploit DRC’s Luita copper processing
facility, develop the Mukondo Mountain cobalt mine—called the world’s
richest cobalt mine—and work on “other” exploration properties. Prairie
is majority owned by the family of Dan Gertler. CAMEC is connected to
Zimbabwean/South African/British tycoon Billy Rautenbach.57 The DRC
government effectively banned controversial Zimbabwean businessman Billy
Rautenbach from the country by declaring him persona non grata in July
2007, but this doesn’t seem to stop him from getting what he wants.
Rautenbach is also wanted in South Africa on 300 charges of fraud,
corruption and theft.
Rautenbach is a
former motor car rally driver who controls a business empire in
Southern and Central Africa through a British Virgin Islands company
called Ridgepoint Overseas Development Limited. In 1998, the short-lived
President of Congo, Laurent Kabila, named Rautenbach the managing
director of La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines), one of
Africa’s biggest cobalt mines, the Katanga properties of the Union
Miniere de Haut Katanga formerly developed by the Belgian colonial
government. Rautenbach today is one of the Africa’s largest exporters of
heterogenite (cobalt ore) from the DRC through his Congo Cobalt Company
(CoCoCo), but he also has shares in two other lucrative DRC mining
firms—Boss and Mukondo—which reportedly earn over US$100 million a
month.58
While there has
been a lot of Western media fanfare over the Kabila governments’
supposed “independent” review of mining contracts, little substantive
change can be expected.59 Structural factors exploit the Congolese
people and lands and benefit white businessmen, arms dealers, bankers,
and their embraceable black agents. Big business benefits from
perception management articles well-placed in media to give the
impression that the international system is just, that there are
watchdogs, checks and balances.
However, while
the DRC and the World Bank present a propaganda front about their
ostensible attention to mining reform and the new mining code,
NIKANOR—Mining Journal reports—“is in the advantageous position of
having entered into a post mining-code contract, ‘which makes us
[NIKANOR] relatively comfortable’”60 In other words, the mining review
is a sham, it may force some changes, but it will be cosmetic at best.
Dan Gertler and
the Steinmetz Group’s partner Jewish-American Nir Livnat is also a
director of Anglovaal Mining with Rick and Brian Menell and Basil Hersov
of the South African Menell and Hersov dynasties.61 Hersov has been
named as a beneficiary of fraud and racketeering involving British BAE
Systems weapons deals with shady offshore companies.62
The octopus of
South African connections is a story in itself, with links to top
officials from Britain to Canada, like Canadian Senator J. Trevor Eyton,
and offshore mining companies involved in all the big money (diamonds,
gold, petroleum, cobalt) and big corporations with interlocking
directorships: Coca Cola, Nestlé, General Motors, and the Bush-connected
Barrick Gold Corporation. Barrick, of course, is partnered up with the
Oppenheimer/De Beers firm Anglo-American Corporation at six sites in
Africa, including Congo.
Rick Menell is a
director of Bateman Engineering—owned by Benny Steinmetz—the junior
partner of the NIKANOR projects in Katanga. Britain’s Earl of Balfour is
a director of both Bateman and NIKANOR. Menell is also the director of
Teal Exploration and Mining, whose directors include Joaquim Chissano,
former President of Mozambique; Murray Hitzman, a Clinton administration
official with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(1994-1996); Hannes Meyer, who worked with Anglo-Gold Ashanti in Congo,
1999-2006, when militias in Ituri were funded to get the gold out. Teal
Exploration also has ties to Anvil Mining and Anglo-American
Corporation.63
Brian Menell,
Nir Livnat’s associate on the board of Anglovaal, is on the board of
Energem (formerly DiamondWorks) with Tony and Mario Teixeira. The Livnat
connection ties Teixeira into networks that have supported both Joseph
Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba in Congo’s bloody wars. Energem is also
involved in the trans-Uganda-Kenya pipeline, along with Nexant, a
subsidiary of the deep intelligence and defense insider Bechtel
Corporation.64
Brian Menell is
also on the board of First Africa Oil, which operates in seven African
countries, and First Africa Oil director John Bentley is a director of
Osprey Oil and Gas, whose directors include Carol Bell, a director of
the Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan Bank. Bentley is also on the board of
Adastra Minerals—formerly America Mineral Fields (AMF, AMFI, AMX), a
company based in 1995 in Hope, Arkansas—and set up by Robert Friedland
and Max and Jean-Raymond Boulle, notable “friends of Bill” Clinton.
Since 1995, American Mineral Fields has been involved in Brazil, Russia,
Norway, Zambia, Angola and the DRC. A criminal backer of the war in
DRC, Jean-Raymond Boulle, who holds 36.4 % of the company stock, was the
former General Director of De Beers in Zaire, part of the Templesman
alliance of terrorism under the Mobutu regime.65,66
The
Gertler/Steinmetz interests apparently curry huge favors with Congo’s
number two most powerful man, Augustine Katumba Mwanke, one of Joseph
Kabila’s closest allies and financiers, former Governor of Katanga
(1998-2001) and director of Australia’s Anvil Mining. The UN Panel of
Experts (2002) cited Mwanke for illegal arms deals and plunder of Congo:
Mwanke negotiated arms purchases through Belgian banks and the DRC
mining company MIBA.67 Reportedly, Mwanke personally clears $US
1,000,000 a day through his interests in Katanga mining deals.68
Anvil Mining
has been involved in massacres in DRC.69 Anvil directors include former
U.S. Ambassador Kenneth L. Brown, who served at U.S. embassies in
Brussels, Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville and South Africa. Brown was Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (1987-1989) under George
Schultz and George H.W. Bush and Director of Central African Affairs
(1980-1981). The former top internal intelligence and security chief of
the United Nations Observer’s Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) has been worked for Anvil mining in Katanga since 2006.70
THOU SHALT NOT RAPE AND PLUNDER
Gertler/Steinmetz
interests have also been jostling for copper and cobalt concessions
with Kinross-Forrest Group. Gertler has bought up or invested heavily in
companies just to close them down. George Forrest also made the UN hit
list of Congo’s looters and Forrest and his three sons helped bankroll
Joseph Kabila’s 2006 election “victory”.71 George Forrest’s daughter is
reportedly married to the son of Louis Michel. Malta and George Forrest
are controlling directors in Katanga Mining Limited.
Born as
Entreprise Générale Malta Forrest, the Belgian Forrest interests have
been pillars of exploitation in Congo since at least 1922, when they
launched mining operations in Katanga. Forrest’s Katanga Mining
directors include: three Canadians; Congo’s Jean-Claude Masangu Mulongo,
a former Governor of DRC and high official at the IMF and World Bank;
and the current Governor of the Central Bank of DRC. The Forrest dynasty
has munitions factories in Belgium and Kenya, and has partnered with
OM-Group, in Ohio [USA], dealing in Congo’s cobalt and coltan. Forrest
International also operates in Europe, Burundi—involving him on both
sides of Congo’s bloody war—and the Middle East.72 Forrest interests in
DRC include aviation, foods, plantations, construction, logging, copper
and cobalt mining. Forrest companies are enmeshed in the coltan plunder
in eastern Congo.
Katanga is the
world’s richest mining metropolis, part of the vast copper belt that
stretches across northern Zambia and southern Congo—and the home to
unprecedented human misery due to state orchestrated repression and
communities overrun with toxic mining, tuberculosis, cancers, immune
disorders, racial discrimination and slavery. The Zambian copperbelt
concessions over the border involve many of the same companies and
interests mentioned above, and others.73
Workers and
communities in and around these mines suffer all the standard treatable
maladies (typhoid, malaria, tetanus, polio, malnutrition) as well.
However, such stories are off the agenda for the North American,
European, Japanese, Australian and Israeli media corporations providing
the mainstay of English language indoctrination meant to instill racial
superiority and a vast ignorance and obliviousness that leaves westerns
populations shaking their heads and wringing their hands and clicking
their tongues, while all the while wondering “what is to be done?” It
does not cross people’s minds that their own hands are dirty, that their
own consciousness has been falsified, as all the raw materials from
Congo enrich the lives of people in the United States, Canada, Europe
and Israel.
The immediate
capital investment required for just one Gertler project in Katanga—the
Komoto Oliveira Virgule (KOV) project—is reportedly $US 1.8 billion
dollars, income to kick start billions of dollars of unused equipment
mothballed in the middle Mobutu era. There are rumors that Bechtel is
involved, but the KOV project involves ThyssenKrupp AG as a minor
player.74
The Krupp firm
is one of several German firms involved in the plunder in eastern Congo,
exploitation which involves the DeutscheGesellschaft für technische
Zusammenarbeit—GTZ—a “German technological cooperation agency” whose
Supervisory Board has representatives of four Federal [German]
Ministries.75 Krupp industries use coltan and cobalt for superalloys.76
Dr.-Ing. Ekkehard D. Schultz, a ThyssenKrupp director, is also a
director of Bayer AG, the Germany firm whose subsidiary H.C. Starck was
named for its involvement in the ongoing illegal plunder of coltan and
cassiterite (tin) in eastern Congo. NIKANOR director Jay Pomrenze is
also a consultant for the Deutsche Bank.77 Certain German and U.S. firms
benefit from the military occupation of Rwandan-backed warlord Laurent
Nkunda in North Kivu, DRC, where Nkunda controls the Lueshe niobium mine
“owned” by Gesellschaft fuer Elektrometallurgie GmbH, a subsidiary of
New York-based Mettalurg Group.78,79
HONOR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER
Dan Gertler’s
grandfather, Moshe Schnitzer (d. November 2007), was known in Israel as
“Mr. Diamond;” in youth he joined the pre-state underground organization
Etzel (Irgoun), an Israeli military cell self-defined as an
“untra-nationationalist Jewish militia,” but one that committed acts of
terrorism in service to the Israeli cause.8 Moshe Schnitzer assumed a
major role in the Africa-Israeli diamond trade in the 1950’s in a
partnership business called Schnitzer-Greenstein. Schnitzer later
founded the Israel Diamond Exchange in Tel Aviv in 1960, which today
brings Israel $14 billion annually in blood business, and is the
country’s second-largest industry, but Israel’s top export. King Leopold
III of Belgium decorated Schnitzer in recognition of his activities
favoring the close relationship of Belgium, Israel and the DeBeers
diamond cartels, and Schnitzer was also President of the Harry
Oppenheimer Diamond Museum in Israel.80
The diamond
jewelry trade in the United States is more than $30 billion annually,
and 99%—everything that is not synthetic or artificial diamonds—involves
blood diamonds and the above organized crime syndicates. Israel buys
more than 50% of the world’s rough diamonds, and the U.S. buys
two-thirds of these. The diamond factories are located in Nethanya,
Petach Tikvah, Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Jerusalem, and other cities around
the country, but most of the offices were in Tel Aviv in the financial
district on Ahad Ha’am Street.81 Dan Gertler’s father, Asher Gertler,
and his uncle, Shmuel Schnitzer, manage the original family business,
and Shmuel is Vice-Chairman of the Belgian-based World Diamond
Council—the entity that spends more money promoting the false image of
“conflict-free” diamonds than it does helping any of the people
dispossessed or brutalized by the diamond industry.48
On August 16,
2007, Rabbi Bentolila in Kinshasa received a communication asking: “What
does the Torah say about men exploiting other men for vast profits
while other men are starving and dying all around them? Is there some
hierarchy to the Torah that suggests, for example, that black people or
Africans are lesser beings, and therefore not to be a concern where
profound profits are being made?”
There was no
reply from Rabbi Bentolila, he was apparently busy readying for another
Bar Mitsvah in Belgium. Unfortunately for Dan Gertler and his spiritual
advisers, the Torah says that a Jew can keep a slave, but a Jew kept as a
slave must be redeemed, and that—an empty, foolish justification for
exploiting innocent people—is how religion falsifies spirituality.
Keith Harmon
Snow is an independent human rights investigator and war correspondent
who worked with Survivors Rights International (2005-2006), Genocide
Watch (2005-2006) and the United Nations (2006) to document and expose
genocide and crimes against humanity in Sudan and Ethiopia. He has
worked in 17 countries in Africa, and he recently worked in Afghanistan.
Posted by CRIMES AND CORRUPTION OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER NEWS mparent7777 Marc Parent CCNWON at 1:40 PM
Global Witness
Congo-Kinshasa: FTSE 100 Mining Company ENRC Must Openly Address Congo Corruption Concerns
11 JUNE 2012
Eurasian
Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC), one of the largest mining groups
listed on London's stock exchange, must publicly address concerns over
corruption risks associated with its rapid acquisition of mining assets
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, said Global Witness in a memo to
ENRC's shareholders published today.
Between
September 2009 and July 2011, ENRC acquired over $2 billion of copper
and cobalt mines in Congo. All of these deals have been acquired in
apparent collusion with the controversial businessman Dan Gertler, who
is a friend of Congolese President Joseph Kabila.
The
deals have seen ENRC make large payments to offshore and secretive
shell companies associated with Mr Gertler. These offshore companies
secretly snapped up prize mining assets at vastly undervalued prices and
quickly sold them on to ENRC - in one case quickly flipping a mine to
ENRC for five times the original value paid. Global Witness is concerned
that corrupt Congolese officials could be among the beneficiaries of
these deals.
"The
nature of these deals raises serious questions about whether corrupt
Congolese officials could be benefitting from Congo's considerable
mineral wealth at the expense of the Congolese people," said Daniel
Balint-Kurti, Campaign Leader for the Democratic Republic of Congo at
Global Witness. "The Congolese state has foregone billions of dollars in
revenues by secretly selling off its assets on the cheap to offshore
companies. With so much at stake in one of the poorest countries on the
planet, ENRC must do the right thing and shed full light on its
dealings."
In
mid-May, Global Witness submitted a detailed list of questions relating
to ENRC's dealings with Mr Gertler to both ENRC and the law firm
Dechert, which acts as the company's anti-corruption auditor. ENRC must
provide full answers to these questions and publish them if it wishes to
end controversy over its activities in Congo. ENRC's chairman, Mehmet
Dalman, has said he expects to have examined the results of an external
audit into corruption allegations by the end of June. In a statement
sent to Global Witness as we were going to press, ENRC said: "ENRC has a
zero-tolerance policy to bribery and corruption, which extends to all
of our business dealings, across all of our operations. The Board has
been working extremely hard to ensure that its policies are adopted and
procedures adhered to, with serious consequences for any breach of these
policies and procedures."
Global
Witness has also submitted questions to Mr Gertler relating to his
business with ENRC. While Mr Gertler has not provided answers to this
list of questions, shortly before publication his spokesman issued a
statement questioning Global Witness's motives and saying we are funded
by Mr Gertler's competitors. The statement also said Global Witness has
rejected an offer of an independent audit of the beneficiaries of
companies that belong to the Fleurette Group, Mr Gertler's holding
company. These statements are incorrect. Global Witness would be happy
to discuss the offer of an audit and has told the Fleurette Group so on a
number of occasions.
Global
Witness's latest briefing on corruption concerns linked to Mr Gertler
comes a month after it called on another FTSE 100 company, Glencore, to
explain its involvement with the businessman. Both Glencore and ENRC own
mining interests in Congo worth billions of dollars, and for both these
companies their assets are tightly wound up with Mr Gertler's
interests.
"ENRC
shareholders should be taking a close look at the corruption risks
being run by their company in Congo," said Balint-Kurti. "ENRC should
cease conducting business with offshore entities whose beneficiaries are
not publicly declared and which pose significant corruption risks. As
shareholders gather for the ENRC AGM, they should be demanding that the
company takes convincing action against corruption and stops conducting
business in such a secretive manner."
ENRC
has defended its record on corruption in Congo.. Mr Gertler and
Glencore have similarly denied any involvement in corruption in Congo,
while also challenging the facts presented by Global Witness. These
views are reflected in greater detail in Global Witness's briefings.
Further
information about Global Witness's investigation into the "secret
sales" scandal can be found at www.globalwitness.org/secretsales.
The
documents available from the Global Witness website include: Global
Witness's memo to ENRC's shareholders, Q&A on ENRC's links to the
"secret sales" scandal, the list of questions sent by Global Witness to
ENRC on 15th May, the list of questions sent by Global Witness to Mr
Gertler's spokesman on 14th May, the statement by Dan Gertler's
spokesman regarding Global Witness on 11th June, the response by ENRC to
Global Witness on 11th June.
The
9th May memo to Glencore's shareholders as well as supporting documents
is also available at www.globalwitness.org/secretsales.
For ENRC's stance on corruption, see its Code of Conduct at http://www.enrc.com/en-GB/Media1/Code-of-Conduct/.
For
recent valuations of some of ENRC's most valuable assets in Congo see
briefing by Renaissance Capital at
http://www.centralasia.rencap.com/download.asp?id=13951.
- Aeolanthus biformifolius De Wild.; a hyperaccumulator of copper from Zaire
- Associations
de mineraux secondaires d'uranium a Shinkolobwe (region du Shaba,
Zaire). Secondary uranium mineral assemblages at Shinkolobwe, Shaba,
Zaire
- Bauxite deposits in the SADC Region
- Copper deposits in marine sediments
- Copper
marketing; the London metal exchange and CIPEC; New directions in
mineral development policies; report of an international workshop held
at Bagauda, near Kano, Nigeria; 8-10 September 1975
- Das
Cu-W-S-System und seine Mineralien sowie ein neues Tungstenitvorkommen
in Kipushi/Katanga. The Cu-W-S system and its minerals as well as a new
tungstenite occurrence in Kipushi, Katanga
- Diamonds in the SADC Region
- Die
zeit- und schichtgebundenen Lagerstaettembildungen des Urans in der
Erdgeschichte. The time and stratigraphic effect in uranium ore
formation in the Earth's history; Beitrage zu Problemen der Zeit- und
Schichtgebundenen Lagerstaettenbildung
- Examen
des oxydes de fer et titane dans l'environnement du gisement de cuivre
de Musoshi (Shaba, republique du Zaire). The iron and titanium oxides in
the environment of the copper deposits of Musoshi, Shaba, Zaire
- Fluid Inclusions and Stratiform Mineralization at Kamoto, Western Katanga
- Geologic
factors in looking for hidden gold deposits; Mineral'nyye paragenezisy i
tektonika rudnykh mestorozhdeniy--Mineral parageneses and tectonics of
ore deposits
- Geological background to the copper-bearing strata of southern Shaba (Zaire)
- Geological background to the copper-bearing strata of southern Shaba (Zaire)
- Geologie et geochimie du gisement de Kipushi, Zaire. The geology and geochemistry of the Kipuchi deposit, Zaire
- Geology and copper deposits of the Musoshi and Kinsenda mines in Replubic of Zaire
- Heavy mineral sand deposits in the SADC Region
- Kamoto (Katanga) et White Pine (Michigan) ; deux gisements stratiformes de cuivre
- Kamoto
(Katanga) et White Pine (Michigan); deux gisements stratiformes de
cuivre. Kamoto (Katanga) and White Pine (Michigan); two stratiform
copper deposits
- La
dolomie stromatolithique "R.S.C." dans les gisements cupriferes
stratiformes du Shaba; Zaire. The stromatolitic dolomite in the
stratiform copper layers of Shaba, Zaire
- La
succession stratigraphique du C.M.N. (ou R.2.3.) au centre de la
sous-province cuprifere shabienne. The stratigraphic succession of the
C.M.N. (or R.2.3) at the center of the Shabian copper-bearing
subprovince
- Le gisement primaire aurifere de Twangitza. The primary gold ore deposit of Twangitza, Kivu, Zaire
- Les
concentrations minerales de la chaine ouest-congolienne et de son
avant-pays. The mineral concentrations of the Western Congo Chain and
its foreland; Resumo das Comunicacoes, Simposios e Conferencias;
Conferencias
- Les formations ferrugineuses de la Tele (Haut-Zaire). The ferruginous formations of Tele, upper Zaire
- Les gisements d'itabirites de la region Luebo-Charlesville (Kasai). Itabirite formations in the Luebo-Charlesville area, Kasai
- Les mines de fer mondiales et la préparation des minerais - Afrique
- Les
sulfures du gisement cuprifere stratiforme de Musoshi, Shaba, Zaire.
The sulfides of the stratiform cupriferous deposit of Musoshi, Shaba,
Zaire
- Lithium;
the element that makes the world go round; Proceedings of the 2nd
'industrial minerals' international congress; held at the Sheraton
Hotel, Munich, on 17-19 May, 1976
- Lixiviation ammoniacale d'un minerai cupro-cobaltifere sulfure. Ammonia leaching of cupro-cobaltiferous sulfide minerals
- Metallogenic aspects of the Shaban Copperbelt, Zaire
- Metallotectes du gisement de Kamoto (Republique du Zaire). "Metallotects" (metallogeny criteria) of the Kamoto deposit, Zaire
- Minerais
cupriferes et roches encaissantes a Musoshi, province du Shaba,
Republique du Zaire. Copper minerals and host rocks at Musoshi, Shaba,
Zaire
- Mineralisations
cupro-cobaltiferes associees aux horizons pyroclastiques situes dans le
faisceau superieur de la serie de Roan, a Shituru, Shaba, Zaire. The
cupro-cobaltiferous mineralizations associated with pyroclastic horizons
in the upper part of Roan series, Shituru, Shaba, Zaire
- Mineralogie du gisement de Kipushi, Shaba, Zaire. The mineralogy of the Kipushi deposit, Shaba, Zaire
- New data about the Kilo-Moto gold deposits (Zaire); I, The district of Mongbwalu
- On the diagenetic formation of ores in sedimentary beds, with special reference to Kamoto, Shaba, Zaire
- Paragenese
des sulfures de cuivre dans les gisements du Shaba (Zaire); I, Kipushi;
II, Kamoto. The paragenesis of the copper sulfides in the Shaba
deposits (Zaire); I, Kipushi; II, Kamoto
- Particularites
stratigraphiques et petrographiques du faisceau inferieur du Groupe des
Mines au centre de l'arc cuprifere shabien. Stratigraphic and
petrographic characteristics of the lower part of the Groupe des Mines
at the center of the Shabian copper-bearing arc
- Rayony
preimushchestvennogo razvitiya mestorozhdeniy olovonosnykh
redkometal'nykh pegmatitov. Tin-bearing areas associated with rare-metal
bearing pegmatites
- Relations
et signification de minerais hematitiques et de couches itabiritiques
dans une serie precambrienne metamorphique. Relationships and
significance of hemetite and itabirite beds in a Precambrian metamorphic
sequence
- Some aspects of the stratiform ore deposits of the Zambian Copperbelt and their genetic significance
- Sources of rare earth element in uranium deposits in Shinkolobwe and Kamoto, DRC
- Stratigraphie
et mineralisations du gisement cuprifere de Kipapila, Shaba, Zaire.
Stratigraphy and mineralization of the copper deposits of Kipapila,
Shaba, Zaire
- Stratigraphie,
tectonique et mineralisations dans l'arc cuprifere du Shaba (republique
du Zaire). Stratigraphy, tectonics and mineralization in the
cupriferous arc of Shaba, Zaire
- Sur
la similitude entre les gisements uraniferes (type Shinkolobwe) et les
gisements cupriferes (type Kamoto) au Shaba, Zaire. The similarity
between the uranium deposits (Shinkolobwe type) and the copper deposits,
(Kamoto type) at Shaba, Zaire
- Tantalum and columbium in Zaire
- The 1:2,000,000 scale mineral occurrences map (1976) of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) revised
- The geological environment of copper deposits in Tanganyika
- The gitology of some Adelaidean stratiform copper occurrences
- The
manganese ore deposit of Kisenge-Kamata-Kapolo (western Katanga, Shaba,
Zaire); geochemical composition of the primary carbonate ore;
Flyuorit-baritovyye, margantsevyye i skarnovyye
mestorozhdeniya--Fluorite-barite, manganese and skarn deposits
- The
Pan African West Congo and Katanga thrust and fold belts and their
foreland domains: similarities and differences in Neoproterozoic basin
evolution and mineralization
- U-Th-Pb systematics of Zaire cubic diamonds.
- Uniform
GIS-compilation (1:100,000) of a geological map of the western half of
the Gecamines concession in the Copperbelt of Katanga, Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Volcanisme
et mineralisations diagenetiques dans le gisement de l'Etoile, Shaba,
Zaire. Volcanism and diagenetic mineralization in the Etoile deposits,
Shaba, Zaire
- Vue d'ensemble sur les gisements auriferes du Haut-Zaire. Overview of upper Zaire gold deposits
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Rebuilding of primary school.
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